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Chapter 1
Introduction
The advent of generalized data outsourcing, epitomized by the cloud computing
paradigm, has brought with it great concerns regarding security and privacy due
to the loss of control that it implies. Traditional solutions, mainly based on
the application of internal policies and standard access control strategies, simply
reduce the problem to a trust issue and can be broken by service providers,
either by accident or intentionally. Protecting outsourced information while at
the same time reducing trust in service providers has become a demanding task.
Cryptographic safeguards are a crucial mechanism towards this goal.
This thesis is devoted to the study of proxy re-encryption (PRE), a cryptographic
primitive that constitutes a practical solution to this problem, from the perspec-
tive of both functionality and eﬃciency. Proxy re-encryption is a type of public-
key encryption that also allows a proxy entity to transform ciphertexts from one
public key to another, without learning anything about the underlying message.
From a functional point of view, proxy re-encryption can be seen as a means
of securely delegating access to encrypted information, representing therefore a
natural candidate to construct cryptographically-enforced access control mecha-
nisms. In addition, this primitive is in itself of great theoretical interest, since
its security definitions have to simultaneously balance the security of ciphertexts
and the possibility of transforming them through re-encryption, which represents
a challenging dichotomy.
The contributions of this thesis follow a transversal approach, ranging from the
very definitions of security models for proxy re-encryption to the specifics of ap-
plications. In the remainder of this chapter, we present the motivation, goals and
contributions of this thesis, as well as the outline of the following chapters.
1
Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Scope
It is a fact that the realization of the cloud computing paradigm has raised great
expectations regarding performance, simplification of business processes, and,
foremost, cost reduction [1]. At the same time, it is also true that these ad-
vancements have introduced new security and privacy risks [2]. Threat scenarios
radically change when moving from resources that are fully controlled by the data
owner to resources administrated by third party entities like public clouds.
Nowadays, the great majority of systems, including those deployed by cloud
providers, base their security on preventing potential attackers from accessing
internal servers and databases, where users’ data is stored. To this end, there is a
great variety of measures, with access control systems and network defense tech-
niques being the most prominent. However, the premise of this approach is that
the attackers should not be able to get inside a predetermined security perimeter,
where the protected assets (in this case, users’ data) reside. The harsh reality is
that, although crucial, these types of measures are often not enough. In addi-
tion to external attackers, which include not only “hackers” but also nation-scale
adversaries, accidental data disclosures and insider attacks are also a menacing
possibility.
Countermeasures to these threats include the establishment of internal security
policies and governance rules, and the reinforcement of access control strategies,
but these simply reduce the situation to a trust problem. That is, in the end,
there are no actual mechanisms that prevent cloud providers from breaking these
measures, either by accident or intentionally. Moreover, in most cases, there is
almost no risk of being discovered accessing users’ information without their con-
sent. An interesting conflict appears in this scenario – users want to go to the
cloud for its benefits, but at the same time, they are unwilling to provide their
data to entities that they do not necessarily trust. The adoption of cloud ser-
vices has been slowed by this dichotomy from the beginning. The introduction
of more advanced security mechanisms that enable users to benefit from cloud
services and still ensure the confidentiality of their information could help re-
duce the trust assumptions in the cloud, and hence, to break the aforementioned
dichotomy.
Therefore, it is necessary to depart from the traditional premise that shapes
current cloud security and to assume that the measures defined above can be
bypassed. A more realistic premise is to assume that the attackers have poten-
tial access to users’ data [3]. Under this assumption, the only plausible solution
is therefore the use of cryptography, so outsourced data is stored in encrypted
form. Thus, when traditional security measures fail, attackers will only obtain en-
2
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crypted data. In a way, the deployed encryption mechanisms become the ultimate
safeguard of data confidentiality.
A critical principle of this solution is to design the system in such a way that
even the provider itself does not have access to the corresponding decryption
key; not doing this would again imply a strong trust assumption on the provider.
However, a naive combination of this principle with traditional encryption prim-
itives, both symmetric and asymmetric, can hinder the proper processing and
sharing of outsourced information and negatively impact the functionality of the
system. Therefore, this design decision requires the use of cryptographic primi-
tives that transcend traditional ones, so data confidentiality can be guaranteed,
but functionality still remain unaﬀected.
1.1.1 The Secure Data Sharing Scenario
We have previously discussed the need for weakening the trust assumptions in
outsourced settings, such as the cloud. To this end, encrypting the data prior
to outsourcing strikes as an essential requirement. At the same time, it is also
necessary that the implemented encryption techniques allow the preservation of
data sharing, which is one of the most basic functionalities that is expected in such
scenarios. We refer generically to this setting as the secure data sharing scenario.
We will later describe several examples of use cases that require secure sharing
in this data outsourcing setting. Note that data sharing is one of the simplest
functionalities that is expected in a setting like this. In fact, there are more
advanced functionalities, such as searching, or even computing, over encrypted
data; yet, the data sharing functionality is very challenging as the distribution
of access rights becomes diﬃcult once the information has been encrypted and
outsourced.
Before continuing, it is necessary to understand which are the roles involved in
the main interactions. In any data sharing scenario (regardless of whether there
is outsourcing or not), there are three main separate roles: data producers, data
owner, and data consumers. The most generic usage relation in this setting is
that multiple data producers generate data which is owned by a data owner, who
in turn can share it with multiple data consumers. An important aspect of this
usage relation is that the data owner and data producers can be separate entities,
not necessarily within the same security domain. This latter characteristic has
great implications when it comes to designing secure, yet scalable, solutions, since
this rules out conventional techniques, such as the use of public-key encryption
alone. In addition, under our motivating scenario, we also introduce a fourth role
that provides a data storage service, where information is encrypted. Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Roles and Domains in the Secure Data Sharing Scenario
depicts these roles and domains, as well as the relationships and interactions
between them. The following is a more detailed description of the identified
roles:
• Data Producer Domain: To this domain belong those entities that generate
data. Since generation does not imply ownership, the distinction between
data producer and data owner becomes necessary. However, data produc-
ers can participate in the protection of the data from the beginning, by
encrypting it from the source. In addition, they can send the information
directly to the storage provider, in this way decoupling this interaction from
the data owner.
• Data Owner Domain: This domain is centered on the subject that owns the
data that is to be securely shared. The main function of the data owner
is to authorize consumers to access his data. Note that the data owner
can also (and most times does) act as a data producer, but this does not
rule out scenarios where separate entities participate in data production.
4
1.1. Motivation and Scope
We assume that the data owner interacts with other actors through a user
agent, usually a browser or a specific application, running on a trusted
computer. This domain is assumed to be completely trusted by the data
owner.
• Secure Storage Provider Domain: This domain is controlled by specialized
entities that steward data owners’ information and provide a sharing service,
without being able to learn anything. Given that cloud computing is the
most prominent instantiation of the considered scenario, we will also refer to
this actor as the cloud provider. This domain is assumed to be semi-trusted,
since we assume that the provider will provide the service correctly, but,
at the same time, it may have incentives for trying to read the data. This
trust assumption is explained below in more detail.
• Data Consumer Domain: This domain comprises the entities that are legiti-
mate recipients of the information shared by the data owner, which include
not only people, but also third-party services and data owner’s devices.
Data consumers access the shared information through the storage service
provided by the cloud.
• External Domain: A fifth domain, omitted in Figure 1.1, comprises all the
external actors that may have an interest in the protected information, such
as hackers and nation-scale adversaries. However, none of these actors are
either in charge of managing data or granted with any permission to read
it. This type of adversary would have to deal with traditional security
measures (e.g., physical security, firewalls, access control systems, etc.),
and in a worst-case scenario, they should see nothing more than encrypted
data. If the encryption scheme in use achieves an adequate security notion
(e.g., indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks), then
we can assume that the data is secure.
Any information that is to be protected must be encrypted from the source (i.e.,
data producer domain) and decrypted by the legitimate recipients (i.e., data
consumer domain). Therefore, from a visibility point of view, the goal is that the
storage provider domain and external domain should only see encrypted data, in
any case.
A naive solution for this scenario would be to use conventional encryption tech-
niques (e.g., AES, RSA) and to share the decryption key with the parties des-
ignated by the data owner. Symmetric encryption cannot be used alone, since
it implies that the same key is shared between producers, owner and consumers
or, at least, that for each piece of encrypted data, producers and owner agree
on a key, which is extremely ineﬃcient. The typical solution would be to use
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some sort of hybrid encryption, where data is encrypted with a fresh random
key using symmetric encryption, and the key is encrypted with public-key cryp-
tography. The problem in our scenario is that the producers do not necessarily
know in advance who are the intended consumers of the encrypted information.
Therefore, the only possibility is that they encrypt the data under some common
public key controlled by the data owner (e.g., the data owner’s public key); this
implies that the data owner has to decrypt the data and subsequently encrypt
it with a key known by the intended consumers; this decrypt-and-encrypt solu-
tion requires the data owner to be available online to re-encrypt the data when
needed, which is not always possible, apart from being extremely ineﬃcient. The
problem gets increasingly complex when one considers multiple pieces of data,
and diverse producers and consumers.
It can be seen that this functionality, although simple, cannot be solved by tra-
ditional encryption techniques without resorting to complex key management
procedures. In order to solve this problem, diﬀerent types of cryptosystems have
been proposed, Proxy Re-Encryption being the most prominent candidate. Proxy
Re-Encryption (PRE) is a type of public-key encryption that allows a proxy en-
tity to transform ciphertexts from one public key to another, without learning
anything about the underlying data. Therefore, from a functional point of view,
proxy re-encryption can be seen as a means of securely delegating access to en-
crypted information.
In this thesis we postulate that proxy re-encryption is a prime candidate for con-
structing cryptographically-enforced access control systems where the protected
resource is stored externally, since it enables dynamic delegation to encrypted
information. In a PRE-based solution, private data can reside in the cloud in
encrypted form and be shared to authorized users by means of re-encryption,
while still remaining confidential with regard to unauthorized parties and the
cloud provider itself. In addition, proxy re-encryption allows the data owner to
delegate the access after the data is encrypted, which is important since in a typ-
ical data sharing scenario it may not always be possible to identify beforehand
the access conditions to the protected data. The use of encryption for protecting
data at rest can decrease the risks associated to data disclosures in this kind of
scenario, since outsourced information can only be eﬀectively shared if access has
been delegated by the data owner.
Secure data sharing is the most pressing functionality in the setting under con-
sideration, since it can be seen as a first step towards realizing more advanced
functionalities; for this reason, the scope of this thesis is set on it. Other func-
tionalities, however, may require the aid of diﬀerent cryptosystems. For example,
there is a growing interest in the area of Searchable Encryption [4], a type of cryp-
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tosystem that permits searching over encrypted data; this makes sense when it is
necessary to retrieve a specific piece of data from an encrypted dataset, although
it does not tackle the issue of sharing the results. The area of Fully Homomorphic
Encryption [5], which enables generic computations over encrypted information,
has an even bigger appeal. This type of cryptosystem has received a great deal
of attention, even from outside the research community [6] due to its dazzling
potential, although as we have seen before, its current state is far from being
practical. In addition, fully homomorphic encryption is a disproportionate solu-
tion for the problem of secure data sharing, since this problem does not require
generic computation capabilities.
Threat model and trust assumptions
As argued, in this scenario the most powerful threats may come from the cloud
provider domain, since we assume that it can bypass its internal security safe-
guards. Thus, we consider it as the main adversary. It is also important to remark
that, in this scenario, data consumers represent a lesser danger, since they are
not as empowered as storage providers: if they are not previously authorized by
the data owner, then they can be considered as belonging to the external domain;
conversely, if they have been granted access to the protected data, then they are
legitimized to read the data, so once the information is released, it is impossible
for any access control system to prevent it from being disclosed.
Based on the definitions given in [7], we identify three types of providers depend-
ing on the underlying trust assumptions:
• Trusted: The cloud provider is a fully trusted entity, which provides a ser-
vice in a correct and truthful manner. This is the type of provider which is
widely assumed nowadays, since users entrust their data to providers with-
out demanding strong protection mechanisms and, hence, they suppose that
the providers will always be trustworthy. However, as we have explained
before, this is not a realistic model of provider for diﬀerent reasons.
• Honest-but-curious: The provider follows the agreed protocol correctly, but
it also stores or collects information about the users without their consent;
for this reason, we may also say that the provider is semi-trusted. Depending
on the nature of this information, there are two distinct, but not exclusive,
subtypes of honest-but-curious cloud providers:
– Data-curious: The provider has an incentive to read users’ data that
is in its custody. Such an incentive could be, for example, selling
users’ private information to third-parties for advertising or fraudulent
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operations; other motivations could be industrial espionage or political
repression.
– Access-curious: The provider collects information related to the access
patterns of the user, which enables it to track users’ behavior and
threaten their privacy.
We additionally assume that honest-but-curious providers do not collude
with authorized data consumers in order to read users’ data; in fact, once
a data consumer has access to the data of the user, it would be trivial to
share it with the cloud provider.
• Malicious: The provider has the possibility to actively deceive the user,
read the user’s data and collect access patterns; it may also collude with
other entities (e.g., data consumers) to do so. A provider of this type may
not follow the agreed protocols, so users cannot trust that they will do so.
This is the most diﬃcult type of adversary; however, it is the most realistic,
since it actually models all the capabilities of a real provider.
With this classification in mind, we will restrict the work in this thesis to data-
curious providers, which behave correctly with respect to protocol fulfillment,
but which have no hindrance to try to read users’ data. We will assume therefore
that the cloud provider may have some incentive to read users’ data without their
consent, but will not try to track users’ behavior and access patterns.
Some application use cases
Once we have described the generic secure data sharing scenario, it is useful
to think of plausible application use cases that can potentially benefit from the
utilization of cryptographically-enforced access control systems. Some of these
use cases are:
• Healthcare: These types of systems, which manage sensitive data such as
patients’ information, diagnostic results and medical personnel data, are
increasingly being computerized and externalized. Consequently, it is of
paramount importance to properly protect the information stored in these
systems. This requirement stems not only from common sense, but also
from a regulatory imperative: for example, in the United States, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) dictates that appro-
priate technical safeguards must be put in place in order to control access
to sensitive information, including the use of encryption techniques [8]. At
the same time, the materialization of widespread communication technolo-
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gies has also brought the possibility of exchanging this data with legitimate
parties (e.g., external hospitals, insurance companies, pharmacies, etc.) in
order to improve the service oﬀered to patients. Therefore, similar problems
to the ones exposed above arise. This scenario has been seen traditionally as
the quintessential use case for secure data sharing, since it clearly illustrates
the assets to protect, the threats and the actors involved.
• Digital Rights Management (DRM): These systems are used to restrict the
usage of copyrighted content, such as video, audio, books and software.
The copyrighted content has to be shared with legitimate consumers, but
at the same time, it is necessary to prevent access from any other entities.
Thus, the relevance of the secure data sharing scenario to this use case is
also immediate, especially when it is combined with a cloud-based delivery
model, which is extremely common nowadays.
• Big Data Analytics in the Cloud: Big Data Analytics represents a new
opportunity for organizations to transform the way they market services
and products through the analysis of massive amounts of data. However,
small and medium size companies are not often capable of acquiring and
maintaining the necessary infrastructure for running Big Data Analytics
on-premise, so the cloud paradigm represents a natural solution to this
problem. The idea of providing Big Data Analytics as a Service, such as
Google Cloud Hadoop [9] and MapR’s Hadoop as a Service [10], is a very
appealing solution for small organizations. This idea makes even more
sense nowadays, since a lot of organizations are already operating using
cloud services, and therefore, it is more sensible to perform analytics where
the data is located (i.e., the cloud). The secure data sharing scenario fits
in well with the outsourcing of Big Data processing to the cloud, since
information can be stored in encrypted form in external servers in the cloud
and processed only if access has been delegated.
It can be seen that all these use cases share a common trait: the possibility of data
being disclosed or stolen is unacceptable. At the same time, they show that the
sharing functionality has to be preserved, since it is necessary for creating added
value services (e.g., better medical assistance, content distribution, analytics,
etc.).
1.1.2 Proxy Re-Encryption
The previous sections have described the secure data sharing scenario. As pointed
out, our research postulate is that proxy re-encryption is an appropriate candidate
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tool for supporting access delegation to encrypted information in this scenario.
In this section, we give a more detailed overview of the concept of proxy re-
encryption and how it fits in as part of a solution to this scenario.
The basic idea of proxy re-encryption is embodied by the ability of a proxy to
transform ciphertexts under the public key of Alice into ciphertexts decryptable
by Bob; to do so, the proxy must be in possession of a re-encryption key that
enables this process. In addition, the proxy cannot learn any information about
the encrypted messages, under any of the keys.
From an abstract viewpoint, a proxy re-encryption scheme can be seen as a mech-
anism for the delegation of decryption rights. For this reason, in PRE literature,
the parties involved are named in terms of a relationship of delegation. A typical
proxy re-encryption environment involves at least three parties:
• Delegator: This actor is the one that delegates his decryption rights using
proxy re-encryption. We usually refer to the delegator as “Alice”.
• Delegatee: The delegatee is granted a delegated right to decrypt cipher-
texts that, although were not intended for him in the first place, where
re-encrypted for him with permission from the original recipient (i.e., the
delegator). This actor usually takes the name “Bob”.
• Proxy: This actor is responsible for the re-encryption process that trans-
forms ciphertexts under the delegator’s public key into ciphertexts that
the delegatee can decrypt using his private key. The proxy uses the re-
encryption key during this process, and does not learn any additional in-
formation.
Figure 1.2 depicts the main actors in a proxy re-encryption environment and their
interactions. Since PRE is a special type of PKE, users also have a pair of public
and private keys, as shown in the figure. Hence, anyone that knows a public key
is capable of producing ciphertexts intended for the corresponding recipient; con-
versely, these ciphertexts can only be decrypted using the corresponding decryp-
tion key. The distinctive aspect is that ciphertext can be re-encrypted in order to
be decryptable by a diﬀerent private key than the one originally intended.
In addition to the actors shown in Figure 1.2, some schemes may involve more
parties such as time servers (in the case of temporal proxy re-encryption schemes
[11, 12]) and key generation centers (in the case of identity-based schemes [13, 14]).
These are omitted here for the sake of generality.
Since proxy re-encryption realizes the functionality of decryption rights, we have
argued that it is a prime candidate for constructing cryptographically-enforced
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Figure 1.2: Main actors and interactions in a PRE environment
access control systems where the protected resource is stored externally. Note
that there is a direct correspondence between the actors involved in proxy re-
encryption and those associated to the secure data sharing scenario, as shown in
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Correspondence between PRE and the secure data sharing scenario
Proxy Re-Encryption Secure Data Sharing
Delegator Data Owner
Delegatee Data Consumer
Proxy Secure Storage Provider
Anyone Data Producer
Ciphertexts Outsourced information
Re-Encryption Enforcement of access delegation
Taking this into consideration, it seems at first glance that the suitability of proxy
re-encryption to our scenario is immediate. As hinted before, in a PRE-based so-
lution to the secure data sharing scenario, private data is initially encrypted by
data producers (which can be any entity that knows the proper public key) and
outsourced to a semi-trusted proxy (i.e., storage provider in the cloud). By creat-
ing the corresponding re-encryption keys and giving them to the proxy, the data
owner is eﬀectively authorizing data consumers to access his data. The proxy
enforces these access delegations through the re-encryption procedure using the
corresponding re-encryption keys, while the information that is protected still re-
mains confidential with respect to unauthorized parties and the proxy itself.
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1.1.3 Challenges of Proxy Re-Encryption
The previous sections have introduced the original motivation of this thesis (i.e.,
the secure data sharing scenario) and an initial research postulate (i.e., the suit-
ability of PRE as a solution to this scenario). There are, however, several chal-
lenges that need to be tackled before advancing the use of proxy re-encryption
into the field of applications. These challenges are distributed among diﬀerent
abstraction levels:
• Security definitions: Challenges at this level are related with the very def-
inition of what is considered secure in proxy re-encryption, from a crypto-
graphic perspective. This involves diﬀerent tasks, such as the analysis of
security notions, modelization of adversaries, and investigation of properties
of schemes, all of them essential for ensuring security in proxy re-encryption.
• Constructions: In this level, more concrete issues become relevant, such as
performance (both from viewpoints of the necessary computations and the
size of keys and ciphertexts), the exploration of new underlying mathemat-
ical structures for constructing schemes, and methods for producing more
secure schemes generically.
• Applications: The secure data sharing scenario presented is a generic setting
that can be instantiated in diﬀerent use cases. The challenge here is to
exploit the applicability of PRE to this scenario in order to devise concrete
and useful applications.
These challenges are the dominant questions throughout this thesis, and hence,
proxy re-encryption constitutes the central topic. Although the secure data shar-
ing scenario acts as a motivation, the identified gaps have proved to be a stimulat-
ing subject worth researching in depth. The following is a more detailed account
of the challenges we have identified in proxy re-encryption, classified according
to the aforementioned abstraction levels.
Security definitions
In order to reason about the security of a cryptosystem, it becomes essential to
have a proper definition and understanding of the notions that model its secu-
rity. Since PRE schemes are also public-key encryption schemes, it is natural to
“reuse” the security notions of PKE. However, in the PRE literature, these secu-
rity notions are often defined in an ad-hoc manner for each scheme, with subtle
variations and restrictions, caused by the lack of established definitions. This
is particularly the case of the definition of attack models, which in the context
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of PRE are potentially richer than in PKE because of the added possibility of
re-encryption.
In addition to this issue, the definition of security in the PRE context presents
a peculiar dichotomy, since PRE constructions have to balance the security of-
fered by the encryption scheme and the functionality of transforming ciphertexts
through re-encryption. Both aspects are somewhat contradictory, since tradi-
tional security notions for encryption require that it should not be possible to
manipulate ciphertexts in a meaningful way, a property called non-malleability ;
however, re-encryption of ciphertexts is actually a type of meaningful manipu-
lation. For this reason, the re-encryption capability can be seen as an “attack
vector” to the security of PRE schemes.
Constructions
There are several challenges associated with the construction of more secure and
eﬃcient PRE schemes. The most immediate is related to the construction of
CCA-secure schemes. In the case of traditional PKE, several generic methods
exist for achieving CCA-secure schemes from weakly secure cryptosystems. To
the contrary, in PRE this process is completely ad-hoc for each scheme. Therefore,
it would be desirable to count on analogous constructions that allow PRE schemes
to “bootstrap” security by means of generic transformations.
On a more concrete note, another challenging aspect is performance. Recall that,
from the motivating scenario, we postulated the use of cryptographically-enforced
access control systems based on PRE. Depending on the particular application
use case, these systems can be handling thousands of access requests per minute.
Therefore, it is crucial that the cryptographic operations performed by both the
cloud provider and the data consumers are suﬃciently eﬃcient, since these are,
presumably, the most common operations. This not only has an eﬀect on time
(i.e., faster service), but also on economic cost (as more computations are tied to
more costs incurred).
Finally, another topic worth exploring is that, to date, most PRE schemes are
based on traditional number-theoretic foundations, such as cyclic groups where
the Discrete Logarithm and Diﬃe-Hellman problems are hard, or those suitable
for cryptographic pairings. However, there is a growing interest nowadays in
other cryptographic foundations, such as lattices. Lattice-based cryptography is
a promising field due to its potential with respect to post-quantum security; in
some cases, performance can be greatly improved too, since lattice operations are
highly parallelizable.
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Applications
Once the topics of a more theoretical nature are tackled, it is necessary to work
on the integration of PRE schemes within real systems. This implies dealing
with protocols, architectures and implementations. These aspects are especially
relevant, since often, the link between theoretical contributions and real-world
systems is missing. The challenge here is to find the proper technologies that
allow a seamless inclusion of a non-traditional cryptosystem such as proxy re-
encryption.
Additionally, associated with the performance challenge described above, it is nec-
essary to study the economic viability of any proposal involving cryptographic
primitives, since the incurred costs may negate the utility of any devised appli-
cation.
Finally, an interesting topic is to devise other potential use cases of PRE, beyond
the secure data sharing scenario.
1.2 Goals and Contributions
The previous sections have given the initial motivation of this thesis, which led
us to consider proxy re-encryption as a candidate cryptographic primitive to the
suggested scenario. Associated with this primitive, we have presented a compi-
lation of challenges, categorized by level of abstraction. These challenges are the
driving factors that have shaped the research agenda of this thesis. Our ulti-
mate objective with this work is therefore to contribute towards the resolution
of these challenges, with the purpose of playing a part in the realization of PRE
as a solution to the secure data sharing scenario. In parallel to these challenges,
we next describe a set of goals that summarize our attitude towards this the-
sis. These goals are to be interpreted more as high-level principles, rather than
specific research targets.
As justified, one of the first goals of this thesis is to contribute towards a better
understanding of the definitions of security upon which design proxy re-encryption
schemes. As stated by Bellare, Hofheinz and Kiltz in [15], “Cryptography is
founded on definitions (...) In order to have firm foundations – in particular a
unique interpretation and common understanding of results – it is important to
have definitional unity, meaning that diﬀerent definitions intending or claiming
to represent the same notion should really do so”. The work in the first part
of this thesis is inspired by this principle. In the previous section we described
14
1.2. Goals and Contributions
the challenges associated with the definitions of security of proxy re-encryption.
In this thesis we aim to investigate the particularities of the attack models and
security notions in PRE, which are often treated in an ad-hoc way, and propose
more stable and generic definitions.
Once there is a better understanding of PRE security notions, an immediate
goal is to study techniques to improve the security of PRE schemes. Ideally, there
should be generic methods and heuristics for designing PRE schemes that achieve
strong and meaningful security notions.
Another goal of this thesis is to foster the design of eﬃcient systems, which show
a judicious use of resources. Often, academic solutions do not focus on the perfor-
mance facet, which can impact dramatically the design of the systems. Resources
such as computational power are seemingly unlimited in the scenarios we are con-
sidering. However, the truth is that, although their cost can be potentially highly
reduced, it can rapidly add up so as to make proposed solutions unfeasible from
the economic standpoint. In this thesis, we consider it to be of paramount im-
portance to not neglect this perspective and to study the impact in costs of any
proposed solutions.
Finally, a principle that guides the development of this thesis is to participate in
the multiple strata that conform this fascinating topic, from the very definitions
of security to the specifics of applications, through the construction of new prim-
itives. Although our point of departure is the use of proxy re-encryption as a
cryptographic mechanism for protect data confidentiality, we intentionally do not
want to circumscribe this work to a specific facet, and rather prefer to follow a
more transversal approach.
With these goals in mind, the following is a list of the main contributions of this
thesis, which can be linked with some of the challenges mentioned in the previous
section:
• We review the basic concepts of proxy re-encryption, including definitions,
security models and properties.
• We analyze of the current state of the art on proxy re-encryption schemes,
including a comparative study of the performance of several schemes, both
from the theoretical and experimental points of view. In addition, we review
the state of research on applications of proxy re-encryption, in particular
the case of the secure data sharing problem.
• We examine the notions of security for proxy re-encryption and identify a
parametric family of attack models that not only considers the availability
of the decryption oracle, but also that of re-encryption. This parametric
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- Parametric Family of Attack Models for Proxy Re-Encryption
- Application of Generic CCA-Secure Transformations
- NTRUReEncrypt
- Escrowed Decryption System
- Data Confidentiality in Big Data
- Blind Identity Management as a Service
- Survey of Proxy Re-Encryption Constructions and Applications
Security 
Definitions
Constructions
Applications
Figure 1.3: Contributions of this thesis
family of attack models for PRE allows us to define a collection of security
notions, whose relations we also analyze.
• We study the applicability of generic CCA-secure transformations to proxy
re-encryption. In particular, we focus on the Fujisaki-Okamoto transfor-
mation, and formulate suﬃcient conditions that allow to use it directly in
PRE. These conditions include a new proxy re-encryption property called
perfect key-switching ; we also make use of intermediate security notions de-
rived from our parametric family. Additionally, we discuss the adaptation
of similar transformations, namely REACT and GEM.
• We present NTRUReEncrypt, a new lattice-based proxy re-encryption scheme.
This scheme is based on the NTRU cryptosystem and is extremely eﬃcient,
in comparison with current schemes. In addition, we describe a provably-
secure version that is safe against chosen-plaintext attacks.
• We propose several applications of PRE, such as a model for privacy-
preserving Identity Management as a Service, a system for delegating access
to encrypted information in Big Data clusters, and an escrowed decryption
system.
Figure 1.3 depicts these contributions along an axis that represents the level of ab-
straction. As mentioned before, our contributions range from the very definitions
of security to the field of applications, by way of concrete constructions.
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1.3 Thesis outline
In this chapter, we have begun by introducing the practical motivation of this
thesis, which is the protection of sensitive data in outsourced environments, such
as the cloud. We have seen that this scenario poses several challenges from
the point of view of privacy and security, and we have briefly explained the
usual countermeasures. After this, our conclusion is that it is necessary to devise
more advanced safeguards, based on the use of cryptographic mechanisms, in
order to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data against a broader class of
threats. This have led us to defend the use of proxy re-encryption as a prime
example of such cryptographic mechanisms, which constitutes a central research
postulate of this thesis. In this chapter, we have also given a brief overview of
what is proxy re-encryption and described the main challenges associated to this
cryptosystem.
Before proceeding, Chapter 2 overviews basic concepts and definitions that are
used in this thesis. As a substantial part of this thesis is heavily based on provable
security, we here provide a general review of this area of cryptography.
Once the essential foundations have been established, it is necessary to study
the state of current research, in order to broaden our understanding of proxy
re-encryption, and consequently, identify research gaps. Chapter 3 presents an
analysis of the state of the art of this type of cryptosystem, not only from the
perspective of specific constructions, but also applications. Firstly, we survey
the main proxy re-encryption schemes so far, and provide a detailed analysis
of their characteristics. In line with the goal of fostering the design of eﬃcient
systems, we also study the performance of selected schemes, both theoretically
and empirically. Secondly, we review applications of proxy re-encryption, with a
special focus on data sharing in the cloud. In this part we analyze in more detail
our research postulate – that proxy re-encryption constitutes a feasible solution
for this scenario, both from the functional and eﬃciency perspectives.
In Chapter 4 we study the conventional security definitions for proxy re-encryption
schemes, which are based on those inherited from public key encryption (PKE).
One of the principal building blocks of these security definitions is the attack
model, which defines the capabilities of an adversary in a security game. PRE is
inherently more complex than PKE, but attack models for PRE have not been
developed further. To this respect, we define a parametric family of attack mod-
els for PRE, based on the availability of both the decryption and re-encryption
oracles during the security game, that enables the definition of a set of intermedi-
ate security notions. We analyze some relations among these notions of security,
and in particular, the separations that arise when the re-encryption oracle leaks
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re-encryption keys. In addition, we discuss which of these security notions repre-
sent meaningful adversarial models for PRE. Finally, we show how a recent PRE
scheme is based on a security model that does not capture chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks through re-encryption, and for which we describe an attack under a more
realistic security notion. This attack emphasizes the fact that PRE schemes that
leak re-encryption keys cannot achieve strong security notions.
Chapter 5 presents new proxy re-encryption constructions, consisting of two sep-
arate contributions. First, we explore the use of lattice-based cryptography for
constructing more eﬃcient PRE schemes. In this chapter, we present NTRUReEn-
crypt, a new bidirectional and multihop proxy re-encryption scheme based on
NTRU [16], a widely known lattice-based cryptosystem. We give two versions of
our scheme: the first one is based on the conventional NTRU encryption scheme
and, although it lacks a security proof, remains as eﬃcient as its predecessor;
the second one is a provably-secure variant that is safe against chosen-plaintext
attacks. For the second part, we focus on the construction of more secure PRE
schemes by means of generic transformations. To this end, we study the adapta-
tion of conventional generic transformations, such as Fujisaki-Okamoto [17] and
REACT [18], originally designed to achieve CCA-security. We show that a direct
and naive application of these transformations leads to flawed schemes, and give
several failed examples from the literature. In addition, we propose an exten-
sion of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation for PRE, which achieves a weaker
form of CCA-security in the random oracle model, and identify the conditions for
applying it.
Chapter 6 is devoted to new applications of proxy re-encryption, with a clear
focus on the secure data sharing scenario. As described in this introduction, this
scenario can be seen as a generalization of diﬀerent application use cases. In this
chapter, we describe the integration of PRE within some of these use cases. Our
first proposal is BlindIdM, a model for privacy-preserving Identity Management as
a Service, with the intention of enabling organizations to outsource their identity
management to the cloud in a secure way, without the cloud provider being able
to read the identity information. We show how PRE can be integrated to SAML
2.0, a standard identity management protocol [19], as an example of instantiation
of the BlindIdM model. A second proposal is presented next, this time focusing
on the Big Data Analytics use case, as introduced in Section 1.1.1. We describe
an extension to the Apache Hadoop system [20] where stored data is always
encrypted and encryption keys do not need to be shared between diﬀerent data
sources; the use of proxy re-encryption allows stored data to be re-encrypted into
ciphered data that the cluster nodes can decrypt with their own keys when a job
is submitted. The last application we present diﬀers from the others, as it is not
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directly related to the cloud data sharing scenario. In Section 6.3 we describe
an escrowed encryption system based on proxy re-encryption. The goal of this
system is to serve as a typical public-key encryption scheme, but at the same
time, the decryption procedure is escrowed by means of proxy re-encryption; a
key aspect of this proposal is that the escrowed decryption can only be achieved
with the collaboration of a set of trusted custodians, which are specialized entities
chosen by the users.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the contributions of this thesis and describes lines
of future work and open research problems.
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Preliminaries
This section provides an overview of basic topics upon which this thesis is grounded.
Apart from basic notion used throughout this thesis, we review here the most com-
mon cryptographic primitives. In addition, we also address the topic of provable
security, an area of cryptography that deals with the analysis of the security of
cryptosystems using mathematical proofs.
2.1 Mathematical Notation
We use the ⊕ symbol to denote the exclusive-or operator, and || to denote the
concatenation operator. The ⊥ symbol is used for representing an error message.
We denote by ￿ · ￿ and ￿ · ￿∞ the vector Euclidean norm and infinite norm,
respectively.
Throughout this thesis, we use the asymptotic notations ω(·), O(·) and Ω(·). The
expression ω(g(n)) denotes the class of functions that dominate g(n) asymptot-
ically (i.e., for suﬃciently large n). That is, f(n) = ω(g(n)) means that f(n)
grows strictly faster than g(n). For example, a linear function (e.g., f(n) = n)
dominates a logarithmic function (e.g., g(n) = log n), since, asymptotically, it
grows much faster; thus, n = ω(log n). A slightly diﬀerent notion is O(g(n)),
which denotes the class of functions that set an upper bound on g(n), asymp-
totically. That is, f(n) = O(g(n)) means that f(n) grows no faster than g(n).
Conversely, Ω(g(n)) denotes the class of functions that set a lower bound on g(n),
asymptotically. That is, f(n) = Ω(g(n)) means that f(n) grows no slower than
g(n).
Based on this notation, we say that a function f(n) is negligible if f(n) = n−ω(1).
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Finally, in some cases we use the expression poly(n) to denote the class of func-
tions which are expressible as polynomials in n.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
In this section we review the basic cryptographic primitives that we use through-
out this thesis, such as symmetric encryption, public-key encryption and hash
functions.
2.2.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric encryption, or more accurately, symmetric-key encryption, is a class
of encryption algorithms where the parties involved share a common secret (i.e.,
the key), which is used is used when they want to communicate secretly with
each other [21]. Therefore, the sender uses the key to encrypt the message, and
the receiver uses the same key to decrypt it.
The following is a generic definition of the syntax of any symmetric encryption
scheme.
Definition 2.1 (SKE scheme). A symmetric-key encryption scheme is a tuple
of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec):
• KeyGen(λ) → K. On input security parameter λ, the key generation algo-
rithm KeyGen outputs a key K ∈ K.
• Enc(K,m)→ c. On input a key K and a message m ∈M, the encryption
algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• Dec(K, c) → m. On input a key K and a ciphertext c ∈ C, the decryption
algorithm Dec outputs a message m ∈M.
The sets of all possible keys, messages and ciphertexts are denoted by K,M and
C, respectively.
Once we have defined the syntax, we can establish the correctness condition for
symmetric encryption. In order to say that a symmetric encryption scheme is
correct it must satisfy a basic condition: for every key K ∈ K and every m ∈M,
then it holds that Dec(K,Enc(K,m)) = m.
The main two types of symmetric encryption algorithms are:
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• Stream ciphers, where each “digit” of the message is processed indepen-
dently with a digit of the key. The One-Time Pad (OTP) is a prime exam-
ple of stream cipher, where the message is XORed with a random key of
the same length; the security of the OTP crucially depends on that the key
is never reused (i.e., the key can only be used “one time”).
• Block ciphers, which are designed to operate over units of a predetermined
size (i.e., blocks). For instance, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
originally proposed by Daemen and Rijmen [22] and standarized by the
US’ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and widely
recognized as the most used block cipher nowadays, has a block size of 128
bits.
2.2.2 Public Key Encryption
As opposed to symmetric encryption, in public-key encryption (PKE) it is not
assumed that communicating parties share any common secret. Instead, PKE
requires two separate keys, one public, used to encrypt messages, and one pri-
vate, used to decrypt the corresponding ciphertexts; these two keys are linked to
each other by some mathematical properties that depend on each PKE scheme.
For this reason, public-key encryption is sometimes called asymmetric encryp-
tion.
The syntax of any PKE scheme is as follows:
Definition 2.2 (PKE scheme). A public-key encryption scheme is a tuple of
algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec):
• KeyGen(λ) → (pk, sk). On input security parameter λ, the key generation
algorithm KeyGen outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk, sk).
• Enc(pk,m) → c. On input the public key pk and a message m ∈ M, the
encryption algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• Dec(sk, c) → m. On input the secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, the
decryption algorithm Dec outputs a message m ∈M or the symbol ⊥ indi-
cating c is invalid.
The plaintext and ciphertext spaces are denoted by M and C, respectively.
As for symmetric encryption, it is necessary to define under what conditions a
PKE is correct. Although similar to symmetric case, this definition takes the
asymmetry of the keys into consideration. The correctness condition for PKE
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schemes is as follows: for every pair of public and private keys (pk, sk) that
results of KeyGen(λ) and every m ∈M, then it holds that Dec(sk,Enc(pk,m)) =
m.
2.2.3 Hash Functions
A cryptographic hash function (or simply, hash function) is a deterministic algo-
rithm H that maps inputs of arbitrary size to fixed-length outputs in an eﬃcient
way. In order to be considered secure, hash functions must meet some minimum
requirements, such as pre-image resistance (it should not be possible to find an
input that hashes to a given output), second pre-image resistance (it should not
be possible to find a second input that hashes to the same value as a given input),
and collision resistance (it should not be possible to find two inputs that hash to
the same value).
2.3 Provable Security
In this section we briefly review some of the basic concepts on provable security,
and in particular, those specific to public-key encryption. Later on, these con-
cepts will be reused when analyzing the security of proxy re-encryption schemes.
As described before, provable security deals with the analysis of the security
of cryptosystems using mathematical proofs. Often, these proofs are oﬀered in
the form of reductions, which are formal argumentations where an algorithm that
transforms one problem (e.g., factoring large numbers)into another problem (e.g.,
breaking some security goal of a given cryptosystem) is defined. It could appear
at first sight that this “reductionist approach” is somewhat weak due to its con-
ditional nature [23], but, in fact, it had made possible the rigorous analysis of the
security of a myriad of cryptosystems, in an elegant, yet powerful, way.
In order to create these proofs, it becomes necessary first to rigorously model
the security goals of the cryptosystem and the adversarial capabilities that are
allowed. This is explained in more detail below.
2.3.1 Security Notions of PKE
In the context of PKE, security notions are usually defined as the combination
of a security goal and an attack model [24]. Throughout this thesis, we focus on
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the indistinguishability of encryptions (IND) goal, which formalizes the inabil-
ity of an adversary to distinguish which message a given ciphertext encrypts. A
weaker goal is one-wayness (OW), which represents the inability of an adversary
to extract the underlying plaintext from a given ciphertext. The strongest goal is
non-malleability (NM), where an adversary should not be able to produce cipher-
texts such that, for a given ciphertext, the plaintexts are meaningfully related.
With regard to attack models, three options are usually considered: (i) chosen-
plaintext attack (CPA), (ii) non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1), and
(iii) adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2). In a CPA model, the only ca-
pability of the adversary is to encrypt plaintexts of her choice (althought this
capability is inherent in a public-key cryptosystem). Under CCA1, the adversary
is also given a decryption capability (i.e., a decryption oracle) but only for its
use before receiving the challenge ciphertext. Finally, in the CCA2 model, the
adversary may use the decryption oracle in any moment, with the only restriction
of not asking for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext. Therefore, a security
notion can be seen as a tuple goal-atk, where goal ∈ {OW, IND, NM}, and atk ∈
{CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
It can be seen that these attack models are diﬀerentiated by the changes on
the decryption capabilities of the adversary, which can be modeled through the
availability of a decryption oracle. Informally, a decryption oracle is a function
Odec(·) that the adversary can query on any ciphertext c (except the challenge
ciphertext c∗) and that outputs the decryption of c with the target secret key.
No additional oracles are necessary for describing the above notions of security
for PKE. As mentioned above, in this thesis we focus on the indistinguishability
goal, so we are concerned with three possible security notions for PKE. The fol-
lowing definitions, adapted from [24], comprise these security notions in a formal
manner.
Definition 2.3 (Indistinguishability game [24]). Let Π=(KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a
public-key encryption scheme, A = (A1, A2) a polynomial-time adversary, and Ω1
and Ω2 the set of available oracles for A1 and A2, respectively. For atk ∈ {CPA,
CCA1, CCA2}, n ∈ N, and δ ∈ {0, 1}, the indistinguishability of encryptions game
is defined by the experiment
Experiment ExpIND-atkΠ,A,δ (n)
(pk∗, sk∗) R←− KeyGen(n); (m0,m1, s)← A1(pk∗);
c∗ ← Enc(pk∗,mδ); d← A2(m0,m1, s, c∗);
return d
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where
If atk = CPA then Ω1 = ∅ and Ω2 = ∅
If atk = CCA1 then Ω1 = {Odec} and Ω2 = ∅
If atk = CCA2 then Ω1 = {Odec} and Ω2 = {Odec}
Definition 2.4 (Advantage [24]). Let Π be a public-key encryption scheme and
A a polynomial-time adversary. For atk ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2} and n ∈ N, the
advantage of A is given by
AdvIND-atkΠ,A (n) = |Pr[ExpIND-atkΠ,A,1 (n) = 1]− Pr[ExpIND-atkΠ,A,0 (n) = 1]|
We say that the encryption scheme Π is IND-atk secure if the advantageAdvIND-atkΠ,A (n)
is negligible.
2.3.2 Hardness Assumptions
In previous sections, we mentioned that provable-secure cryptographic schemes
base their security upon the hardness of problems that are conjectured to be
hard. That is, the proofs of security of these schemes are in fact reductions to
the diﬃculty of some of these hard problems, which are usually well-defined and
studied, to the extent that no eﬃcient algorithms are known to solve them. The
conjectures about the diﬃculty of such problems are known in cryptography as
hardness assumptions. In this section we briefly describe some of the problems
that lead to the hardness assumptions referred throughout this thesis, categorized
by their nature.
Discrete Logarithm and Diﬃe-Hellman Problems
This family of problems is circumscribed to certain kinds of algebraic groups that
have cryptographic applications. Before proceeding with the definition of these
hard problems, it is necessary to give some general definitions, although we will
assume that the reader is familiar with the topic.
A group, denoted by G, is an algebraic structure that combines a set of ele-
ments with a binary operation defined over them, that satisfies the closure and
associativity properties, and that guarantees the existence of the identity and
inverse elements. In the following, we will assume that G is a group of order q,
whose operation is denoted by multiplication. By the definition of an algebraic
26
2.3. Provable Security
group, the multiplication of any pair of elements of the group yields a result
within the group; in other words, the group is closed under the multiplication
operation. Knowing this, if one operates an element x ∈ G by itself several
times, this can be seen as an exponentiation. Since the group is closed under the
multiplication, then xn ∈ G for any n ∈ Z. A generator g is an element of G
such that G = {g1, g2, ..., gq}. It is said then that g generates G and denoted as
G =< g >.
The inverse function to the exponentiation is called the discrete logarithm. In-
formally, let y = xn, then n = logx y is the discrete logarithm of y in base x.
The discrete logarithm is a cornerstone concept in cryptography, since for certain
kinds of groups, it can be shown that no eﬃcient algorithm exists for computing
it. Among these groups, we find, for example, the large prime order subgroups
of Zp for p prime. Based on this, the following is a definition of the problem of
computing the discrete logarithm for generic groups.
Definition 2.5 (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DL)). Given a tuple (g, ga) ∈ G2,
where a ∈ Zq, the DL problem in G is to compute a.
Although the DL assumption appears at the heart of most cryptosystems based
on a group structure, it is often considered an overly weak assumption [25]. Based
on the DL problem, Diﬃe and Hellman defined a key exchange protocol in their
seminal paper “New Directions on Cryptography” [26]. The security of their
protocol implicitely defined what later was dubbed as the Computational Diﬃe-
Hellman problem (or simply, the Diﬃe-Hellman problem).
Definition 2.6 (Computational Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (CDH)). Given a tuple
(g, ga, gb) ∈ G3, where a, b ∈ Zq, the CDH problem in G is to compute gab.
There is no eﬃcient algorithm for solving this problem, for a suﬃciently large
group. In fact, the most eﬃcient method for solving CDH is to solve the DL
problem: on input a tuple (g, ga, gb), one computes a as the discrete logarithm
of ga in base g, and outputs (gb)a as the result. The CDH assumption has been
used in many cryptosystems, but as in the case of the DL assumption, sometimes
it is also too weak. For this reason, the decisional version of the CDH problem is
often considered.
Definition 2.7 (Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (DDH)). Given a tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4, where a, b, c ∈ Zq, the DDH problem in G is to decide whether
c = ab.
The Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman problem is specially useful in cryptography since
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it directly implies the semantic security of multitude of cryptosystems, such as
the ElGamal encryption scheme [25].
It is easy to see why DDH is not harder than CDH: if one could solve CDH,
then the result of such algorithm could be used for trivially deciding if gc = gab.
However, the converse – that CDH is not harder than DDH – is not true for
generic groups [27]. That is, there is a gap between these two problems. Based
on this fact, Okamoto and Pointcheval presented in [28] the following problem,
which precisely covers this gap.
Definition 2.8 (Gap Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (gap-DH)). Given a tuple (g, ga, gb) ∈
G3, where a, b ∈ Zq, the gap-DH problem in G is to compute gab with the help of
an oracle that solves the DDH problem in G.
The gap-DH problem has been used in the security reductions of several cryp-
tosystems. In particular, we are interested on its role in the REACT [18] and
GEM [29] generic transformations, which we study in Section 5.2.
Pairing-based Problems
Informally, a bilinear pairing is a map between a pair of group elements to an-
other element from a certain target group. What make pairings interesting for
cryptography is the bilinear property : let eˆ : G1×G2 → GT be a bilinear pairing1;
the bilinear property of pairings states that:
e(ga1 , g
b
2) = e(g1, g2)
ab
It can be seen that the introduction of a pairing between G and GT makes the
DDH problem in G easy: on input a DDH tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4, one can
make use of the bilinear property of the pairing to decide whether gc = gab
by checking if the equation e(g, gc) = e(ga, gb) holds. It can be seen that this
equation is equivalent to e(g, g)c = e(g, g)ab, which is true if and only if c = ab.
For this reason, pairings were proposed first as a means for cryptanalysis. Later
on, “constructive” uses of pairings were also proposed, which has made possible
the creation of a great variety of cryptosystems. To this end, in pairing-friendly
groups one usually considers other types of hard problems; the most prominent
are similar in form to the Diﬃe-Hellman problems, but adapted to the use of
pairings.
1Although this definition distinguish between G1 and G2, from now on we will assume that
the pairing is symmetric, so G1 and G2 are the same group and will be denoted as G.
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Definition 2.9 (Computational Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (CBDH)). Given
a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc) ∈ G4, where a, b, c ∈ Zq, the CBDH problem is to compute
e(g, g)abc.
Definition 2.10 (Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Problem (DBDH)). Given
a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)d) ∈ G4×GT , where a, b, c, d ∈ Zq, the DBDH problem
is to compute e(g, g)abc.
In this thesis we also make use of other, more involved, pairing-based hard prob-
lems. The l-Decisional Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Inversion problem was first pro-
posed by Dodis and Yampolskiy in [30]; later, Boneh et al. proposed in [31] a
generalization called the l-weak Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion problem.
Definition 2.11 (l-Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion problem [30]). Given a tuple
(g, ga, ga
2
, ..., ga
l
, e(g, g)d) ∈ Gl+1 × GT , the l-DBDHI problem in (G,GT ) is to
decide whether d = al+1.
Definition 2.12 (l-weak Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion problem [31]). Given
a tuple (g, ga, ga
2
, ..., ga
l
, gb, e(g, g)d) ∈ Gl+2 × GT , the l-wDBDHI problem in
(G,GT ) is to decide whether d = al+1b.
Lattice-based Problems
A lattice L(B) is the set of all integer combinations of the basis B = {b1, ..., bn}
of n linearly independent vectors. That is, lattice L(B) is defined as:
L(B) = {B · z : z ∈ Zn}
In cryptography, we are interested on integer lattices, i.e., those where B ∈
Zn×n, and, specially, on q-ary lattices, which are the modular version of integer
lattices.
Elements in a lattice can be represented as vectors in the space where the basis is
defined. In the case of integer lattices, the space is Zn×n, so elements of the lattice
can be seen as integers vectors. For this reason, lattice-based schemes are usually
based on elementary operations over vectors and matrices, such as vector/matrix
addition, inner product, etc.
There are several hard problem associated to lattices. In this thesis, we will focus
in particular in the Learning With Errors (LWE) and the Short Integer Solution
(SIS) families of problems.
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Learning With Errors (LWE) This problem was introduced by Regev in
2005 [32], and has been used for creating several cryptosystems for public key
encryption [33, 34], identity-based encryption [35], and even fully homomorphic
encryption [36].
Definition 2.13 (Learning With Errors problem (LWE) [34]). For given a di-
mension n, a modulus q, a noise distribution ψ over Zq, and an unknown vector
￿s ∈ Znq sampled uniformly at random, the LWE problem is to find ￿s given a poly-
nomial number m of samples of the form (￿ai,￿bi = ￿ai · ￿s + xi) ∈ Znq × Zq, where
￿ai ∈ Znq is uniformly random and xi is sampled from the noise distribution ψ, for
i ∈ {1, ...,m}.
Typically, the noise distribution ψ is chosen to be a Gaussian centered around 0.
Note that this is the computational (or “search”) version of the LWE problem.
One can define a decisional version, where the problem is to distinguish between
the above ditribution of samples and uniformly random samples from Znq × Zq.
Both versions have been proven to be equivalent [32].
From a practical viewpoint, however, the LWE problem is not usually considered
since its instantiation requires key sizes and computation times that are at least
quadratic in the security parameter [37]. Lyubaskevsky et al. proposed the use
of lattices with additional algebraic structure, and introduced in [37] the Ring
Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem, which can be seen as a variant of
the LWE problem but in a ring setting.
Let Φ(x) = xn + 1, with n a power of 2; that is, Φ(x) is the 2n-th cyclotomic
polynomial and is irreducible over the rationals. Let R be the ring of integer
polynomials Z[x] modulo Φ(x); that is, R = Z[x]/Φ(x). Elements of R, which
are residues modulo Φ(x), can be represented by integer polynomials of degree less
than n, we often treat them as vectors in Zn. Let q be a prime integer such that
q = 1 mod 2n, and Rq = R/q = Zq[x]/Φ(x). Elements of Rq can be represented
by polynomials of degree less than n with coeﬃcients in Zq, so we often treat
them as vectors in Znq . The Ring-LWE problem is defined as follows.
Definition 2.14 (Ring-LWE problem). Let s ∈ Rq a uniformly random ring
element and ψ a distribution over Rq, then we define As,ψ as the distribution
that samples pairs of the form (a, b), where a is chosen uniformly from Rq and
b = a · s + e, for some e sampled from ψ. The distribution As,ψ is also called
the Ring-LWE distribution. The Ring-LWE problem is to distinguish distribution
As,ψ from a uniform distribution over Rq ×Rq.
Note that in this case, we are directly defining the decisional version of this
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problem. The Ring-LWE is interesting because it produces much more eﬃcient
cryptosystems, as opposed to the traditional LWE problem.
Short Integer Solution The Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem was pro-
posed by Ajtai in [38], where it was proven to be at least as hard as other lattice
problems, and can be seen as a variant of the subset-sum problem over a special
additive group [37]. The SIS problem has been used for defining one-way collision-
resistant hash functions [38, 39], and digital signature schemes [35, 40].
Definition 2.15 (Short Integer Solution Problem (SIS)). Given a uniform ma-
trix A ∈ Zn×mq , and a real β, the SIS problem is to find a “short” nonzero vector
z ∈ Zm such that A · z = 0 mod q and ||z||2 ≤ β. Note that when m ≥ n log q,
short solutions are guaranteed to exist.
The following is a generalization of the SIS problem that is usually considered in
lattice-based cryptosystems.
Definition 2.16 (Inhomogenous Short Integer Solution Problem (ISIS)). Given
a uniform matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , a vector b ∈ Znq , and a real β, the ISIS problem is to
find a “short” nonzero vector z ∈ Zm such that A · z = b mod q and ||z||2 ≤ β.
Note that when m ≥ n log q, short solutions are guaranteed to exist.
2.3.3 The Random Oracle Model
Hash functions are an essential tool in many cryptographic schemes and protocols.
For this reason, it is also necessary to take them into consideration when proving
the security of schemes and protocols. However, it is diﬃcult to construct these
proofs from known properties of hash functions (e.g., collusion resistance).
Because of this problem, it is often necessary to resort to a random oracle, which
is an ideal abstraction of a hash function. More specifically, a random oracle is
a function that, for each possible input, outputs a uniformly distributed random
value. Random oracles are deterministic, in the sense that they must output the
same value for the same input. In addition, the simulator of the random oracle
is free to read previous inputs and outputs, and even to determine its behavior,
as long as the output remains uniformly distributed. The Random Oracle model
was first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [41], and has been used extensively
since then.
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Chapter 3
A Systematic Analysis of
Proxy Re-Encryption
In this chapter, we provide a detailed overview of the concept of proxy re-
encryption, and survey the current state of research, both for constructions and
applications, following a systematic approach. We review the main proxy re-
encryption schemes so far, and provide a detailed analysis of their characteristics.
Additionally, we also study the eﬃciency of selected schemes, both theoretically
and empirically. Finally, we discuss some applications of proxy re-encryption,
with a focus on data sharing in the cloud, which is the original motivating sce-
nario in this thesis.
3.1 Introduction
In 1997, Mambo and Okamoto [42] introduced the notion of “proxy cryptosys-
tem”, after envisioning the possible applications of a cryptosystem capable of
transforming ciphertexts intended for Alice into ciphertexts decryptable by Bob.
A naive solution to this problem could be that the original recipient decrypts the
ciphertext and subsequently encrypts the original message with the public key
of the new recipient. However, the decrypt-and-encrypt solution implies that the
original recipient must be available for re-encrypting ciphertexts when needed,
which is not always feasible. Moreover, this solution is very ineﬃcient from the
communication viewpoint. Mambo and Okamoto’s proposal was just a more
eﬃcient approach than the naive decrypt-and-encrypt.
Another naive solution to this problem could be to share the original secret key
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with a proxy entity, so it can first decrypt the ciphertext and then re-encrypt it
using the public key of the new recipient. However, this solution is clearly not
suitable for all cases, as it requires a high level of trust in the proxy, enough to
entrust him the secret key of the original recipient. It is clear that this solution
would introduce numerous risks.
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss proposed in 1998 the first solution to this problem
[43], with the introduction of what they called “atomic proxy cryptography”, now
known as “proxy re-encryption” (PRE). In this solution, a semi-trusted proxy
entity is granted a re-encryption key, a special kind of key used during the trans-
formation of ciphertexts for Alice into ciphertexts for Bob; this transformation
process is performed without the proxy being able to read the underlying message.
Since then, there have been multiple proposals of proxy re-encryption schemes,
based on diﬀerent hardness assumptions and primitives. In this chapter we ana-
lyze the most important contributions on proxy re-encryption constructions.
From an abstract viewpoint, a proxy re-encryption scheme realizes the function-
ality of delegation of decryption rights, since it allows a user (i.e., the delegator)
to delegate the decryption rights to another user (i.e., the delegatee). This func-
tionality is extremely useful in many applications; in this chapter, we also review
several proposed applications of proxy re-encryption. In particular, we are es-
pecially interested on the application of proxy re-encryption to the problem of
access delegation to encrypted data, which has a natural relevance on the secure
data sharing scenario, as explained in the first chapter.
3.1.1 Research Methodology
In order to perform a thorough survey on proxy re-encryption schemes and ap-
plications, we followed an ad-hoc methodology to identify and filter publica-
tions based on bibliometric criteria. A comprehensive bibliography on proxy
re-encryption schemes and applications, carefully maintained by Shao [44], served
as a first raw source of publications. On top of that, we manually added several
relevant publications that were not included in this bibliography, which stem
from our own study of the literature or through queries for relevant keywords
to search engines. The result of this phase is two lists of publications, one fo-
cused on schemes (together with attacks and security analyses) and the other on
applications. The list of schemes originally had 83 publications and the list of
applications 69, totaling 152.
Once the list of publications was prepared, it was necessary to define a filter for
the list of proxy re-encryption schemes, given the workload associated to their
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analysis. Although, in general, most of the papers were preliminarily studied,
some of them were filtered out. We used the number of cites for each paper, as
measured by Google Scholar, as an heuristic metric of the relevance of the pa-
per. For instance, non-recent publications (e.g., before 2009) which have no cites
yet, were marked as not relevant. However, manual verification of the discarded
publications was required in order to rule out false negatives. The result of this
phase is a collection of 58 publications, where 13 were from schemes and 45 from
applications.
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide the basic definitions and concepts that will serve as
the basis of our analysis. This includes syntax definition, security models and
relevant properties.
3.2.1 Syntax of PRE schemes
Basically, a PRE scheme has two types of functions: those that generate key ma-
terial (KeyGen and ReKeyGen), and those that deal with ciphertexts and messages
(Enc, ReEnc, and Dec). Some of this functions are alike PKE functions: KeyGen
produces pairs of public and secret keys, Enc generates a ciphertext that encrypts
a message according to a certain public key, while Dec deciphers the ciphertext
using the corresponding secret key. On top of these functions, a PRE scheme
also defines functions to support the re-encryption functionality: ReKeyGen pro-
duces a re-encryption key between Alice and Bob, and ReEnc uses this key to
transform ciphertexts originally intended for Alice into ciphertexts decryptable
by Bob using his secret key.
Most of proxy re-encryption schemes comply with the diagram shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, which depicts the flow of messages, ciphertexts and keys in a PRE envi-
ronment.
The following is a general definition of the syntax of a proxy re-encryption
scheme, based on the ones from Canetti and Hohenberger [45] and Ateniese et al.
[11]:
Definition 3.1 (PRE scheme). A proxy re-encryption scheme is a tuple of algo-
rithms (KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec):
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pkA pkB skB
Enc ReEnc Dec
KeyGen
ReKeyGen
m cA cB
rkA→B
skA
m
Figure 3.1: General diagram of a proxy re-encryption scheme
• KeyGen(n)→ (pkA, skA). On input security parameter n, the key generation
algorithm KeyGen outputs (pkA, skA), the public and secret keys for user A.
• ReKeyGen(pkA, skA, pkB, skB) → rkA→B. On input the pair of public and
secret keys (pkA, skA) for user A and the pair of public and secret keys
(pkB, skB) for user B, the re-encryption key generation algorithm ReKeyGen
outputs a re-encryption key rkA→B.
• Enc(pkA,m) → cA. On input the public key pkA and a message m ∈ M,
the encryption algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext cA ∈ C.
• ReEnc(rkA→B, cA)→ cB. On input a re-encryption key rkA→B and a cipher-
text cA ∈ C, the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc outputs a second ciphertext
cB ∈ C or the error symbol ⊥ indicating cA is invalid.
• Dec(skA, cA) → m. On input the secret key skA and a ciphertext cA ∈ C,
the decryption algorithm Dec outputs a message m ∈M or the error symbol
⊥ indicating cA is invalid.
The plaintext and ciphertext spaces are denoted by M and C, respectively.
Note that, although this definition is wide enough, there are more general defi-
nitions of the syntax of PRE schemes, such as the one from Ateniese et al. [11],
where instead single encryption and decryption algorithms, there are sets of al-
gorithms
−→
Enc and
−−→
Dec, defined over diﬀerent ciphertext spaces.
Figure 3.2 shows the relations among plaintext and ciphertext spaces for diﬀer-
ent kinds of PRE schemes, where (3.2a) represents PRE schemes with a single
ciphertext space, while (3.2b) shows the case of two ciphertext spaces. Examples
of PRE schemes with a single ciphertext space are [43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49], while
[11, 14, 50, 12] are schemes with two ciphertext spaces. Some schemes, such as
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M
C
Enc Dec
ReEnc
(a) Single ciphertext space
M
C1 C2
Enc1
Dec1
Enc2
Dec2
ReEnc
(b) Two ciphertext spaces
Figure 3.2: Transformations between plaintext and ciphertext spaces
[13], exhibit an expansive nature on re-encryption, and technically, are defined
over an infinite number of ciphertext spaces, since each re-encryption induces a
diﬀerent space. For the sake of simplicity, we opt for the generic (and simpler)
syntax with a single ciphertext space.
3.2.2 Security Models of Proxy Re-Encryption
Being proxy re-encryption an extension of public-key encryption, it is natural that
the security models for PRE extend those of PKE. However, the ability to re-
encrypt ciphertexts presents an interesting challenge when facing the definitions
of security for PRE. On the one hand, PRE constructions have to guarantee the
security objectives of the scheme, such as confidentiality and validity of cipher-
texts. On the other hand, they have to allow the transformation of ciphertexts
by means of re-encryption. Intuitively, both goals seem to conflict with each
other.
Security Notions for PRE
Similarly to PKE, the most usual security notions in PRE are indistinguishabil-
ity against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and indistinguishability against
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA). Both notions capture inability of an ad-
versary to distinguish ciphertexts for known messages, and are diﬀerentiated by
when the oracles are available for the adversary. These security notions are for-
mally defined as a two-phase security game: during the first phase, the adversary
can use the available oracles, constrained by some conditions; next, before the
second phase starts, the adversary freely chooses two messages and receives the
challenge ciphertext, which is an encryption of one of them at random; next, he
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can use the available oracles, again, constrained by some conditions; and finally,
he has to guess which of the messages was encrypted.
The restrictions applicable during the game are what actually diﬀerentiates the se-
curity notions. When the oracles are completely restricted throughout the game,
the security notion is IND-CPA, while when they are permitted, the notion is
IND-CCA. It is possible to define more fine-grained notions for IND-CCA, as
in PKE: if oracles are forbidden during the second phase, then one obtains in-
distinguishability against non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA1); if
not, we are alluding to the indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attacks (IND-CCA2) notion. The IND-CCA1 notion is seldom targeted in proxy
re-encryption.
For defining IND-CCA security in PRE it is necessary to forbid certain queries
from the adversary. Just as in PKE the adversary cannot query the decryption
oracle with the challenge ciphertext, in PRE the adversary should not be able
to trivially win the game through queries to the decryption, re-encryption and
re-encryption key generation oracles; however, such restrictions should allow the
adversary to still query the decryption and re-encryption oracles with any ci-
phertext which is not derived from the challenge ciphertext. The restrictions to
the oracles in PRE are usually defined using the concept of derivatives of the
challenge ciphertext, first proposed by Canetti and Hohenberger in [45], which
captures the idea of ciphertexts that are connected to the challenge by means
of oracle queries. See Section 4.2 in the next chapter for more details about the
concept of derivatives, and for a detailed description of possible attack models,
parametrized as a function of the availability of the decryption and re-encryption
oracles.
An interesting and orthogonal concept to the aforementioned security notions is
Replayable CCA (RCCA) originally defined for PKE [51]. This is a weaker form
of IND-CCA where the adversary is able to make innocuous modifications to
ciphertexts, as long as the original message is not altered. This notion naturally
fits in the context of PRE, since the goal of PRE is to transform ciphertexts from
one user to another, without changing the message.
Assumptions
The security models for PRE are also shaped by some additional assumptions.
Perhaps the more important of these assumptions in the PRE context is the
corruption model. In a static corruption model, the adversary must decide in
advance whether to corrupt a user or not before asking for the generation of
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the user’s keypair; with the term corruption we are referring to the adversary
knowing the secret keys of the user. In contrast, in an adaptive corruption model,
the adversary is free to corrupt users in any moment.
Another interesting assumption is related to how the adversary obtains keys. In
the knowledge of secret key model, the challenger generates the key material of all
users, while in the chosen key model the adversary can adaptively choose public
keys for malicious users [12]. See [52] for more insights about these models.
As in PKE, the vast majority of proxy re-encryption schemes are examples of
provable security. In some cases, the proofs of the security are given in the
random oracle model, where hash functions are assumed to behave as random
oracles, an idealization where the hash function is deterministic but its output is
uniformly distributed at random in its image domain. When this assumption is
not present, we say that we are in the standard model.
The security of provable-secure schemes is defined in terms of reductions to hard
problems. In other words, the schemes are proven secure, assuming that certain
problem is hard. There is a multitude of hardness assumptions, some of them
more prominent than others. The most usual are the Computational and Deci-
sional Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH and DDH) problems in the case of generic groups,
the Bilinear Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman (DBDH) problem in the case of groups
with bilinear pairings, and the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem in the case
of lattice-based schemes.
3.2.3 Properties
In this section we review the main properties associated to proxy re-encryption
schemes. Some of these properties are related to the ability of an adversary
(including the proxy and the delegatees) for deriving key material. We will use the
notation introduced by Wang et al. in [53] for describing some of these properties
in a more formal manner. We will denote by X + Y → Z if element Z can be
derived from elementsX and Y ; public information, such as the public parameters
and the public keys, is intrinsically assumed. The converse case will be denoted
by X + Y ￿ Z.
Directionality
This property is associated to direction of the delegation, and is embodied by the
re-encryption key. The delegation can be either unidirectional or bidirectional.
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Unidirectional delegation means that decryption rights are delegated only from
delegator to delegatee, and not in the other direction. Using the notation de-
scribed above, we say that a PRE scheme is unidirectional when the following
applies:
rkA→B ￿ rkB→A
Otherwise, the scheme is bidirectional, so it is possible to compute rkB→A from
rkA→B. The fact that a PRE scheme is bidirectional is not necessarily negative,
but depending on the situation, it may not be a desirable characteristic. Since
PRE can be seen as a mechanism for delegation of decryption rights, bidirectional
schemes would be appropriate for scenarios where the trust relationship between
delegators and delegatees is symmetric. However, this situation is not common
for most applications.
For bidirectional schemes, there is a recurring pattern that appears in some of
them, related to how the re-encryption keys are constructed. Informally, these
re-encryption keys contain a combination of the delegatee’s secret key and the
inverse of the delegator’s secret key, so when they are used during re-encryption,
the delegator’s secret key in the ciphertext can be substituted by the delegatee’s.
More formally, this pattern appears in schemes where public keys are a function
of the secret keys, and the secret key space and re-encryption key space are the
same. Let us assume that the underlying structure of the secret key space has
a group structure, where ∗ is the operator. Then, in this pattern, re-encryption
keys are of the form rkA→B = sk−1A ∗ skB, where sk−1A is the inverse of skA for the
∗ operator. Therefore, it is clear that when this pattern emerges, the converse
re-encryption key can be easily computed as rkB→A = rk−1A→B, so the scheme
is bidirectional. A second result is that it is possible that a collusion between
the proxy and one of the participants extracts the secret key of the other (e.g.,
skA = rk
−1
A→B ∗skB). We refer to this pattern as the “BBS pattern”, as the BBS98
scheme [43] was the first example. Other notable examples are the schemes from
Canetti and Hohenberger [45], Weng et al. [54] and Xagawa and Tanaka [46].
Usually, the underlying group is multiplicative, although, for example, the scheme
from Xagawa and Tanaka uses an additive group. For this reason, we preferred
to describe this pattern with the generic operator ∗.
Number of Uses
We say a PRE scheme is single-use if ciphertexts are re-encryptable just once.
This characteristic is usually associated to schemes with multiple ciphertext
spaces, since this way the re-encryption can be constructed as a one-way trans-
formations between ciphertext spaces, e.g., by means of pairings.
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On the contrary, if ciphertexts are re-encryptable multiple times, the PRE scheme
is said to be multi-use. This characteristic is usually associated to schemes with
a single ciphertext space. We further classify multi-use schemes in three types
according to the way they achieve this property:
• True multi-use schemes : The main characteristic of this type of schemes
is that the re-encryption function does not alter the form of the cipher-
texts. That is, re-encrypted ciphertexts are identical in shape to original
ciphertexts, except maybe for the random elements. For this reason, re-
encryption preserves the size of ciphertexts and the running time of the
decryption does not depend on the number of re-encryptions of the cipher-
text. Examples of this type of multi-use schemes are [43] and [45]. As an
illustration, let us study the re-encryption procedure in [43]: the encryption
of a message m for the user A is of the form cA = (mgk, gak), being k a
random secret, and the re-encryption key for user A to B is computed as
rkA→B = ba , where a and b are the secret keys of users A and B respec-
tively. The re-encryption function simply exponentiates the second element
of the ciphertext to the re-encryption key, so the re-encrypted ciphertext is
cB = (cA,1, c
rkA→B
A,2 ) = (mg
k, (ga)
b
a ) = (mgk, gbk).
• Expansive multi-use schemes : Some multi-use schemes are based on an it-
erative method of key encapsulation. The idea is that a random secret,
generated for each re-encryption key, acts as trapdoor for a trapdoor func-
tion applied to the random secret of the previous re-encryption; the cur-
rent random secret is encrypted with the encryption function of the PRE
scheme, so it can be further re-encrypted. Thus, the ciphertext contains
a sort of chain of random secrets for each re-encryption, scrambled using
trapdoor functions. The result of this procedure is that the ciphertext size
grows linearly with the number of re-encryptions, and, as a consequence,
the cost of decryption depends on the number of previous decryptions. A
general method for constructing expansive multi-use schemes, depicted in
Figure 3.3, is as follows: Let gT be a trapdoor function with trapdoor T and
x1, ..., xN random secrets, then the general form of a ciphertext re-encrypted
N times will be:
cN = (gx1(m), gx2(x1), ..., gxN (xN−1),Enc(pkN , xN))
Re-encryption keys are of the form rki→j = (f(ski, xj),Enc(pkj, xj)), where
fT is also a trapdoor function. The challenge in designing a scheme of
this kind is to define the re-encryption function so the combination of
Enc(pki, xi) and fski(xj)) results in gxj(xi), for all xi, xj, and without the
proxy learning anything.
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c0 = Enc(pk0,m)
c1 = (gx1(m),Enc(pk1, x1))
c2 = (gx1(m), gx2(x1),Enc(pk2, x2))
rk0→1 = (fsk0(x1),Enc(pk1, x1))
rk1→2 = (fsk1(x2),Enc(pk2, x2))
Figure 3.3: Re-encryption process in expansive multi-use PRE schemes
• Limited multi-use schemes : Whereas the previous kinds of multiuse schemes
support an indefinite number of re-encryptions, some recent proxy re-encryption
schemes, in particular those based on lattices [46, 47, 48, 49], present a
limited version of the multi-use property, since the re-encryption function
introduces noise to the ciphertext. For this reason, and depending on the
parameters used, the accumulated noise makes the decryption procedure to
fail after a certain number of re-encryptions. This may even happen after
just one re-encryption. Thus, schemes of this type are in an intermediate
area between single-use and multi-use. For instance, the scheme we pro-
pose in Section 5.1 is of this type, as the number of possible re-encryptions
varies with the parameters used; in particular, the average number of re-
encryptions that is supported varies from 5 to 50. Another interesting
example is the scheme from Kirshanova [48], which is allegedly single-use,
although that would ultimately depend on the choice of parameters.
Collusion-safeness
This property conveys the safeness of the delegator’s secret key against collusion
attacks made by the delegatee and the proxy; that is, delegator’s secret key cannot
be derived from the re-encryption key and the delegatee’s secret key:
rkA→B + skB ￿ skA
However, this property may not be suﬃcient for some purposes. In most cases,
such a collusion does reveal a weak secret associated to the delegator’s secret
key skA. In some schemes, such as [11] and [12], this weak secret can be used
to create new re-encryption keys or to decrypt re-encryptable ciphertexts; to a
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certain extent, the weak secret key enables to achieve the functionality of the
re-encryption key generation function and the decryption function.
Transitivity
A PRE scheme is said to be transitive if the proxy alone is able to re-delegate
decryption rights. That is, it can combine re-encryption keys to produce new
ones. More formally:
rkA→B + rkB→C → rkA→C
As in the bidirectional case, transitiveness is not negative per se; it depends heav-
ily on the scenario where the scheme is applied. However, transitive delegation is
troublesome in general, because it is diﬃcult for the original delegator to foresee
the potential delegations which could occur.
Schemes that present the BBS pattern are also transitive. This is easy to check: if
rkA→B = sk−1A ·skB and rkB→C = sk−1B ·skC , then rkA→C = rkA→B ·rkB→C .
Interactivity
Recall that the general syntax of PRE presented in Section 3.2.1 included the
secret key of the delegatee skB in the re-encryption key generation function. If
this key is not needed, then the scheme is not interactive, since re-encryption keys
for delegatees can be produced without their participation; that is, the delegator
is able to create a re-encryption key using his own secret key and the delegatee’s
public key. More formally:
skA → rkA→X , ∀X
On the contrary, an interactive scheme implies the participation of the delegatee;
in most cases interactivity is an undesired property, as it introduces a communi-
cation overhead, and more worryingly, may be vulnerable to collusion-attacks for
extracting the secret keys involved. However, interactive schemes can be used to
implement delegation acceptance by the delegatee [11]; that is, re-encryption keys
cannot be generated without the consent and participation of the delegatee.
It is worth mentioning, that the BBS pattern introduced before produces inter-
active schemes, since the re-encryption key generation necessarily uses the secret
keys of both users. Canetti and Hohenberger describe in [45] a simple secure
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three-party protocol for computing the re-encryption key that involves the proxy
and both users. The protocol is as follows:
1. A selects a random blinding factor r from the secret keys’ space, and sends
r ∗ sk−1A to B and r to the proxy.
2. B computes r ∗ sk−1A ∗ skB and sends it to the proxy.
3. The proxy computes rkA→B = (r ∗ sk−1A ∗ skB) ∗ r−1.
The final outcome of the protocol is that the proxy knows the re-encryption
key but no secret keys, while the users do not reveal their secret keys to each
other.
Other properties
• Temporary: Some schemes take the temporal dimension into consideration,
so the delegation of decryption rights is only valid for a specific period of
time. This property was first introduced by Ateniese et al. in [11].
• Conditional: It is also possible to define keywords that restrict the re-
encryption functionality, in a conditional vein. Therefore, conditional PRE
represents a fine-grained generalization of traditional PRE. In conditional
PRE, re-encryption keys are associated to a certain keyword, so the proxy is
only capable of re-encrypting ciphertexts that are tagged with that keyword.
This notion was introduced by Weng et al. in [55].
• Non-transferability: This property, first considered by Ateniese et al. in
[11], captures the idea of the inability of a collusion of proxy and delegatees
to re-delegate decryption rights. More formally:
rkA→B + skB ￿ rkA→X , ∀X
• Proxy invisibility: A PRE scheme is said to be proxy-invisible if a delegatee
is unable to distinguish a ciphertext computed under her public key from a
re-encrypted ciphertext, originally encrypted under another public key [11].
That is, the proxy is “invisible”, in the sense that the delegatee cannot
discern whether the proxy has transformed the ciphertexts or not.
• Perfect Key-Switching: A stronger property than proxy invisibility is per-
fect key-switching, which we propose in Section 5.2. Informally, a PRE
scheme satisfies this property when the re-encryption cleanly switches one
public key for another, without altering the format of the ciphertext nor
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the random coins used; that is, the key-switching that takes places during
re-encryption is perfect. Examples of this type of scheme are the BBS98
[43] and CH07 [45] schemes. It is clear that perfect key-switching implies
proxy invisibility: a re-encrypted ciphertext has exactly the same form as
a ciphertext originally encrypted with the delegatee’s public key. However,
the converse (i.e., proxy invisibility implies perfect key-switching) is not
necessarily true, since a proxy-invisible PRE scheme may alter the original
randomness during the re-encryption (e.g., AFGH06a [11]).
3.3 Analysis of Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes
In this section we review and analyze the main proxy re-encryption schemes,
which result from the bibliometric process presented in Section 3.1.1. A total of
13 publications were selected, and since some of them proposed several schemes,
the total number of analyzed schemes is 19. We only considered those proposed
schemes which were accompanied by a proof of security; in some cases, variants
of the proposals are sketched, but without presenting a demonstration of security
and correctness, or even a full description of the construction.
The goal of this analysis is to study the characteristics of each of these schemes,
taking in consideration the concepts presented in the previous section, without
explaining in detail the constructions from the cryptographic point of view. The
review makes a comparative analysis possible, which is described subsequently.
Finally, we also present a performance analysis of a selection of these schemes,
both theoretically and empirically.
3.3.1 Review of Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes
An early notion, reminiscent of proxy re-encryption, was presented in 1997 by
Mambo and Okamoto [42], although their proposal implied that the original re-
cipient must be available for re-encrypting ciphertexts when needed, which is not
always feasible. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss proposed in 1998 the first proxy
re-encryption scheme [43], which complies with the established notion of proxy
re-encryption. Since then numerous schemes have been proposed. In this section
we review a selection of these schemes.
In order to properly identify schemes, each scheme was labeled with the author’s
initials and year of publication, and if necessary, an additional alphabetic index
for diﬀerentiating schemes within the same publication (e.g., AFGH06a).
45
Chapter 3. A Systematic Analysis of Proxy Re-Encryption
BBS98 scheme
This scheme was the first to show an actual construction that complied with
the notion of proxy re-encryption. Given the simplicity and elegance of the con-
struction, we describe it here for illustration purposes. This scheme is based on
ElGamal and works in a multiplicative cyclic group G ⊂ Zp of prime order q,
where p = 2q + 1 is a prime, and g a generator of G. Alice generates a random
secret key skA = a ∈ Zq and publish her public keys pkA = ga ∈ G. Bob proceeds
analogously for generating his key pair. In order to send an encrypted message
m to Alice, one samples a random integer r ∈ Zq and uses her public key pkA to
compute the following pair:
cA = (pk
r
A,m · gr) = (gar,m · gr)
Since G ⊂ Zp, all operations are performed modulo p. The re-encryption key is
computed using the secret keys of the users, which implies that the scheme is
interactive, as follows:
rkA→B =
skB
skA
=
b
a
∈ Zq
Once the proxy has the re-encryption key, it is able to transform a ciphertext cA,
intended for Alice, in a ciphertext cB, whose recipient is Bob; in order to do so,
the proxy takes cA = (cA,1, cA,2), and computes:
cB = (c
rkA→B
A,1 , cA,2) = ((g
ar)
b
a ,m · gr) = (gbr,m · gr)
It can be seen that the re-encryption process simply switches one key for another,
cleanly, making this scheme an example of the perfect key-switching property.
Therefore, the decryption process is exactly the same for all the ciphertexts. In
order to retrieve the original message, the recipient (e.g., Bob) uses his secret key
to compute:
m =
cB,2
(cB,1)
1
skB
This scheme is multi-use and proven CPA-secure in the standard model. It is
the prime representative of the pattern for bidirectional schemes presented in
Section 3.2.3 (i.e., the BBS pattern). Therefore, it is also interactive, transitive
and not resistant to collusions.
AFGH06 schemes
Ateniese, Fu, Green and Hohenberger proposed in [56] and [11] new proxy
re-encryption schemes based on bilinear pairings. These schemes were the first to
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present the idea of multiple ciphertext spaces, as shown in Figure 3.2b. Original
encryptions are referred as “second-level ciphertexts”, while re-encrypted cipher-
texts are “first-level ciphertexts”. Hence, the re-encryption function is a trans-
formation between the second-level ciphertext space and the first-level one.
Their first scheme, AFGH06a, is unidirectional, single-use, not interactive, not
transitive, and proxy invisible; it is also collusion-safe, although colluding ad-
versaries may compute the weak secret ga1 of the delegator that allows to de-
crypt second-level ciphertexts and create re-encryption keys. The second scheme,
AFGH06b, is a temporary variation of the previous one, where the validity of re-
encryption keys is bounded to a specific time period. It is similar to AFGH06a,
but it introduces a trusted third party that broadcasts a random value associated
to each time period. Thus, this scheme permits the revocation of all previous del-
egations just by making a change in a global parameter (i.e., the current time pe-
riod). However, in order to generate re-encryption keys, the delegator needs that
the delegatee compute and publish a delegation acceptance value, which makes
this scheme interactive. Moreover, the re-encryption key generation must occur
in the same time period (or before) than the encryption process, which limits
the flexibility of the scheme. Both schemes, AFGH06a and AFGH06b, are proven
CPA-secure in the standard model. The authors also propose several applica-
tions of proxy re-encryption, and in particular they implement an access control
server for a secure file system using PRE. Additionally, the authors provide the
first implementation [57] and performance measurements of a proxy re-encryption
scheme.
GA07 schemes
Green and Ateniese proposed in [13] the first identity-based proxy re-encryption
schemes (IB-PRE). Being identity-based, these schemes use the identities of the
delegator and delegatees as their public keys. The authors present two IB-PRE
schemes, which we will refer as GA07a and GA07b. Their first scheme, GA07a,
is unidirectional and oﬀers multi-use capabilities, at the expense of being only
CPA-secure in the random oracle model. The scheme is also non-interactive, and
non-transitive. However, this scheme is not collusion-safe, as the proxy and the
delegatee can collude and pool their keys to obtain the secret key of the delegator.
This scheme is based in the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [58], and, in principal,
can reuse an existing deployment, as it uses the same type of parameters and
keys. The multi-use property is achieved using an expansive construction, so the
ciphertexts grow on each re-encryption. This scheme was the first to show this
type of construction.
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Their second scheme, GA07b is single-use, and is allegedly CCA-secure in the
random oracle model, although Koo et al. present in [59] an attack that uses
the re-encryption oracle during the second phase of the security game, so we will
consider it as CCA1-secure. This scheme is based on the Gentry-Silverberg HIBE
scheme [60]. It is also important to note that, in the same vein as most IBE-based
schemes, these schemes require a Key Generation Center that issues a private key
for each identity and that must maintain a master secret key. Both schemes are
also pairing-based.
CH07 scheme
Canetti and Hohenberger present in [45] a CCA-secure bidirectional scheme in
the standard model. They initially construct a CCA-secure scheme in the random
oracle model, and modify it for the standard model. We will only consider the lat-
ter version, since the modifications are minimal. The CH07 scheme presents the
BBS pattern, so it is also interactive, transitive, and not resistant to collusions.
CH07 introduces CCA-security by integrating a one-time signature into the ci-
phertexts, following the CHK paradigm [51]. Informally, the solution proposed by
the authors is to sign a portion of the ciphertext, which remains unaﬀected by the
re-encryption; otherwise, the signature is invalidated. The remaining part of the
ciphertext is what actually changes during re-encryption. In order to validate this
part, the signed portion includes some extra information that permits to check
that the re-encrypted part has only changed the underlying public key. Another
main contribution of the authors is several definitions of CCA-security for bidi-
rectional proxy re-encryption schemes, both game- and simulation-based.
CT07 schemes
Chu and Tzeng presented in [14] two IB-PRE schemes, built upon Waters IBE
construction [61]. In fact, their security proofs are reductions to the security of
the Waters IBE scheme, which in turn is secure under the DBDH assumption.
Similarly to the GA07a scheme, the proposed schemes follow the expansive multi-
use construction. The first scheme, CT07a, is CPA-secure in the standard model,
unidirectional and not interactive, but not collusion-resistant, as shown by [12].
The second scheme, CT07b, is reported CCA-secure, but Shao and Cao show in
[62] that anyone is able to re-randomize ciphertexts, which makes the scheme
secure in a weaker notion, namely RCCA; this scheme is also not resistant to
collusions.
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Mat07 scheme
Matsuo presented in [63] two IB-PRE schemes. The first one is a rather pecu-
liar proposal, called “hybrid proxy re-encryption”, where ciphertexts encrypted
using a public key encryption scheme can be re-encrypted to ciphertexts under
an identity-based encryption scheme; due to this unusual nature, we will not an-
alyze it here. The second one, Mat07, is an identity-based proxy re-encryption
scheme. A significant characteristic of this scheme is that it introduces a new
entity called “Re-Encryption Key Generator” that is in charge of producing re-
encryption keys and that receives a copy of the master secret key; in principle, the
Private Key Generator could also take this role. Thus, in this setting the original
delegator is deprived of the re-encryption key generation capabilities, which are
now taken by the Re-Encryption Key Generator. The scheme is unidirectional,
single-use, collusion-resistant and is proven CPA-secure on the standard model.
It is also interactive, as it requires the secret key of the delegatee, and transitive,
since it is trivial to compute the re-encryption key rkID→ID￿￿ from rkID→ID￿ and
rkID￿→ID￿￿ .
ABH09 scheme
Another interesting proposal is presented in [64], where the authors define the
notion of key privacy in the context of proxy re-encryption, which prevents the
proxy to derive the identities of both sender and receiver from a re-encryption
key. Their scheme, ABH09, is constructed with bilinear pairings and is proven
CPA-secure in the standard model. The scheme is unidirectional, single-hop,
resistant to collusions, not interactive and not transitive.
The key privacy property is proven by means of a specific security game defined
by the authors, which serves as a reference to other key-private PRE schemes.
Additionally, they also present two necessary conditions for a PRE scheme to
be key private. The first condition is that the re-encryption function should not
be deterministic. The second condition is that a restricted PKE-version of the
scheme should also be key private, as defined in [65] for PKE.
WDLC10 scheme
Weng et al. proposed in [54] two bidirectional schemes without pairings, both
CCA-secure in the random oracle model under the hardness of the Computational
Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) problem. Unlike most of previous proposals, these schemes
are not based in bilinear pairing operations, which makes them, in principle, more
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eﬃcient. These schemes achieve CCA-security by integrating Schnorr signatures
[66] with a PRE-version of hashed ElGamal encryption scheme. The first scheme,
WDLC10a, follows the BBS pattern for bidirectional schemes. Therefore, it is
interactive, transitive and not resistant to collusions. In contrast to other schemes
that follow this pattern, WDLC10a is single-use. The second scheme, WDLC10b,
is very similar to the previous one, but produces re-encryption keys in a diﬀerent
way in order to be non-transitive.
LV11 schemes
Libert and Vergnaud proposed, first in [67] and later on in [12], several unidirec-
tional schemes with chosen-ciphertext security in the standard model. Specifi-
cally, they achieve the RCCA notion, which is a relaxed version of CCA security.
The first scheme, LV11a, is similar to AFGH06a, but takes ideas from CH07, such as
the use of one-time signatures. It is unidirectional, single-use, collusion-resistant,
not interactive and not transitive. Since it is defined in the RCCA model, it is
possible to re-randomize ciphertexts. Seo et al. [68] detected an error in one of
their security proofs, in which the adversary was able to distinguish the simu-
lation from a real attack, and propose a way to amend it. The second scheme,
LV11b, is a temporal version of the previous one; as opposed to the temporal
scheme from Ateniese, AFGH06b, this scheme is not interactive. Additionally, it
is the first PRE scheme that considers the chosen-key model. In addition to these
schemes, Libert and Vergnaud also propose several variations of their schemes,
without providing extensive descriptions and proofs. In particular, they show
how the temporal scheme can be extended to allow temporal windows, instead
of just single periods of time; they also introduce a conditional version of their
scheme.
XT10 scheme
Xagawa and Tanaka presented in [46] the first proxy re-encryption scheme based
on lattices. In particular, this scheme is based on the Learning With Errors
(LWE) problem [32]. This scheme is reminiscent to the BBS98 scheme, but
adapted to a lattice-based setting. It presents the same BBS pattern, although
represented additively, so rkAB = skB − skA. Therefore, this scheme is bidirec-
tional, interactive, transitive and not resistant to collusions. The scheme is also
multi-use, more specifically, of the limited multi-use type.
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ABPW13 scheme
Aono et al. proposed in [47] a lattice-based encryption scheme, ABPW13, which
is proven CPA-secure in the standard model. This scheme is based upon a lattice
cryptosystem from Lindner and Peikert [33], whose hardness relies on the LWE
problem. ABPW13 is unidirectional, interactive, not transitive and limited multi-
use. The scheme is not resistant to collusions from the proxy and the delegatee,
as shown recently by [69]. The authors also state that ABPW13 is key-private;
however, Nishimaki and Xagawa recently noted in [70] that, although the scheme
ensures the anonymity of the delegator, the delegatee is exposed trivially, since its
public key is contained in the re-encryption key, achieving then a partial form of
key-privacy. A strong contribution from the authors is the estimation of security
parameters for achieving desired levels of security. This estimation was done by
approximating the cost of an exhaustive search attack to LWE.
On top of this scheme, the authors construct a “CCA-secure” version in the ran-
dom oracle model, using the generic conversion from Fujisaki and Okamoto [71].
However, this version is flawed because it does not perform the validation step
during decryption of re-encrypted ciphertexts. If one forces this check, decryp-
tion will always fail in the case of re-encryption, breaking the correctness of the
scheme.
Kir14 scheme
Kirshanova presented in [48] a lattice-based PRE scheme, which was reported to
be CCA1-secure. The scheme is based on the CCA1-secure PKE scheme from
Micciancio and Peikert [40], and its security is associated to the hardness of
lattice problems, namely, the Learning With Errors and Short Integer Solution
(SIS) [38] problems. Basically, Kirshanova extended the original PKE scheme
to support re-encryptions, using the technique presented in [40] for trapdoor
delegation. The scheme Kir14 is unidirectional, not interactive and resistant to
collusions. The authors state that the scheme is single-use, although technically
we consider it of the limited multiuse type, as the choice of parameters is what
determines the number of possible re-encryptions. The authors prove on what
conditions the re-encryption process preserves the correctness, but this proof only
considers one hop; still, it would be possible that some sets of parameters permit
multiple re-encryptions. We show in Section 4.4 an attack to this scheme in the
CCA1 setting, and prove it actually satisfies a weaker notion of CCA1 where
no re-encryption oracle is provided to the adversary. The attack makes use of
a property first introduced by Canetti and Hohenberger in [45], called privacy
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of re-encryption keys, which captures the notion of an adversary being unable
to extract re-encryption keys from the knowledge of original and re-encrypted
ciphertexts. We refined this property and show its relation to queries to the re-
encryption oracle. We show then how the Kir14 scheme leaks re-encryption keys
when the re-encryption oracle is present, which is implied by the CCA1 security
notion.
NAL15 schemes
For the sake of completeness, we also include in this analysis two proposals con-
tained in this thesis (see Section 5.1). These proposals are based on the NTRU
cryptosystem [16]. The first scheme, NAL15a, is originally named “NTRUReEn-
crypt” since it is a PRE-version of the original NTRUEncrypt scheme. NAL15a
is bidirectional, multihop, and interactive, but not collusion-resistant, as it fol-
lows the usual BBS pattern. As the underlying NTRU scheme, the underlying
structure of this scheme is a polynomial ring, so the operations performed are
simply additions and multiplications of polynomials, which can be computed
very eﬃciently, and can even be parallelized. Therefore, the key strength of this
scheme is its performance. Experimental results show that this scheme outper-
forms others by an order of magnitude, in a similar way than NTRU does with
respect to other PKE schemes. However, the original NTRU scheme does not
have a proof of security, in the provable sense, and its security (and therefore
of NAL15a) is only conjectured, which has been called the “NTRU assumption”
[72]. The parameters for NTRU are then computed with regard to its resistance
to attacks. To overcome this problem, we also propose a provably-secure variant
that is proven CPA-secure under the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem, a vari-
ation of the LWE problem under a polynomial ring; this scheme is an extension
of a provable-secure version of NTRU proposed by Stehle´ and Steinfeld [73]. This
second PRE scheme, NAL15b, is identical to the previous one with respect to the
properties.
3.3.2 Summary and Comparison
We now summarize and compare the analyzed schemes in a single table. Table 3.1
shows this comparison, according to the following criteria:
• Directionality: A single arrow (→) is used to represent a unidirectional
scheme, whereas a double arrow (↔) denotes a bidirectional one.
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• Use: Single-use schemes are represented by the letter ’S’, true multi-use
schemes by the initials ’TM’, expansive multi-use schemes by ’EM’, and
limited multi-use schemes by ’LM’.
• Number of ciphertext spaces (#spaces): This column specifies the number
of ciphertext spaces on which the scheme is defined.
• Security: The achieved notion of security (e.g., CPA, CCA, RCCA) is pre-
sented, as well as whether is based or not in the random oracle model (RO
or SM).
• The “Based on” column describes the underlying structure on which the
scheme is constructed. The possible values are “Group” for generic groups,
“Pairing” for groups with bilinear pairings, and “Lattice” for schemes that
are lattice-based. Additionally, the hardness assumption is also presented.
• Collusion resistance: Schemes that are resistant to collusions are marked
with ￿, and with × otherwise.
• Non-transitive: Schemes that are non-transitive are marked with ￿, and
with × otherwise.
• Non-interactive: Schemes that are non-interactive are marked with ￿, and
with × otherwise.
• The last column shows additional relevant characteristics of the analyzed
schemes
3.3.3 Eﬃciency
This section is devoted to analyzing the performance of several PRE schemes.
This analysis will be made from two points of view: theoretical and empirical.
The latter kind of study is is seldom tackled in the literature.
As described in the general syntax of PRE, there are several functions in a
PRE scheme. However, from a functional point of view, we are mainly in-
terested in studying the computational costs for three of them: encryption of
messages intended to be re-encrypted, re-encryption of ciphertexts, and decryp-
tion of re-encrypted ciphertexts. This decision is justified by the actual use
of proxy re-encryption in applications, where ciphertexts are meant to be re-
encrypted. Therefore, functions such as non-delegatable encryption (denoted
usually by “first-level encryption”) are out of the scope of this analysis, since
could be achieve by means of traditional encryption schemes.
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Theoretical analysis
In this section we analyze and compare schemes from the theoretical standpoint.
We omit from our analysis the schemes that are lattice-based, since their under-
lying structure varies greatly, the theoretical analysis of costs is very intricate
and the results are not directly comparable. Therefore, the underlying structure
of the analyzed schemes is groups, either generic ones or pairing-based.
Usually, computational costs are analyzed in terms of the main operations per-
formed, which in this case are the exponentiation and the pairing. These costs
are denoted by te and tp, respectively. It is important to note that, in the case
of pairing groups, the computational costs of operations are diﬀerent depending
on the group where are performed; in fact, operations in G are more expensive
than in GT . For this reason, when necessary we will make the distinction between
operations in G (denoted by te) and in GT (denoted by teT ). Some of the schemes
make use of a one-time signatures (OTS) for reaching CCA-security. In this case,
the signature of a message using OTS, including key pair generation, is denoted by
tS, while the verification of a signature is denoted by tV . Finally, the decryption
of expansive multi-use schemes varies with the number N of re-encryptions.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3.2. It is interesting to see
the great diﬀerence in performance between schemes. For instance, the BBS98
schemes only needs a few exponentiations, as opposed to more complex schemes,
such as LV11a and CH07, which require up to five pairing operations for the
decryption. This is due to the additional costs incurred by the achievement of
CCA-security. Notable schemes are WDLC10a and WDLC10b, since they provide
CCA-security but only require a few exponentiations. Note also how in the case
of expansive multi-use schemes, the cost of decryption depends on the number of
re-encryptions.
With regard to space costs, these are mainly driven by the size of group elements.
Note also that, in the case of pairing groups, GT admits shorter representations
than G. As in the case of computational costs, some schemes make use of OTS;
the size of a signature is denoted by |σ|, while the size of a verification key is |svk|.
The cost of ciphertexts in some schemes also depends on the size of the original
message, |m|. Finally, in some cases, elements of Zq are also used. Table 3.3
shows the results of this analysis.
It can be seen how expansive schemes increase the size of ciphertext linearly
on each re-encryption. Similarly to the analysis of computational costs, CPA-
schemes usually have lower size of ciphertexts, since CCA-schemes need to include
additional elements for the validation of the ciphertexts (e.g., signatures).
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Table 3.2: Computational costs of selected PRE schemes
Scheme Encryption Re-encryption Decryption
BBS98 2te te te
AFGH06a te + teT tp teT
AFGH06b tp + te + teT tp teT
CH07 tp + 4te + teT + tS 4tp + 2te + tV 5tp + 2te + teT + tV
GA07a tp + 2te tp Ntp
GA07b tp + 3te 4tp + 2te 2tp + te
CT07a 2te + teT 2tp (N + 2)tp
CT07b 3te + teT + tS 2te + tV (7N + 3)tp + 2te + (N + 1)tV
Mat07 tp + 3te + teT tp + teT 2tp
ABH09 2te + teT 4tp + 2teT teT
WDLC10a 3te 3te 2te
WDLC10b 3te 3te 2te
LV11a 3te + teT + tS 2tp + 4te + tV 5tp + te + teT + tV
LV11b 5te + teT + tS 4tp + 8te + tV 9tp + te + teT + tV
Empirical analysis
We complement the theoretical analysis with an experimental evaluation, based
on previous work [49]. A selection of these schemes was implemented, with repre-
sentation of all the kinds of PRE schemes; this time, lattice-based schemes were
also included. The selected schemes are BBS98, AFGH06a, WDLC10a, LV11a,
ABPW13, and NAL15a. Our execution environment was an Intel Core 2 Duo
processor @ 2.66 GHz with 4 GB of RAM.
Group-based schemes were implemented in Java using elliptic curve cryptography
over a prime field. The NIST P-256 curve was used, which provides 128 bits of
security [74].
Pairing-based schemes were implemented using the jPBC library [75], a pairing-
based cryptography library for Java. As for the cryptographic details, we used a
supersingular curve of the form y2 = x3+x, with a 256-bit group order and 3072
bits for the field size, which achieves 128 bits of security (against the discrete
logarithm problem in G and GT ) [76][77]. In this case, the pairing is symmetric
(i.e., Type 1 pairing), which implies that operations in G are costlier than in GT ;
for example, using these parameters, exponentiations in G are 10 times costlier
56
3.3. Analysis of Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes
Table 3.3: Space costs of selected PRE schemes
Scheme CT Re-encrypted CT
BBS98 2|G| 2|G|
AFGH06a |G|+ |GT | 2|GT |
AFGH06b |G|+ |GT | 2|GT |
CH07 |svk|+ 3|G|+ |GT |+ |σ| |svk|+ 3|G|+ |GT |+ |σ|
GA07a |G|+ |GT | (N + 1)(|G|+ |GT |)
GA07b 2|G|+ |GT |+ |m| |G|+ |GT |+ 2|m|+ |id|
CT07a 2|G|+ |GT | (N + 2)|G|+ (N + 1)|GT |
CT07b 3|G|+ |GT |+ |svk|+ |σ| (6N + 3)|G|+ (N + 1)(|GT |+ |svk|+ |σ|)
Mat07 2|G|+ |GT | 2|G|+ |GT |
ABH09 2|G|+ |GT | 2|GT |
WDLC10a 2|G|+ |m|+ |Zq| 2|G|+ |m|
WDLC10b 2|G|+ |m|+ |Zq| |G|+ |m|
LV11a |svk|+ 2|G|+ |GT |+ |σ| |svk|+ 4|G|+ |GT |+ |σ|
LV11b |Zq|+ |svk|+ 3|G|+ |GT |+ |σ| |Zq|+ |svk|+ 7|G|+ |GT |+ |σ|
Table 3.4: Experimental performance of several PRE schemes (in ms.)
Scheme Encryption Re-encryption Decryption
BBS98 11.07 11.48 11.21
AFGH06a 22.76 83.52 13.76
WDLC10a 22.52 22.29 11.89
LV11a 155.27 386.93 443.87
ABPW13 1.17 20.50 0.47
NAL15a 0.43 1.15 1.22
than in GT . For eﬃciency reasons, we have made extensive use of exponentiation
and pairing preprocessing of frequently-used elements.
With regard to lattice-based schemes, we implemented NAL15a as an extension
of an available open-source Java implementation of NTRU [78]. We used the
ees1171ep1 parameter set from [79], which is designed for 256 bits of security.
The ABPW13 was implemented using the SageMath software, using the set of
parameters proposed by the authors that correspond to 143 bits of security and
128-bit plaintexts.
Table 3.4 shows the cost in ms. of the main operations of the selected PRE
schemes. These figures were measured as the mean CPU time of 10.000 executions
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for each type of operation. Roughly, the theoretical costs presented before are
translated to an empirical setting. It is worth mentioning the high performance
that lattice-based schemes exhibit. Both schemes, ABPW13 and NAL15a, present
similar figures regarding encryption and decryption, although ABPW13 is one
order of magnitude slower when it comes to re-encryption. Note, however, that
the results of these experiments are highly dependent on implementation issues,
such as the choice of language, parameters (type of curve, size of fields, type
of pairing, etc.), the underlying libraries and the use of preprocessing. For this
reason, any comparative analysis based on these figures has to take these aspects
into consideration.
3.4 Applications of Proxy Re-Encryption
The second part of this chapter is devoted to the analysis of the applications of
proxy re-encryption. As described in the introduction, we performed a review
of almost 70 papers regarding applications, of which 45 were finally analyzed in
detail.
We also followed a bibliometric approach for drawing conclusions on this part.
In particular, we classified each of the reviewed application according to certain
criteria: objective, scenario and functionality. The first criterion is related to
the security objectives that are intended to tackle with the application of PRE;
possible objectives are confidentiality, privacy, authentication and accountability.
The second criterion was clearly dominated by the cloud scenario, although other
scenarios are also considered, such as wireless networks. The third criterion is
associated to the intended functionality that is constructed with PRE, being
access control and key management the most prominent.
Once the classification is finished we counted the number of occurrences for each
category, and obtained the results shown in Table 3.5. The principal finding
after this study is that, not surprisingly, most of devised PRE applications are
centered on the combination of the confidentiality objective, the cloud computing
scenario, and the access control functionality. In other words, the typical use case
for proxy re-encryption is the construction of cryptographically-enforced access
control system in the clouds, so data can be shared to authorized users while
remaining confidential with regard to unauthorized parties and the cloud provider
itself. This result is compatible with our initial research postulate, by which we
consider PRE as a valuable part of the solution to the secure data sharing scenario.
The next section discusses the role of PRE in this scenario in more detail.
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Table 3.5: Bibliometric Analysis of PRE Applications
Criteria Classification Coverage
Objective
Confidentiality 80%
Privacy 10%
Authentication 8%
Accountability 2%
Scenarios
Cloud 53%
Wireless Network 8%
Others 33%
Functionality
Access Control 67%
Key Management 24%
Communication 4%
3.4.1 PRE and the Secure Data Sharing Scenario
As described in the introduction of this thesis, and illustrated in Figure 1.1, the
aforementioned scenario can be decomposed in several security domains, which
match naturally to the actors involved in PRE. When PRE is integrated within
the domains of the secure data sharing scenario, the data owner acts as a del-
egator who transfers access rights to encrypted information to data consumers,
who act as delegatees; a proxy entity (i.e., the cloud) participates in this dele-
gation process, transforming encrypted information by means of re-encryption.
Figure 3.4 depicts this more detailed view, including the associated key material
that is present on each domain.
From an abstract standpoint, data sharing in the cloud can be seen as a problem of
access control, where the protected resource is encrypted information. Proxy re-
encryption is then used to construct a cryptographically-enforced access control.
Ateniese et al. proposed in [11] a generic way to do this, as shown in Figure 3.5.
Let us assume three main actors: (i) the data owner, with public and private keys
pkA and skA; (ii) a consumer, with public and private keys pkB and skB; and
(iii) the cloud, which acts as a proxy and allows access to encrypted data through
re-encryption. The data to be protected is encrypted by the data owner with
a fresh symmetric encryption key, the data key, which is in turn encrypted his
public key pkA using the PRE scheme, thus creating an encrypted lockbox. This
lockbox, which contains the encrypted data and data key, can now be stored in
an untrusted repository, such as the cloud. Note also that the production of
encrypted data can be performed by any entity that knows the public key of the
data owner, supporting this way multiple data sources. For granting access to his
data, the data owner generates re-encryption keys for authorized users and hands
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Figure 3.4: Integration of PRE and Secure Data Sharing Domains
them to the proxy entity. As mentioned before, the re-encryption key rkA→B can
be seen as an access delegation token that the owner of the data creates in order
to enable user U to access to his data. When the delegatee user requests access
to the encrypted data, the proxy re-encrypts the lockbox. Finally, the delegatee
user decrypts the lockbox with his private key skB.
This template for cryptographically-enforced access control stems naturally from
the main functionality of PRE, which is delegation of access rights to encrypted
data. Note that it is not necessary for the data owner to be online. The only
requirement is that the cloud is available (which is an intrinsic characteristic of
the cloud paradigm). The data owner can be oﬀ-line, while consumers interact
directly with the cloud provider in order to access to authorized information. Note
that this assumes a honest-but-curious trust model, where the cloud provider may
have an incentive for accessing users’ data without their permission, but at the
same time, it is assumed to behave honestly with respect its functionality.
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Review of the literature
In this section we review the state of research on solutions for cloud data sharing
that use proxy re-encryption. Most of them share a similar essence, although
vary greatly with regards to specific constructions and designs.
In [80], Yu et al. propose a system for data sharing in the cloud, using a combi-
nation of Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and PRE. Data is
encrypted using KP-ABE and stored in the cloud, so only users in possession of
an appropriate collection of attribute secret keys can decrypt the data. Besides
managing encrypted data, the cloud also manages attribute secret keys of the
users, except for one special secret key which is required for all decryptions, so
the cloud cannot decipher anything. The reason why the cloud manages these
secret keys is to handle revocation of users. When a data owner revokes certain
users, then new keys must be provided for the remaining users, and encrypted
data must be re-encrypted. Both issues are handled by the cloud using PRE,
so the data owner simply generates re-encryption keys for transforming not only
ciphertexts, but also attribute public and secret keys. This added functionality
is possible by carefully integrating the BBS98 scheme with a KP-ABE scheme.
For eﬃciency reasons, the re-encryptions are performed in a “lazy” way, that is,
only when an access request from a user is made. [81] propose a modification
to Yu et al. design in order to avoid collusions between the provider and re-
voked users, but their proposal consists basically in replacing the cloud provider
with a trusted third party, which implies relying on stronger trust assumptions.
[82, 83, 84] describe similar approaches but for integration with Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE), where the access structure is associated
to the encrypted data rather than to the user attribute key.
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Lin et al. propose in [85] a combination of threshold encryption with PRE. This
proposal fits the general template of PRE application for data sharing, with the
exception being that the proxy entity is distributed among several servers in order
to support a decentralized architecture. On an access request, a randomly chosen
subset of these servers re-encrypt the data, and since each of these servers store a
share of the data owner’s secret key, they also perform partial decryptions of the
encrypted data. The delegatee user combines the partially decryptions in order
to obtain the requested data.
Jia et al. describe in [86] a classical instantiation of the PRE-based access control
template. The proposed system uses the CPA-secure identity-based PRE scheme
from [13], GA07a, where re-encryption keys represent authorization tokens be-
tween users. Revocation is handled by the data owner by asking the provider to
replace re-encryption keys with new ones.
Liu et al. propose in [87] a time-constrained access control scheme, combining
once again PRE and ABE. In this case, ABE is used for describing time-based
access control policies, whereas PRE is used for updating the time attributes.
Their proposed system follows the typical template for PRE-based access control
in the cloud.
The proposal from [88] is diﬀerent from the previous ones in that it is a general
model that can be instantiated with diﬀerent PRE schemes. The proposals pre-
sented before require a specific PRE scheme (most of the times, a variation of the
classic BBS98 scheme), carefully tailored for its integration with other primitives
and protocols, such as ABE schemes. This general model modifies the encrypted
lockbox scheme presented before, including ABE in the following manner. The
data key k is split in two diﬀerent keys k1 and k2 by means of a XOR operation,
so k = k1 ⊕ k2. Next, PRE is used for encrypting k1 and ABE for k2. If a con-
sumer requests access to the encrypted data, then he must possess the necessary
ABE secret keys and the cloud must have the corresponding re-encryption key for
performing the re-encryption. In that case, then the consumer is able to retrieve
k1 and k2, and hence, to decrypt the data with the data key k. In this model,
fine-grained access control is provided by ABE, whereas PRE makes revocation
possible. This model is an example of use of re-encryption keys as authorization
tokens, where the presence of re-encryption keys in the cloud provider means that
the consumer is authorized to access the data.
Xiong et al. present CloudSeal in [89], a cloud-based data sharing system that in-
tegrates PRE with a secret sharing scheme. This proposal is slightly similar to the
one from Yu et al., but instead of ABE, it uses a secret sharing scheme. The main
drawback is that it assumes the existence of secure channels between the data
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owner and data consumers, which nullifies the necessity of the proposal.
Han et al. propose in [90] an identity-based PRE scheme suitable for intra- and
inter-domain data sharing. The main feature of this scheme it that it bounds
the re-encryption keys not only to the consumers’s identity but also to a specific
ciphertext (i.e., a shared file). This design choice implies that the data owner must
create a diﬀerent re-encryption key for each pair of data consumer and shared
file, but also limits the chances that the cloud provider re-encrypts arbitrary data.
Lin et al. also propose a similar idea [91], but with a hierarchical PRE instead of
identity-based PRE.
Other similar examples are found for more specific applications. For example, the
PRE-based access control template is used in [92, 93] for creating an Identity-
as-a-Service model where the cloud identity provider cannot access the identity
information. In [94], PRE is used for delegating access to encrypted search in-
dexes, in the context of privacy-aware searches. Proxy re-encryption is integrated
to the MapReduce paradigm for privacy-preserving Big Data processing in [95].
Other examples are found for service aggregation [96], de-duplication in secure
cloud storage [97], and privacy-preserving location-based services [98].
Findings
Among the principal findings after this review, is the occurrence of common
patterns that appear among these proposals. For instance, the most prominent is
that authorization is realized by considering re-encryption keys as authorization
tokens. Thus, rkA→B can be seen as an authorization from data owner A to user
B. In this case, the enforcement of access rights is naturally realized by means
of re-encryption.
When it comes to revocation of access rights, PRE can be used in two ways.
The first way is applicable when re-encryption keys are used as authorization
tokens between users; in this case, the owner simply instructs the cloud provider
to delete the re-encryption keys [11, 88]. Therefore, it is necessary that the cloud
provider is trusted enough to ensure that the keys are actually deleted. The
second way, used by Yu et al. [80], is to re-encrypt the data so it cannot be
decrypted by the revoked user. In this case, it is also necessary to trust that the
cloud provider is performing the re-encryption and that it is not maintaining a
copy of the unre-encrypted data.
Another interesting finding concerns other cryptographic primitives that usually
accompany PRE. The main is Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), which is used
in combination with PRE in at least 9 of the 45 papers (that is, a fifth part).
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Another cryptographic technique commonly used in conjunction with PRE is
Threshold Encryption.
Principal Motivations for this Use Case
As mentioned in Section 3.1, proxy re-encryption can be seen as a cryptographic
primitive for accomplishing access delegation to encrypted information. There-
fore, it has a natural application in the construction of cryptographically-enforced
access control systems, in particular, for scenarios where the protected resource
is stored externally (e.g. the cloud).
In a PRE-based solution for the cloud, private data can reside in the cloud in
encrypted form and be shared to authorized users, while still remain confidential
with regard to unauthorized parties and the cloud provider itself. The use of
encryption for protecting data at rest can decrease the risks associated to data
disclosure in this kind of scenario, since outsourced information can only be ef-
fectively shared if access has been delegated by the data owner. In this Section
we have reviewed several proposals that revolve around this basic model.
We believe that this represents a great advance with respect to the state of
current cloud services, where users’ data is fully controlled by the cloud provider,
or, at its best, data is encrypted with keys controlled by the provider. Data
owners are obliged to trust that the provider will make proper use of his data
and will guarantee its protection. Therefore, a PRE-based solution could enable
users to outsource their data to cloud providers without necessarily establishing
a strong trust relation with them, relying instead in the protection granted by
the underlying cryptographic mechanism.
At this point, it is worth studying what kind of incentives may motivate cloud
providers to implement this kind of solutions, that is, handle data in encrypted
form. Note that, in the first place, cloud providers would lose control over the
user’s data, which is currently a valuable asset. Moreover, providers may incur in
more expenses as a result of implementing these additional security mechanisms.
However, there are two main incentives that could encourage cloud providers to
adopt this solution.
The first incentive is compliance and minimization of liability. An intrinsic char-
acteristic of the cloud is that it enables ubiquitous access to data, which can,
potentially, infringe privacy and data protection regulations. Moreover, the cloud
can also be used to host and process information that is of problematic nature,
such as, illegal or defamatory material [99]. Therefore, cloud providers are af-
fected by specific laws and regulations regarding privacy, data protection and
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copyright, among others. Although cloud providers currently try to reduce their
liability through specific clauses in SLAs, legal responsibility for the data in the
cloud also lies on the side of the provider. In contrast, in a PRE-based solution
where the outsourced data is encrypted prior to reaching the cloud, liability of
the cloud provider is drastically minimized, as it is unable to read user’s data,
for which it does not hold the decryption keys. As a consequence of this, users
should be the ones designated as liable and subject to the enforcement of key
disclosure laws.
Data confidentiality as an added value represents a second type of incentive. This
way cloud provider could oﬀer secure data processing and storage as an added
value, establishing a competitive advantage over the rest. This characteristic
could be an important driver in users’ decision process, as there is an increasing
interest in this kind of services. In our opinion, there is room in the current cloud
service landspace for a business model based on the respect for users’ privacy and
data confidentiality.
Economic analysis
One of the postulates of this thesis is that the application of proxy re-encryption
as a cryptographic mechanism for supporting secure data sharing in the cloud is
practical. However, a thorough analysis of the practicality of this kind of solution
should also determine whether it is economically viable or not.
There is a vast amount of proposals for improving the security, reliability and
functionality of cloud services, but, at the same time, there are almost no criti-
cal analyses about the economic impact that arises from the implementation of
such proposals. In particular, most of proponents of the use of cryptography
only provide theoretical analysis of security and computation complexity, but do
not study whether their proposals are economically feasible or not, even when
their solutions often imply an intensive use of computation or communication
resources.
In [7], Chen and Sion analyze the economic impact of the outsourcing of compu-
tation and storage to the cloud. The key contribution of this work is the quan-
tification of the costs associated to this outsourcing, which are driven by several
factors, such as hardware, energy and personnel. The authors break down the
expenses derived from computation, storage and network services, using the pic-
ocent (which corresponds to 10−12 USD cents) as unit of cost. Table 3.6 shows
these estimations, which correspond to 2010. Additionally, we provide an ad-
justment of these prices to the year 2015. Although some factors that influence
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Table 3.6: Estimated cost (in picocents) for cloud resources
Resource Cost (2010) Cost (2015)
Computation (per CPU cycle) 0.93 – 2.36 0.65 – 1.65
Network (per bit) 800 – 6 000 560 – 4200
Storage (per bit per year) 100 70
Table 3.7: Comparison of re-encryption costs in the cloud
Scheme Time (ms) Cost (cents) #re-encryptions/cent
BBS98 11.48 4.58E-05 21 844
AFGH06a 83.52 3.33E-04 3 003
WDLC10a 22.29 8.89E-05 1 1250
LV11a 386.9 1.54E-03 648
ABPW13 20.5 8.17E-05 12 233
NAL15a 1.15 4.59E-06 218 063
these costs remain stable (e.g., infrastructures, energy and personnel), the core
resource, which is hardware, increases with time its eﬃciency per unit of cost.
Computing resources are the best example, since the cost per CPU cycle has de-
creased exponentially through history, following Moore’s law. A simple analysis
based on the prices of Amazon EC2 shows that these have decreased roughly a
30% from 2010 to 2015 (a yearly 7%); there are, however, some indications that
real costs for the cloud provider have decreased even more and that their margins
of benefits have progressively increased [100].
Based on these figures, we estimate the cost per re-encryption operation for sev-
eral of the PRE schemes analyzed in this survey. A similar economic assessment
about the use of proxy re-encryption in a cloud setting is presented in [92]. Recall
that the re-encryption is the basic operation that the cloud provider performs in
a PRE-based access control solution for the cloud. Table 3.7 shows these esti-
mations, assuming a cost of 1.5 picocents per CPU cycle. These figures vary
greatly depending on the selected scheme and its properties, but demonstrate
that the cloud provider could perform in the order of thousands of re-encryptions
per cent.
For illustration purposes, let us assume a scenario similar to that suggested in
[92], where a cloud provider implements a PRE-based access control solution that
performs a million re-encryptions per day, one for each access request it receives.
From the figures of the last table, it can be seen that the total cost of these
operations over the course of a year range from $5,631 for the LV11a scheme, to
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just $17 for the NAL15a scheme. In our opinion, these expenses are reasonable
for a cloud provider, considering the costs that it could incur in the case of a
disclosure or security breach. These costs are diﬃcult to estimate, but at the
very least such incidents would have a negative impact with regard to loss of
customers and reputation.
3.4.2 Other Applications of PRE
Although protecting outsourced information in the cloud is a natural applica-
tion, there are other interesting uses for proxy re-encryption, where group key
management is the most remarkable. In this case, PRE can be used for diﬀerent
purposes such as distributing keys, revoking access, performing key escrows, etc.
This has multiple applications, such as DRM protection [101, 102, 103, 104], and
security in multicast communications [105, 106, 107, 108].
Among alternative uses of PRE we find privacy-preserving solutions for RFID
[109, 110, 111], authentication in VANETs [112, 113], location privacy [114],
privacy in online social networks [115], anonymity in P2P communication [116],
and access control in other scenarios [117, 118].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we survey and analyze the current state of research on proxy re-
encryption, for both constructions and applications. The most prominent proxy
re-encryption schemes are studied in the light of relevant properties and security
models. We additionally provide a comparative analysis of the performance of
selected schemes, both from the theoretical and experimental points of view.
With regards to the applications, we perform an extensive analysis of the avail-
able literature following a bibliometric approach. As a result, we confirm that
secure data sharing in the cloud is currently the use case with the most potential
for proxy re-encryption. In a PRE-based solution to cloud data sharing, private
data can reside in the cloud in encrypted form and be shared to authorized users
by means of re-encryption, while still remain confidential with regard to unautho-
rized parties and the cloud provider itself, reducing this way the risks traditionally
associated to this scenario. We postulate that the cloud data sharing problem
could certainly benefit from the use of proxy re-encryption, given the functional-
ities and performance levels that it provides. Moreover, it is more realistic than
other solutions, such as those based on homomorphic encryption.
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In the next chapters, we will tackle some of the challenges associated to proxy
re-encryption described in the introduction. In particular, the next chapter is
devoted to analyzing the very definitions of security in PRE.
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The previous chapter gave deep insight into the basic concepts of proxy re-
encryption, including some of the most representative schemes and applications.
Now we put the focus on security definitions, the fundamental abstractions that
shape the idea of security in proxy re-encryption. As proxy re-encryption is a
special type of public-key encryption, it is natural to “reuse” the security no-
tions of the latter (see Section 2.3.1). Thus, PRE schemes in the literature aim
to achieve IND-CPA [11], IND-CCA1 [48] and IND-CCA2 [45] security. How-
ever, the desired security notions are often defined in an ad-hoc manner for each
scheme, with subtle variations and restrictions, caused by the lack of established
definitions of the security notions of PRE, and ultimately, of the attack models,
which in the case of PRE are potentially richer than in PKE because of the pos-
sibility of re-encryption. While in the PKE setting, the diﬀerent attack models
are determined by the availability of the decryption oracle (i.e., not available in
CPA, only before the challenge in CCA1, or throughout the game in CCA2), in
the PRE setting it is reasonable to base the attack models on the availability of
both the decryption and the re-encryption oracles.
In this chapter we explore these subtleties by means of a parametric family of
attack models that considers the availability of both oracles separately. In turn,
the resulting set of attack models enables fine-grained security notions for PRE.
Based on these notions, we study some of the relations that arise between them,
and especially, the separations, which further support the importance of the
re-encryption oracle. The identified separations stem from the study of a new
property of PRE, called “privacy of re-encryption keys”, and that formalizes the
concept that re-encryption keys should not be leaked through the re-encryption
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function; we show that when a scheme does not satisfy this property, it cannot
achieve a proper security notion for PRE.
Finally, in light of this formalization, we show how a recent “CCA1-secure” proxy
re-encryption scheme from PKC 2014 [48] does not actually achieve a meaningful
chosen-ciphertext security notion for PRE, since it breaks when one considers an
oracle for re-encryption. The methodology described for this attack, based on
the leakage of re-encryption keys, supports the idea that PRE schemes should
not leak re-encryption keys.
4.1 Introduction
In the context of PKE, there is a wide consensus on the consideration of indistin-
guishability against adaptive ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) as the right notion
of security, although weaker notions such as IND-CCA1 may be suﬃcient in other
contexts, such as homomorphic encryption. See [119] for a detailed exposition on
the importance of security against chosen ciphertext attacks. The arguments for
CCA2-security also hold in the case of proxy re-encryption. Canetti and Hohen-
berger motivate the necessity of CCA2-security with an example of a decryption
oracle in a scenario of encrypted email forwarding, where email user Alice can
set the mail server to forward all her encrypted emails to a designated recipient
Bob, without giving her secret keys to either the mail server or Bob [45]. In
this example, an attacker might gain access to a decryption oracle by producing
ciphertexts, emailing them to Alice and then hoping that she responds with “Did
you send the following attachment to me?”, together with the decrypted cipher-
text. If instead of this, it is Bob who responds to the attacker attaching the
re-encrypted ciphertext, then the attacker would gain access to a re-encryption
oracle. The motivation for considering the re-encryption oracle also comes from
the study of applications of proxy re-encryption from the literature, where the
re-encryption function is deployed as a service, so participants of the system can
re-encrypt ciphertexts from one user to another. This service eﬀectively simu-
lates a re-encryption oracle. In fact, expecting the availability of this oracle is a
weaker assumption than presuming the availability of a decryption oracle, since
the latter requires knowledge of secret keys, and therefore, it probably would be
better protected and less likely to be available.
While in the PKE context a chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) means that the ad-
versary is free to choose ciphertexts for querying a decryption oracle, in the PRE
context a CCA adversary should also be able to freely re-encrypt ciphertexts.
That is, the re-encryption functionality should be captured by any meaningful
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CCA model for PRE. In fact, the re-encryption oracle alone is able, in some cases,
to simulate a decryption oracle, as shown in Section 4.3.3. This further supports
our claims about its relevance and raises questions about what are proper security
notions for PRE.
4.2 Definitions of Security for Proxy Re-Encryption
The definitions of security in the context of PRE extend those of PKE due to the
possibility of re-encrypting ciphertexts. That is, in addition to the KeyGen, Enc
and Dec functions, a PRE scheme defines two more, ReKeyGen and ReEnc, which
are associated with this additional capability (as described in Definition 3.1 in
Section 3.2.1). This incorporation is what led us to conceive a more comprehen-
sive characterization of the attack models and security notions for PRE.
Before proceeding, recall that we distinguished in Section 3.2.1 between schemes
with a single ciphertext space from those with multiple ciphertext spaces. The for-
mer are usually associated with multi-hop PRE schemes, although there are some
recent single-hop schemes based on lattices that also present this characteristic
[47, 48]. The latter are, on the contrary, usually associated with unidirectional
schemes, since this way there may be transformations between ciphertext spaces
that are valid only in one direction. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves to
PRE schemes defined over a single ciphertext space, although our results can be
extended to the other case.
The additional re-encryption capability that is introduced in proxy re-encryption
clearly makes the definitions of security more complex. As in the decryption
case, the re-encryption capability can be modeled by the access to a re-encryption
oracle Oreenc. Thus, it is natural to think of a collection of attack models with
diﬀerent access levels to the decryption and re-encryption oracles. In this section
we describe a parametric set of chosen-ciphertext attack models, which depends
solely on the availability of these oracles for each phase of the security game.
This family of attack models in turn implies a collection of security notions. As
mentioned before, we will restrict ourselves to the indistinguishability goal.
It is reasonable to argue that meaningful chosen-ciphertext attack models for
proxy re-encryption should provide re-encryption capabilities, in the form of a re-
encryption oracle. However, access to this oracle is not suﬃcient guarantee that
proper re-encryption capabilities are granted to the adversary. In order to not
make the security game trivial for the adversary, it is necessary that the definition
of the re-encryption oracle includes some restrictions. At the same time, it is also
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important that these restrictions are not too strong, since this would achieve
weaker notions of security, as pointed out by Canetti and Hohenberger in [45]. In
particular, the re-encryption oracle should be able to re-encrypt any ciphertext
that is not derived from the challenge ciphertext, between any pair of users,
including the target user. Otherwise, the security model would be too restrictive,
leading to weaker security notions. Therefore, it is paramount that the proposed
attack models are accompanied by a reasonable definition of the oracles available,
as well as their restrictions.
4.2.1 Oracles
The following definitions of oracles and their restrictions are adapted from those
of Canetti and Hohenberger [45]. A core concept that shapes the restrictions is
the notion of derivatives of the challenge. As stated before, the security game
could be trivial for the adversary if there were no restrictions, since in certain
cases a re-encryption oracle can be used to simulate a decryption oracle. For
example, consider the case of the challenge ciphertext c∗, which can be poten-
tially re-encrypted from the target public key pk∗ to any other one. Canetti
and Hohenberger introduce the notion of derivatives as a means for shaping the
oracle restrictions. Informally, the derivatives of the challenge are those pairs
(pk, c) that are linked to (pk∗, c∗) through queries to the re-encryption and re-
encryption key generation oracles, and which would allow trivial attacks from the
adversary.
Definition 4.1 (Derivatives of the challenge). The set of derivatives of (pk∗, c∗)
is defined inductively, as follows:
• (pk∗, c∗) is a derivative of itself.
• If (pkj, cj) is a derivative of (pki, ci) and (pki, ci) is a derivative of (pk∗, c∗),
then (pkj, cj) is a derivative of (pk∗, c∗).
• If the adversary has issued a re-encryption query (pki, pkj, ci) and obtained
a ciphertext cj as response, then (pkj, cj) is a derivative of (pki, ci).
• If the adversary has issued a re-encryption key generation query (pki, pkj),
and Dec(pkj, cj) ∈ {m0,m1}, then (pkj, cj) is a derivative of all pairs
(pki, c).
Once this concept has been established, we will describe the oracles involved in
the security game. Apart from the decryption and re-encryption oracles, it is
necessary to provide additional oracles for dealing with the inherently multi-user
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nature of proxy re-encryption. These oracles provide the adversary of keys for
multiple users, which can be either honest or corrupt depending on whether the
adversary is unaware of the corresponding secret key or not.
Let n ∈ N be the security parameter for a PRE scheme, and IH and IC be the
sets of indices of honest and corrupt users, respectively. By definition, the target
user is deemed honest, so its index i∗ ∈ IH . The public and private keys of target
user are pki∗ and ski∗ , respectively; we will, however, notate them as pk∗ and sk∗,
for simplicity. We define the following oracles, which will be made available to
the adversary during the security game and which can be invoked multiple times
in any order:
• Honest key generationOhonest: The oracle obtains a new keypair (pki, ski)←
KeyGen(n), adds index i to IH , and returns the public key pki.
• Corrupt key generationOcorrupt: The oracle obtains a new keypair (pki, ski)←
KeyGen(n), adds index i to IC , and returns the pair (pki, ski).
• Re-encryption key generationOrkgen: On input a pair of public keys (pki, pkj),
the oracle returns the re-encryption key rki→j ← ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj).
The adversary is only allowed to make queries where i ￿= j, and either
i, j ∈ IH or i, j ∈ IC .
• Re-encryption Oreenc: On input (pki, pkj, c), where i ￿= j and i, j ∈ IH ∪IC ,
the oracle returns the re-encrypted ciphertext c￿ ← ReEnc(rki→j, c). The
adversary is not allowed to make queries where j ∈ IC and (pki, c) is a
derivative of (pk∗, c∗).
• Decryption Odec: On input (pki, c), where i ∈ IH ∪ IC , the oracle returns
m ← Dec(ski, c). The adversary is not allowed to make queries where
(pki, c) is a derivative of (pk∗, c∗).
The ability to re-encrypt and decrypt ciphertexts is modeled by Oreenc and Odec.
The restrictions on the derivatives of the challenge ciphertext disallow trivial
attacks from the adversary, but are flexible enough to support a wide range
of queries. For example, it should be possible for the adversary to issue re-
encryption queries of the form (pk∗, pkj, cˆ), where pkj is corrupt, but (pk∗, cˆ) is
not a derivative of (pk∗, c∗).
The key generation oracles Ohonest, Ocorrupt, and Orkgen are always available for
the adversary,subject to the restrictions above. It can be seen that we assume a
static corruption model, where the adversary must decide to corrupt a user or not
before asking for the generation of the user’s keypair [64], hence the distinction
between honest and corrupt key generation. In addition, we also put common
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restrictions regarding how the adversary obtains keys. In particular, we are as-
suming the knowledge of secret key model, where the challenger generates the
key material of all users. A stronger model is the chosen key model, where the
adversary can adaptively choose public keys for malicious users [12].
The restrictions on the re-encryption key generation oracle have a strong influence
on the security model; in particular, we disallow the generation of re-encryption
keys between honest and corrupt users, as in some cases, this may lead to trivial
attacks from the adversary. We stress that the intention of this work is to support
definitional unity for PRE by providing a universal framework that captures the
essence of CCA-security, thus avoiding the definition of security notions that
are particular for each PRE subfamily. Although it would be possible to define
stronger notions by removing the restrictions on this oracle, this would render
these definitions useless for schemes with useful PRE properties, such as multi-
hop or transitiveness, which are of interest for many applications. For instance,
Libert and Vergnaud [12] permit all possible re-encryption key generation queries,
except those from the target user to a corrupt one. However, this only works when
the scheme is single-hop, non-transitive and resistant to collusions.
There are several examples that justify the restrictions for honest-to-corrupt re-
encryption keys. For instance, in multi-hop PRE, an adversary could trivially
win the game by first re-encrypting the challenge ciphertext to a honest user key,
and then using the honest-to-corrupt key to re-encrypt it to a corrupt user key,
thus trivially winning the game. The adversary could also achieve a similar result
if the scheme is transitive. Another example is found in not collusion-resistant
schemes, where the adversary can use a honest-to-corrupt key and a corrupt
secret key to extract the honest secret key. With regard to the restrictions to
corrupt-to-honest keys, there are two main reasons for that. On the one hand,
adversaries in non-interactive PRE schemes do not require the private key of the
delegatee for computing re-encryption keys, so the re-encryption key generation
oracle would be superfluous. On the other hand, interactive schemes are usually
bidirectional, which means that it is possible to compute a honest-to-corrupt key
from a corrupt-to-honest key, so the arguments above apply. Therefore, although
it is possible to remove these restrictions, it would make the resulting security
notions too particular and not relevant for many PRE schemes, which conflicts
with our original intention to attain definitions that are universal.
4.2.2 Attack Models
Inspired by the mnemonic defined in [24] for attack models CCA1 and CCA2,
where the number denotes the last adversarial stage during which she has access
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to a decryption oracle, we analogously define a parametric set of attack models
for proxy re-encryption based on the last adversarial stage during which the
adversary has access to the decryption and re-encryption oracles. Thus, our
parametric set of attack models is characterized by a pair of indices i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2},
so CCAi,j denotes an attack model where the adversary has a decryption oracle
until Phase i, and a re-encryption oracle until Phase j. As extreme cases, we
have that a “pure” CPA model is then denoted by CCA0,0, whereas a “pure”
CCA model is represented by CCA2,2. There is, however, a range of intermediate
attack models, diﬀerentiated by the last stage during which the adversary has
access to the decryption and re-encryption oracles. In the following, we formalize
this concept.
As stated, what actually varies among the proposed attack models is the avail-
ability of the decryption and re-encryption oracles. That is, throughout the
game the adversary has access to the key generation oracles Ohonest, Ocorrupt,
and Orkgen. We denote as Ωkg to the set that comprises these oracles. Now, let
Ωcca1 and Ω
cca
2 denote the sets of additional oracles that are available in Phases
1 and 2, respectively; the possible values that these sets can take are therefore
∅, {Oreenc}, {Odec}, and {Odec,Oreenc}. Let Ω1 = Ωcca1 ∪ Ωkg and Ω2 = Ωcca2 ∪ Ωkg
be the sets of oracles available in Phases 1 and 2, respectively. Since the set Ωkg
of key generation oracles is always present, then the sets Ωcca1 and Ω
cca
2 fully char-
acterize the possible attack models. We can describe the available oracles in a
more formal manner as follows. Let CCAi,j be an attack model for PRE and
k ∈ {1, 2}, then Odec ∈ Ωccak , for i ≥ k, and Oreenc ∈ Ωccak , for j ≥ k.
Table 4.1 describes the possible attack models for proxy re-encryption as a func-
tion of the availability of the oracles, characterized by the sets Ωcca1 and Ω
cca
2 .
The diﬀerent combinations of available oracles produce a parametric set of at-
tack models, with 9 possible choices. Note that we disallow the possibility of
having an oracle in Phase 2 but not in Phase 1, as the wording used in the def-
inition of the parametric attack models uses the term “until Phase” for defining
oracles’ availability and not “in Phase”. As a particular case of these attack
models we have that when Ωcca1 = Ω
cca
2 = ∅, the attained model CCA0,0 is indeed
CPA, since no decryption and re-encryption oracles are provided.
Not all possible attack models of this set are meaningful in the context of proxy re-
encryption. In fact, it seems reasonable to consider the access to a re-encryption
oracle to be easier than to a decryption oracle, since usually, re-encryption is
performed as a service by an online semi-trusted entity, whereas decryption ca-
pabilities are retained by the users. Hence, attack models in which there are
more decryption than re-encryption capabilities, and in particular, those where
a decryption oracle is provided but not a re-encryption one (CCA1,0 and CCA2,0),
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Table 4.1: Parametric Family of Attack Models for PRE
Ωcca1 Ω
cca
2 Attack model
∅ ∅ CCA0,0 = CPA
{Oreenc} ∅ CCA0,1
{Oreenc} {Oreenc} CCA0,2
{Odec} ∅ CCA1,0
{Odec,Oreenc} ∅ CCA1,1
{Odec,Oreenc} {Oreenc} CCA1,2
{Odec} {Odec} CCA2,0
{Odec,Oreenc} {Odec} CCA2,1
{Odec,Oreenc} {Odec,Oreenc} CCA2,2
do not seem to be appropriate for shaping security in a PRE scenario. This is
discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.4.
We later show general results that separate some of the security notions that arise
from these attack models. In particular, we demonstrate how the leakage of re-
encryption keys through Oreenc induces a separation between notions of security.
In addition, in Section 4.4 we show a concrete example of a PRE scheme that is
proven secure under a CCA1,0 model, but that fails when one considers a CCA1,1
model.
4.2.3 Security Notions for PRE
In the same fashion as for PKE, security notions for PRE are constructed by
combining a security goal (in this case, indistinguishability of encryptions) and
the proposed family of attack models. The following definitions are based upon
the definition of security for PKE given in Section 2.3.1.
Definition 4.2. Let Π=(KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, Dec, ReEnc,) be a PRE scheme,
A = (A1, A2) a polynomial-time adversary, and Ω1 and Ω2 be the set of available
oracles for A1 and A2, respectively. For i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, δ ∈ {0, 1}, and n ∈ N,
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the indistinguishability game is defined by the experiment
Experiment Exp
IND-CCAi,j
Π,A,δ (n)
(pk∗, sk∗) R←− KeyGen(n); (m0,m1, s)← A1(pk∗);
c∗ ← Enc(pk∗,mδ); d← A2(m0,m1, s, c∗)
return d
It is required that in the case that i = 2 or j = 2, the oracle queries from adversary
A2 have to satisfy the restrictions about derivatives of the challenge ciphertext c∗.
The sets of available oracles Ωcca1 and Ω
cca
1 are defined in accordance to the attack
model CCAi,j, as shown in Table 4.1.
Definition 4.3. Let Π be a proxy re-encryption scheme and A a polynomial-time
adversary. For i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and n ∈ N, the advantage of A is given by
Adv
IND-CCAi,j
Π,A (n) = |Pr[ExpIND-CCAi,jΠ,A,1 (n) = 1]− Pr[ExpIND-CCAi,jΠ,A,0 (n) = 1]|
We say that the PRE scheme Π is IND-CCAi,j secure if the advantageAdv
IND-CCAi,j
Π,A
is negligible.
Note that, in the security game described by the experiment, we are assuming
the selective model, since the challenger fixes the target public key pk∗ at the
beginning. This choice is made for the sake of clarity in the proof, and is also
followed by other relevant references, such as [11, 12].
Another aspect worth mentioning arises from how we disallow oracle queries that
include the challenge ciphertext (or a derivative). As shown in [15] by Bellare et
al., there are diﬀerent ways for formalizing this in the IND-CCA security game
for PKE. They identify four styles (SP, SE, BP, and BE), which result from the
combination of two orthogonal factors: the first factor is to disallow these queries
only in the second phase (“S”) or in both phases (“B”); the second factor depends
on whether the adversary is penalized a posteriori in case she makes such queries
(“P”), or, simply, this possibility is excluded from the experiment (“E”). In the
light of this formalization, the limitations posed on the oracle queries from A2 in
the definition of our experiment imply that our security notions fall under the
IND-CCA-SE category, as we only exclude adversaries that query derivatives of
the challenge ciphertext in phase 2; no restrictions exist on phase 1, as the set of
derivatives would be empty in this phase.
Finally, once the security notions have been defined, it is interesting to illustrate
them with examples of related schemes. It is reasonable to expect that most of
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these representatives belong to the central security notions, namely IND-CCA0,0,
IND-CCA1,1, and IND-CCA2,2 (see Section 4.3.4 for a discussion on why we con-
sider these notions as central). For example, the schemes from Blaze et al.
[43] and Ateniese et al. [11] are widely-known examples of IND-CCA0,0 secu-
rity. Canetti and Hohenberger present in [45] a classic instance of scheme secure
under IND-CCA2,2. Interestingly, and to the best of our knowledge, there are no
examples of IND-CCA1,1-secure schemes in the literature; Kirshanova presented
in [48] a scheme which was allegedly secure under this notion, but we show in
Section 4.4 that this scheme is actually IND-CCA1,0 secure. As for the rest of the
notions, we argue in Section 4.3.4 that they should be considered as degenerate
notions due to their asymmetry in the adversarial capabilities. These notions are
usually related to attacked schemes: for instance, Koo et al. present in [59] an
attack to the scheme from Green and Ateniese [13] that uses the re-encryption or-
acle during the second phase; thus, assuming no other attack is found, the scheme
from Green and Ateniese could be considered as a representative of IND-CCA2,1
security, as the attack is not valid under this security notion.
4.3 Relations among PRE security notions
As explained in Section 2.3.1, attack models can be combined with security
goals to form security notions. We restrict this thesis to the indistinguishabil-
ity goal. Hence, we derive a parametric set of security notions IND-CCAi,j, for
i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
In this section we study the relations between these notions, and in particular,
the separations that arise when the adversary is able to learn re-encryption keys
from a ciphertext and its re-encrypted value. In addition, we study how these
relations are influenced when we consider the multihop property. Finally, we
discuss which of these security notions should be considered meaningful, which
can be useful when addressing the definitions of security for a PRE scheme.
4.3.1 Implications among PRE security notions
The relations that naturally arise between these security notions can be repre-
sented diagrammatically, as depicted in Figure 4.1. This figure shows the hier-
archical relations that are consequence from the trivial implications between the
security notions. The following result demonstrates the trivial fact that a PRE
scheme that is secure under some security notion remains secure when one low-
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IND-CCA2,2 IND-CCA2,1 IND-CCA2,0
IND-CCA1,2 IND-CCA1,1 IND-CCA1,0
IND-CCA0,2 IND-CCA0,1 IND-CCA0,0 = IND-CPA
Figure 4.1: Implications among security notions for PRE
ers the re-encryption capabilities of the adversary. This result is represented in
Figure 4.1 by the horizontal arrows.
Theorem 4.4 (IND-CCAi,j ⇒ IND-CCAi,j−1). For i ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}, if
a PRE scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,j, then it is also secure in the
sense of IND-CCAi,j−1.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We prove the contrapositive: if a PRE scheme Π is not
secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,j−1, then it is not secure in the IND-CCAi,j sense
either. The former means that there is an algorithm B that breaks Π in the
IND-CCAi,j−1 sense with non-negligible advantage ε. From B, we can define an
algorithm A for breaking Π in the IND-CCAi,j sense and which behaves exactly
as B, since the oracles provided to B are also provided to A. Adversary A breaks
Π in the IND-CCAi,j sense with the same non-negligible advantage ε.
Similarly, the next result follows from considering the decryption oracle, instead
of the re-encryption one. This result is represented in Figure 4.1 by the vertical
arrows.
Theorem 4.5 (IND-CCAi,j ⇒ IND-CCAi,j−1). For i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, if
a PRE scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,j, then it is also secure in the
sense of IND-CCAi−1,j.
The proof is analogous to the one for Theorem 4.4.
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IND-CCA2,2
IND-CCA2,1
IND-CCA2,0
IND-CCA1,2
IND-CCA1,1
IND-CCA1,0
IND-CCA0,2
IND-CCA0,1
IND-CCA0,0
Thm. 4.8
Thm. 4.7
Figure 4.2: Separations among notions of security.
4.3.2 Separations among PRE Security Notions
Aside from the relations that arise from the initial – and rather trivial – implica-
tions among security notions, we are also interested in the separations that exist
between them. Figure 4.2 shows the separations that we address in this thesis; the
initial implications shown in Figure 4.1 are depicted with light dashed arrows for
the sake of clarity. Implications of the form IND-CCAi,j ⇒ IND-CCAi￿,j￿ mean that
each PRE scheme that is secure in the IND-CCAi,j sense, it is also secure in the
sense of IND-CCAi￿,j￿ . On the contrary, a separation IND-CCAi,j ￿⇒ IND-CCAi￿,j￿
means that there is at least a PRE scheme that is secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,j
but not in the sense of IND-CCAi￿,j￿ .
The separations that we analyze arise from exploiting the vulnerabilities of PRE
schemes that do not satisfy the private re-encryption keys property. This property
was first described in Remark 2.6 of [45], which stated that an adversary should
not be able to learn re-encryption keys from a ciphertext and its re-encrypted
value. The scheme analyzed in Section 4.4 is an example of this type of scheme.
The following is a more formal and general definition of this property.
Definition 4.6 (Private Re-Encryption Keys). Let Π be a proxy re-encryption
scheme and A a polynomial-time adversary. Let Ω = {Ohonest,Ocorrupt,Oreenc}
be the set of available oracles for A, and pk the public key of a honest user. The
scheme Π satisfies the private re-encryption keys property if the probability that
A computes a valid rkpk→pk￿, for some public key pk￿ of her choice, is negligible.
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Note that this definition is oblivious to the nature of the delegatee’s public key
pk￿. If this public key is from a honest user, then this is enough for forbidding the
possibility that the scheme achieves IND-CCA2,1 or IND-CCA2,2 security, as shown
next in Theorem 4.7. A more worrying situation is that pk￿ belongs to a corrupt
user (so A knows sk￿), since this completely rules out the chance of the scheme to
even be IND-CCA0,1 secure. This produces a greater separation between notions,
as demonstrated in Theorem 4.8.
The original definition of the private re-encryption keys property by Canetti and
Hohenberger contains the outline of a plausible attack to schemes that do not
fulfill this property. The following result, conveyed by Theorem 4.7, formalizes
this attack in order to establish a separation between security notions for PRE.
The basic idea behind this attack is that if the attacker can learn rkpk∗→pk￿ through
queries to Oreenc, where pk￿ belongs to a honest user, then she can win the security
game by locally re-encrypting c∗ to c￿, and then querying Odec with input (pk￿, c￿).
Note that this latter query is legal since the re-encryption key has been leaked
by queries to Oreenc, so it complies with the restrictions for derivatives of the
challenge ciphertext. However, it can be seen that this attack strategy only
works when the adversary has access to a decryption oracle during the second
phase and to a re-encryption oracle in any phase; that is, it can be only of type
CCA2,1 or CCA2,2. As a consequence, it is not possible to conduct this attack in
any other attack model (i.e., where a re-encryption oracle is not present or where
there is no decryption oracle in phase 2).
In principle, this suggests that this attack strategy produces two separations: one
from IND-CCA1,2 to IND-CCA2,1 (which corresponds to the case when the attack
does not work because the decryption oracle is not available in the second phase),
and another from IND-CCA2,0 to IND-CCA2,1 (the attack does not work because
the re-encryption oracle is never available). In the publication associated to this
chapter [120], we formalized each separation as theorems and provided a proof.
However, we have notice since then some flaws in these proofs. While the fix for
the proof of the second separation is immediate, the first one does not seem to
be trivial, since it is not possible to generate the re-encryption keys to leak, and
therefore, to define the re-encryption oracle in the CCA1,2 attack model. Luckily,
the first separation is not relevant with respect to the findings presented in this
chapter (and the associated publication). For this reason, we provide here an
amendment for the second separation, expressed by the next theorem.
Theorem 4.7 (IND-CCA2,0 ￿=⇒ IND-CCA2,1). If there exists a PRE scheme Π
that is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0, then there exists a PRE scheme Π￿
that is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0 but which is not secure in the sense of
IND-CCA2,1.
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Algorithm Enc’(pk, x)
y ← Enc(pk, x)
return (0, y)
Algorithm Dec’(sk, (y1, y2))
If y1 = 0 then return Dec(sk, y2)
else return ⊥
Algorithm ReEnc’(rk, (y1, y2))
If y1 = 0 then return
(0,ReEnc(rk, y2))
else return (1, rk)
Figure 4.3: Modified algorithms in Π￿
Proof of Theorem 4.7. First, assume that there exists a PRE schemeΠ = (KeyGen,
ReKeyGen, Enc, Dec, ReEnc) that is secure in the sense of IND-CCA1,2; otherwise,
the theorem is vacuously true. We now define scheme Π￿ =(KeyGen’, ReKey-
Gen’, Enc’, Dec’, ReEnc’), where KeyGen’ = KeyGen, ReKeyGen’ = ReKeyGen, and
Enc’, Dec’, and ReEnc’) are defined as shown in Figure 4.3. Informally, Π￿ sim-
ply leaks the re-encryption key during a re-encryption when the first component
is diﬀerent from 0. That is, we are constructing a proxy re-encryption scheme
which does not fulfill the property of private re-encryption keys. A re-encryption
oracle for this scheme should behave in the same way (i.e., it cannot output a
random value instead of the corresponding re-encryption key), since otherwise it
could be immediately detected by the adversary by verifying the correctness of
the re-encryption.
Claim 4.7.1. Π￿ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,1.
Proof of Claim 4.7.1. We define an adversary A = (A1, A2) that breaks Π￿ in the
sense of IND-CCA2,1, with probability 1 and in polynomial time, as follows. As we
are working in the selective model, A1 receives the target public key pk∗ at the be-
ginning of the game. In addition, A1 gets a honest public key pkh through oracle
Ohonest. According to the definition of the CCA2,1 model, Oreenc is available during
the first phase. A1 queries this oracle with (pk∗, pkh, (1, z)), for a randomly gen-
erated ciphertext z. Note that this query is legitimate, since challenge ciphertext
has not been generated yet. A1 receives rkpk∗→pkh as part of the output of the re-
encryption oracle, includes it in the state s and outputs (m0,m1, s). At the guess
phase, the challenge ciphertext is (0, c∗), so A2 receives (m0,m1, s, (0, c∗)) and
extracts rkpk∗→pkh from s. Now it computes ReEnc’(rkpk∗→pkh , (0, c
∗)) = (0, ch).
Finally, since the decryption oracle Odec is available during the second phase, ac-
cording to the definition of the CCA2,1 model, it makes the query Odec(pkh, (0, ch))
to recover the message mδ and determines δ with probability 1. This query is le-
gitimate because (pkh, (0, ch)) cannot be considered a derivative of the challenge,
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as the adversary did not obtain the re-encryption key from Orkgen.
Claim 4.7.2. Π￿ is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0
Proof of Claim 4.7.2. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that Π￿ is not se-
cure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0. Then, there exists an algorithm B that breaks
Π￿ in the IND-CCA2,0 sense with non-negligible advantage ε. From B, we can
define an adversary A = (A1, A2) that breaks Π in the IND-CCA2,0 sense as fol-
lows. Algorithm A1 simply outputs the same results than B1 for input pk∗, while
algorithm A2 takes input (m0,m1, s, c∗) and outputs the result d from calling B2
with parameters (m0,m1, s, (0, c∗)). The computations of B are done by A simu-
lating B’s decryption oracle OBdec using its own oracle OAdec, as follows: on input
(pk, (c1, c2)) to OBdec, A verifies that c1 = 0 and outputs OAdec(pk, c2); otherwise,
it outputs ⊥. The simulation is perfect, and A breaks Π in the IND-CCA2,0 sense
with the same advantage ε.
We present now a diﬀerent attack strategy, which produces a greater separation
between PRE security notions. Suppose that the adversary is able to extract
rkpk∗→pkx through calls to Oreenc, where pkx belongs to a corrupt user. Then, she
wins the security game by locally re-encrypting the challenge ciphertext c∗ to cx,
which she can decipher using skx. The only oracle query to Oreenc is legal since it
does not involve a derivative of the challenge ciphertext. It can be seen that this
attack strategy can only work when there is a re-encryption oracle available (i.e.,
any attack model above CCA0,1), thus producing a separation between IND-CCA2,0
and IND-CCA0,1.
Theorem 4.8 (IND-CCA2,0 ￿=⇒ IND-CCA0,1). If there exists a PRE scheme Π
that is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0, then there exists a PRE scheme Π￿
that is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2,0 but which is not secure in the sense of
IND-CCA0,1.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. The proof in this case is very similar to that of Theo-
rem 4.7, except that we now prove that Π￿ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA0,1.
Claim 4.8.1. Π￿ is not secure in the sense of IND-CCA0,1.
Proof of Claim 4.8.1. This proof is similar to the one of Claim 4.7.1. We define
an adversary A = (A1, A2) that breaks Π￿ in the sense of IND-CCA0,1, with prob-
ability 1 and in polynomial time, as follows. Since we are working in the selective
model, A1 receives the target public key pk∗ at the beginning of the game. In
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addition, A1 gets a pair of corrupt public and private keys (pkx, skx) through or-
acle Ocorrupt. Recall that, according to the definition of the CCA0,1 attack model,
the only additional oracle available in the phase 1 is Oreenc. A1 queries this or-
acle with (pk∗, pkx, (1, z)), for a randomly generated ciphertext z. A1 receives
rkpk∗→pkx as part of the output of the re-encryption oracle, includes it in the
state s and outputs (m0,m1, s). In phase 2, the challenge ciphertext is (0, c∗),
so A2 receives (m0,m1, s, (0, c∗)) and extracts rkpk∗→pkx from s. Now it com-
putes ReEnc’(rkpk∗→pkx , (0, c∗)) = (0, cx). Finally, it evaluates Dec’(skx, (0, cx)) to
recover the message mδ and determines δ with probability 1.
The last theorem entails the following corollary, which formalizes the idea that
there are PRE schemes that are secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,0, but fail once
a re-encryption oracle is introduced.
Corollary 4.9. If there exists a PRE scheme Π that is secure in the sense of
IND-CCAi,0, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, then there exists a PRE scheme Π￿ that is secure in
the sense of IND-CCAi,0 but which is not secure in the sense of IND-CCAi,j, for
j ∈ {1, 2}.
The scheme described in Section 4.4 illustrates this corollary, since it is IND-CCA1,0
secure (i.e., it does not consider a re-encryption oracle), but not IND-CCA1,1 se-
cure, as we show how the attacker can use the re-encryption oracle to win the
security game. This attack further supports the separation between PKE-based
notions (i.e., those that do not consider a re-encryption oracle) and the rest.
4.3.3 Relations for multihop PRE
In this section we study the eﬀect on the security notions that appears from the
following observation: assuming a proper re-encryption oracle (that is, one that
enables re-encryption from a honest party to a corrupt one), then the adversary
can construct a decryption oracle using the re-encryption one. She solely has
to re-encrypt ciphertexts to a corrupt user and decrypt afterwards, since she
knows the secret key. More formally, let x be a corrupt user controlled by the
adversary, then for all public keys pki and all ciphertexts c, where (pki, c) is not
a derivative of (pk∗, c∗), the decryption oracle can be simulated by the adversary
as follows:
Odec(pki, c) = Dec(skx,Oreenc(pki, pkx, c)) (4.1)
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This equivalence only holds in the multihop case, since when c is already a re-
encryption from other ciphertext, then it is not possible to re-encrypt it again;
that is, for single-hop PRE schemes this equivalence only holds when the ci-
phertext has not been re-encrypted (i.e., a second-level ciphertext [11]). On the
contrary, multihop PRE schemes permit to re-encrypt ciphertexts indefinitely.
Note also that the query Oreenc(pki, pkx, c) is legal as long as (pki, c) is not a
derivative of (pk∗, c∗). This result allows us to establish additional implications
between security notions, for the case of multihop PRE.
In the IND-CCA0,1 scenario, the re-encryption oracle is only provided in Phase 1
and no decryption oracle is available. For a multihop scheme, it is easy to check
that Equation 4.1 describes a valid simulation of the decryption oracle during
Phase 1. Since the challenge ciphertext has not yet been generated, neither
the re-encryption nor decryption oracles have any kind of restriction on the input
ciphertext. Thus, if a re-encryption oracle for Phase 1 is provided, the decryption
oracle becomes redundant, since it can be easily simulated by the adversary.
Therefore, IND-CCA0,1 ⇒ IND-CCA1,1.
Now we assume that the re-encryption oracle is also available in Phase 2. In
this case, there is a restriction on the input ciphertexts, as described in Sec-
tion 4.2, so it cannot be a derivative of the challenge ciphertext. Note that
the very same restriction is applicable to the decryption oracle during the same
phase. As in the previous case, Equation 4.1 describes a valid simulation of the
decryption oracle, this time for both phases. Similarly, if a re-encryption oracle
is provided until Phase 2, then the decryption oracle becomes redundant, as it
can be simulated by the adversary using the re-encryption oracle. Therefore,
IND-CCA0,2 ⇒ IND-CCA2,2.
These two results, together with the fact that IND-CCA1,1 ⇒ IND-CCA0,1 and
IND-CCA2,2 ⇒ IND-CCA0,2, imply that IND-CCA1,1 ≡ IND-CCA0,1 and IND-CCA2,2 ≡
IND-CCA0,2. Therefore, the previous set of relations between security notions can
be simplified for the multihop case, as shown in Figure 4.4. For clarity, the no-
tions of IND-CCA0,2 and IND-CCA1,2 have been assimilated into IND-CCA2,2, and
IND-CCA0,1 into IND-CCA1,1.
These results strengthen the idea that the re-encryption oracle is somewhat more
powerful than the decryption oracle, and that in some cases, renders it completely
redundant.
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IND-CCA2,2
IND-CCA2,1
IND-CCA2,0IND-CCA1,1
IND-CCA1,0
IND-CCA0,0
Figure 4.4: Relations among security notions for multihop PRE
4.3.4 Discussion
From the parametric family of attack models for PRE we propose, we have de-
veloped in this thesis a set of security notions and showed the relations among
them. However, that does not necessarily mean that all the notions are equally
meaningful for the context of PRE. Recall that one of the main characteristics
of PRE is that re-encryption capabilities are granted to some semi-trusted entity
that acts as proxy, transforming ciphertexts from one public key to another. In
this case, it seems reasonable to think of the proxy as a re-encryption oracle, and
since it is a semi-trusted entity, its availability for an adversary may be easier
than in the case of the decryption oracle. In fact, there are several examples
of devised applications of PRE where re-encryption is performed as a service by
an online semi-trusted entity, whereas decryption capabilities are retained by the
users [11, 101].
Hence, attack models in which the decryption capabilities are greater than for
re-encryption, and particularly, those where a decryption oracle is provided but
not a re-encryption one (CCA2,0 and CCA1,0), do not seem to be appropriate for
shaping security in scenarios where proxy re-encryption is applied. The scheme
we analyze in Section 4.4 is an example of construction that is only secure under
this kind of attack model. In our opinion, it seems diﬃcult to strongly justify
any asymmetry between the adversarial capabilities concerning decryption and
re-encryption. For that reason, we consider that the representative attack models
for PRE are CCA2,2, CCA1,1, and CCA0,0 (which can be denoted as CPA). The
rest of attack models (and therefore, security notions) can be considered as the
formalization of transitional models, but that fail to properly capture adversarial
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capabilities of meaningful scenarios. Nevertheless, these transitional models can
be of use when reasoning about security notions, and as intermediate milestones
during the design of PRE schemes, as proposed in the next chapter.
In the next section, we describe an example of a recent PRE scheme, which is
allegedly “CCA1-secure”. However, our analysis shows that, according to our
definitions of attack models for PRE, this scheme is in fact IND-CCA1,0 secure,
since it does not consider a re-encryption oracle. Furthermore, it cannot achieve a
better security notion since it leaks the re-encryption keys when the re-encryption
oracle is introduced. This impossibility is a consequence of Theorem 4.8.
4.4 Security Analysis of a Recent “CCA1-secure”
PRE scheme
The scheme analyzed in this section was proposed by Kirshanova at PKC 2014
[48]. Although, the scheme is said to be “CCA1-secure”, its security proof does
not provide meaningful re-encryption capabilities to the adversary. An analysis of
the security proof reveals that this scheme is actually secure under IND-CCA1,0,
because the decryption oracle is available until the challenge, but it lacks of a
re-encryption oracle. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, we do not consider this as
a meaningful notion for PRE because of the asymmetry between the adversar-
ial capabilities concerning decryption and re-encryption. In fact, IND-CCA1,0 is,
together with IND-CCA0,1, the closest notion to IND-CCA0,0 ≡ IND-CPA. In this
section we describe an attack to this scheme under a more significant notion,
namely IND-CCA1,1. That is, this scheme cannot achieve IND-CCA1,1 in its cur-
rent form. The main idea behind this attack is that failure to fulfill the private
re-encryption keys property leads to insecure schemes when one considers the re-
encryption oracle. The proposed attack is applicable even when a re-encryption
oracle is provided only before the challenge phase. In addition, such oracle must
not have strong restrictions, since this would imply an overly weak security model,
as discussed in Section 4.2. In particular, it should be possible to ask for the re-
encryption of ciphertexts that are unrelated to c∗, from the target user to a
corrupt one.
4.4.1 Description of the scheme
First we will describe the scheme from Kirshanova. This is one of the first PRE
schemes based on the hardness of lattice problems, specifically, the Learning
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With Errors (LWE) [32] and Short Integer Solution (SIS) [38] problems. Some
details, such as a comprehensive characterization of the random distributions used
and the validity checks in the decryption algorithm, are omitted for the sake of
clarity. We refer the reader to [48] for a complete description of the scheme, and
to [40] for more details on the original PKE scheme upon Kirshanova’s scheme is
based.
Let n be the security parameter. The modulus q = poly(n) is a large prime
power and k = log q. Set m¯ = O(nk) and m = m¯ + 2nk. Let DR be a random
distribution over Zm¯×nk that samples the secret keys R and De a random distri-
bution over Zm that samples error vectors e; details about these distributions are
omitted. InvertO and SampleO are two algorithms for inverting the LWE-function
and sampling preimages from the SIS-function, respectively. Let G ∈ Zn×nkq be
a specially-constructed public matrix that makes these algorithms eﬃcient. The
scheme is as follows:
• KeyGen(n): choose A0 ← Zn×m¯q , R1, R2 ← DR and an invertible matrix
H ← Znk×nkq . Next, define A1 = −A0R1 ∈ Zn×nkq and A2 = −A0R2 ∈
Zn×nkq , and compose the matrix A = [A0|A1|A2] ∈ Zn×mq . The public key is
the pair pk = (A,H), while the secret key is matrix sk = [R1|R2] ∈ Zm¯×2nk.
• Enc(pk = ([A0|A1|A2], H),m ∈ {0, 1}nk): choose a non-zero invertible ma-
trix Hu, and a vector s← Znq . Set Au = [A0|A1 +HG|A2 +HuG]. Sample
error vector e ← De. Compute bt = 2(stAu mod q) + et + (0, 0, enc(m))t
mod 2q, where the first zero vector has dimension m¯ , the second has
dimension nk and enc is an encoding function. Output the ciphertext
c = (H, b) ∈ Zn×nq × Zm2q.
• Dec(pk = ([A0|A1|A2], H), sk = [R1|R2], c = (Hu, b)): Using matrix Hu
compute Au = [A0|A1+HG|A2+HuG]. With the secret key call algorithm
InvertO([R1|R2], Au, b mod q,Hu). As output we receive two vectors z ∈ Znq
and e ∈ Zmq that satisfy bt = ztA + et mod q. Let v = b − e mod 2q.
Compute
vt
 R1 R2I 0
0 I
 mod 2q
and apply enc−1 to the last nk coordinates.
• ReKeyGen(pk = ([A0|A1|A2], H), sk = [R1|R2], pk￿ = ([A￿0|A￿1|A￿2], H ￿)): Let
Y = [A￿0|A￿1 + H ￿G|A￿2 − A2] and yi be the i-th column of Y . Execute
SampleO(yi, [A0|A1], R1, H) for each column vector yi and concatenate the
column vector outputs to form matrix X. It can be seen that this matrix
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satisfies that [A0|A1]X = Y . Parse matrix X as [X0|X1|X2], where the
block X0 ∈ Z(m¯+nk)×m¯ is the output corresponding to the first part of Y ,
X1 ∈ Z(m¯+nk)×nk to the second one, and X2 ∈ Z(m¯+nk)×nk to the last one 1.
Finally, output the re-encryption key rkpk→pk￿ :
rkpk→pk￿ =
￿
X0 X1 X2
0 0 I
￿
• ReEnc(rkpk→pk￿ , c = (Hu, b)): to change the underlying public key in the
ciphertext component b, compute b
￿t = bt · rkpk→pk￿ . Finally, output c￿ =
(Hu, b￿).
4.4.2 Attack under the IND-CCA1,1 setting
In this section we describe an attack to Kirshanova’s scheme under the IND-CCA1,1
setting. Once we give the attacker the capability of using a re-encryption oracle,
and given the fact that the re-encryption function in the Kirshanova PRE scheme
does not check for the validity of its inputs, then the attacker can query the re-
encryption oracle with a series of deceptive ciphertexts, which ultimately leak the
re-encryption key from the target user to a corrupt one. Note that these queries
are completely legal, as the input ciphertexts are not related to the challenge
ciphertext (in fact, when the re-encryption key is leaked the challenge ciphertext
has not been produced yet). Once the attacker asks for the challenge ciphertext,
she can re-encrypt it for a corrupt user under her control, and distinguish the
original challenge message. This attack constitutes an instantiation of one of
the generic attacks used for separating security notions described in Section 4.3,
namely the one used in the proof of Theorem 4.8.
Assuming a IND-CCA1,1 setting, then we can construct a CCA1,1 attack (i.e.,
only consulting the decryption and re-encryption oracles before the challenge) as
follows. First, as we are working in the selective model, the challenger gives the
target public key pk∗ to the attacker at the beginning of the game. In addition,
the attacker asks for a pair of corrupt public and private keys (pkx, skx) to oracle
Ocorrupt. Next, recall that the re-encryption function simply multiplies the original
ciphertext by the re-encryption key, as shown in Equation 4.2 and depicted by
Figure 4.5a, without performing any kind of prior or subsequent checks:
1In the original scheme, matrix X is further decomposed into smaller blocks (e.g., X0 is
decomposed in X00 and X01), but this is not necessary for our analysis.
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Challenger Adversary
Oreenc
bt
b￿t = bt · rk
(a) The re-encryption oracle
Challenger Adversary
Oreenc
bt = (1, 0, ..., 0)t
b￿t = (1, 0, ..., 0)t · rk = row1(rk)
(b) Using a unit vector as input
Figure 4.5: Leaking re-encryption keys
[b￿t0 |b￿t1 |b￿t2 ] = [bt0|bt1|bt2] ·
￿
X0 X1 X2
0 0 I
￿
= [bt0|bt1] · [X0|X1|X2] + [0|0|bt2] (4.2)
The attacker can take advantage from the behavior of the re-encryption oracle and
ask for the re-encryption of specially-crafted “trap” ciphertexts bti = [b
t
i,0|bti,1|bti,2],
so that [bti,0|bti,1] = uˆi, where uˆi ∈ Z1×m¯+nk2q is the i-th row unit vector, for
1 ≤ i ≤ m¯ + nk, and bti,2 is chosen randomly in Z1×nk2q . Next, the attacker
proceeds with m¯ + nk queries to Oreenc(pk∗, pkx, (Hi, bi)), for random Hi, to ob-
tain re-encrypted ciphertexts (Hi, b￿i). It can be seen that, after removing the
term [0|0|bti,2], the vector b￿i from the re-encrypted ciphertexts will have the form
b￿i = uˆ · [X0|X1|X2], which corresponds to the i-th row of the re-encryption key.
A simplified illustration of this stage of the attack is shown in Figure 4.5b. Fi-
nally, the attacker simply stacks the results together to obtain the matrix X of
the re-encryption key rkpk∗→pkx . Note that, originally, re-encryption keys are de-
fined over Z, but with these queries she actually obtains its representation in Z2q;
nonetheless, the obtained re-encryption key is equivalent for making computa-
tions, and thus, equally valid.
The knowledge of this re-encryption key gives the attacker enough power to de-
crypt the challenge ciphertext during the second phase of the game, and hence
distinguish the original message. Note that the queries to the re-encryption oracle
can be carried out before the challenge ciphertext is generated, so it is complies
with the IND-CCA1,1 security notion (i.e., it cannot be considered an adaptive
attack).
This attack can be refined as follows. Assume that the re-encryption oracle could
“detect” the aforementioned queries as trap ciphertexts and return a random
output (althought that could mean producing invalid re-encryptions for valid
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ciphertexts that happen to have the same form). In this case, the attacker may
be unable to detect the situation, since she does not know the underlying message
of the trap ciphertexts (i.e., she does not know whether or not the trap ciphertexts
are valid encryptions under target public key pk∗).
We now describe another way of extracting the sought-after re-encryption key,
by concealing these trap vectors in the following way. The attacker produces m
ciphertexts (Hi, pti) = Enc(pk
∗,mi), for random mi ∈ {0, 1}nk, and constructs
a matrix P ∈ Zm×m2q , so that each pti is the i-th row of P . Note that, by the
hardness assumption of the encryption scheme, the distribution of vectors pti is
within negligible statistical distance from the uniform distribution, as described
by the LWE hardness assumption. Hence, with overwhelming probability, P is
an invertible matrix, and P−1P = I. In the case that P were not invertible, the
attacker could simply “resample” more ciphertexts and produce a new P .
Next, the attacker makes m queries Oreenc(pk∗, pkx, (Hi, pti)), with 1 ≤ i ≤ m. By
the definition of the re-encryption function, the outcome of each query contains
the vector p￿ti = p
t
i · rkpk∗→pkx . Let P ￿ ∈ Zm×m2q , so that each p￿ti is the i-th row of
P ￿. Hence, it can be seen that P ￿ = P · rkpk∗→pkx . Finally, she simply computes
rkpk∗→pkx = P−1 · P ￿ = P−1 · P · rkpk∗→pkx . Using this re-encryption key, the
attacker decrypts the challenge ciphertexts as described before.
4.4.3 Analysis of the attack
There are two main reasons that explain why this attack is possible. The first
is related to the construction itself, whereas the second concerns the underlying
security model.
Firstly, the scheme leaks the re-encryption key through queries to the re-encryption
oracle. That is, it fails to satisfy the private re-encryption keys property. This
characteristic is what makes possible for the attacker to learn the re-encryption
key from the target user to one under her control, thus winning the security game.
This is a consequence of how the re-encryption function is constructed, which is
simply the multiplication of a ciphertext by the re-encryption key. Thus, when
the input ciphertexts are carefully chosen, it is possible to recover the desired
re-encryption key. A possible solution to thwart this attack consists on adding a
small noise after the multiplication. Another issue with the re-encryption func-
tion is that it is performed without any kind of validity check on the input. This
poses an interesting problem since this validity check should be performed with-
out the proxy seeing the original plaintexts. The usual solution to this problem
is to make the ciphertexts publicly verifiable [54]. A consequence of this property
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is that it prevents the proxy from acting as an oracle [121], which is exactly the
weak point of the analyzed scheme.
Secondly, the adversarial model used in this scheme (i.e., CCA1,0) does not provide
access to a re-encryption oracle during the security game, so the scheme is obliv-
ious to the fact that it is insecure when one considers access to this oracle, as in
CCA1,1. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, the only attack models deemed meaningful
for PRE are CCA2,2, CCA1,1, and CCA0,0, as there should be very strong reasons
for justifying any asymmetry between the adversarial capabilities concerning de-
cryption and re-encryption. In addition, the re-encryption capabilities should be
wide enough to allow the adversary to ask for the re-encryption of ciphertexts
that are unrelated to the challenge ciphertext, for any pair of users.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have studied the notions of security for proxy re-encryption
by identifying a parametric family of attack models that not only considers the
availability of the decryption oracle (as in PKE), but also the re-encryption oracle.
Although this seems to be a rather natural step, to the best of our knowledge, it
has not been explicitly considered before. This parametric family of attack models
for PRE allows us to define a collection of security notions, whose relations we
analyze. This type of study is necessary to achieve a better understanding of
the definitions of security upon which design proxy re-encryption schemes. For
instance, one immediate application of this work is found in Section 5.2, where
we use it to reason about the construction of generic CCA-secure transformations
in the context of proxy re-encryption.
Part of this chapter has been concerned with studying separations between PRE
notions of security. In particular, we have established separations between secu-
rity notions by exploiting the private re-encryption keys property, or more accu-
rately, the failure to fulfill this property. The consequence of these separations is
that schemes that leak re-encryption keys through queries to the re-encryption
oracle cannot achieve strong security notions. These results strengthen the idea
that meaningful chosen-ciphertext attacks for PRE should consider both oracles
(decryption and re-encryption).
In addition, these separation results have been illustrated with an example of a
recent PRE scheme from PKC 2014 [48] that is said to be “CCA1-secure”, but
that fails to achieve a meaningful notion of security for PRE, since we construct
a chosen-ciphertext attack based on queries to the re-encryption oracle.
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Chapter 5
New Proxy Re-Encryption
Constructions
One of the main interests that drive the work on this thesis is to investigate
more concrete aspects of proxy re-encryption schemes, such as those related to
performance and security constructions. This chapter is divided according these
two aspects.
In the first half we explore the use of lattice-based cryptography for constructing
more eﬃcient PRE schemes. In particular, we propose new proxy re-encryption
schemes based on NTRU [16], a widely known lattice-based cryptosystem. Lattice-
based cryptography is a promising field, not only due to its potential regarding
post-quantum security, but also because its performance can be outstanding in
some cases. We provide two diﬀerent schemes: the first one is based on the con-
ventional NTRU cryptosystem and, although it lacks a security proof, remains
as eﬃcient as its predecessor; the second one is based on a variant of NTRU
proposed by Stehle´ and Steinfeld [122], which is proven CPA-secure under the
Ring-LWE assumotion. To the best of our knowledge, our proposals are the first
proxy re-encryption schemes to be based on the NTRU primitive. In addition,
we provide experimental results to demonstrate the eﬃciency of our proposal, as
well as a comparison with previous proxy re-encryption schemes, which confirms
that our first scheme outperforms the rest by an order of magnitude.
The second half of this chapter has a diﬀerent focus, as it is dedicated to the con-
struction of CCA-secure schemes. In the case of traditional public-key encryption,
there are several generic methods for achieving CCA-secure schemes from weakly
secure cryptosystems, such as the Fujisaki-Okamoto [71, 17] and REACT [18]
transformations. In PRE, however, this process is completely ad-hoc for each
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scheme. Therefore, it would be desirable to count on analogous constructions
that allow PRE schemes to “bootstrap” security by means of generic transforma-
tions. In this section, we study the adaptation of some of these transformations to
proxy re-encryption and find both positive and negative results: although direct
application is not possible (as it leads to flawed constructions), we devise viable
extensions that enable to enhance the security of existing schemes.
5.1 Proxy Re-Encryption Schemes Based on NTRU
5.1.1 Introduction
Since the introduction of proxy re-encryption by Blaze et al. in 1998 [43], many
PRE schemes have been proposed. The vast majority of these schemes are based
on bilinear pairings, which have several drawbacks. For instance, pairings are
known to be computationally intensive operations. With respect to security,
pairing-based proxy re-encryption schemes ultimately rely on the hardness of
the discrete logarithm problem. This poses a problem in the case that eﬃcient
cryptanalytic attacks against the discrete logarithm problem are developed or
quantum computation becomes practical. This problem is also applicable to other
schemes not based on pairings but that also depend on the discrete logarithm or
on integer factorization assumptions.
Apart from bilinear pairings, the use of other foundations for constructing proxy
re-encryption schemes has received little attention. Recently, some lattice-based
proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed [46, 47]. Lattice-based cryp-
tography is a promising field, chiefly because of its role in post-quantum cryp-
tography, but in some cases, also for its performance. As a prime example of
widely-accepted and eﬃcient lattice-based cryptosystem we find NTRU, which
was introduced in 1996 by Hoﬀstein, Pipher and Silverman [16]. Since then,
it has remained as the most practical lattice-based public-key cryptosystem, at
the point of being standardized by IEEE Std 1363.1-2008 [79] and ANSI X9.98-
2010 [123]. One of the main reasons of NTRU’s popularity is its overwhelming
performance with respect to traditional public-key cryptosystems. For instance,
optimized GPU versions of NTRU proved to be up to 1000 times faster than
RSA and 100 times faster than ECC [124]. These results are explained by the
simplicity of its basic underlying operation, which is the convolution, i.e., the
polynomial multiplication. NTRU uses polynomials with relatively small coeﬃ-
cients, so multiplications can be eﬃciently performed, even in constrained devices
[125]. Another implication of this is that the size of the keys is relatively compact,
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when compared to other lattice-based schemes. In addition, the convolution op-
eration can even be parallelized, which is very convenient as multicore and GPU
processors are becoming more relevant nowadays.
One of the main drawbacks of NTRU is that it lacks a formal security proof, so its
security stems from the practicality of best known attacks. This has meant that,
over the years, NTRU has followed a somewhat “break-and-repair” approach,
where advances in attacks have stimulated changes in the scheme and its set of
parameters, although it has remained essentially the same. In order to advance
towards solving this gap, Stehle´ and Steinfeld proposed in 2011 a provable-secure
variant of NTRU [73, 122], whose security is based on the assumed hardness of
lattice problems.
In this chapter, we propose new bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes based
on NTRU. Our first result, NTRUReEncrypt, is a slight modification of the con-
ventional NTRU encryption scheme; this proposal extends the original scheme
in order to support re-encryption, thus it remains just as eﬃcient. However, it
lacks of a formal security proof, as does NTRU. For this reason, we also present
PS-NTRUReEncrypt, a provably-secure version based on the variant of the NTRU
primitive proposed by Stehle´ and Steinfeld in [73, 122]. To the best of our knowl-
edge these are the first proxy re-encryption schemes based on NTRU, and one of
the first to be based on lattices. In addition, we complement our proposal with
an experimental comparison of the performance of several proxy re-encryption
schemes, which confirms that our first scheme outperforms the rest by an order
of magnitude.
5.1.2 Definitions
In this section, we provide some basic definitions relevant to our proposal. Be-
fore starting, we note that we will reuse the generic syntax definition given in
Section 3.2.1. Firstly, we formulate the concept of correctness, based on the one
given by [45]; in this case, as these kinds of schemes are usually multihop, we
refer to multihop correctness (i.e., ciphertexts that can be re-encrypted multiple
times). Secondly, we specify the security definition of a bidirectional CPA-secure
proxy re-encryption scheme; note that this is a particular instantiation of the
security notions provided in the previous section, namely, IND-CCA0,0.
Definition 5.1 (Multihop Correctness). A bidirectional PRE scheme (Setup,
KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec) is multihop correct with respect to plaintext
space M if:
• For all (pkA, skA) output by KeyGen and all messages M ∈M, it holds that
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Dec(skA,Enc(pkA,M)) =M .
• For any sequence of pairs (pki, ski) output by KeyGen, with 0 ≤ i ≤ N , all
re-encryption keys rkj→j+1 output by ReKeyGen(skj, skj+1), with j < N , all
messages M ∈ M, and all ciphertexts C1 output by Enc(pk1,M), it holds
that:
Dec(skN ,ReEnc(rkN−1→N , ...ReEnc(rk1→2, C1))) =M
If for any M ∈M correctness holds only with probability 1 minus a negli-
gible quantity, we say that the scheme is correct with respect to M.
Definition 5.2 (Bidirectional PRE CPA-security game). Let λ be the security
parameter, A an adversary, and IH , IC the sets of indices of honest and corrupt
users, respectively. The game consists of an execution of A with the following or-
acles, which can be invoked multiple times in any order, subject to the constraints
below:
Phase 0: The challenger takes a security parameter 1λ, obtains global parameters
params ← Setup(1λ) and initializes sets IH , IC to ∅. The challenger generates
the public key pk∗ of target user i∗, adds i∗ to IH , and sends pk∗ to the adversary.
Phase 1:
• Honest key generation Ohonest: The oracle obtains a new keypair (pki, ski)←
KeyGen(λ), adds index i to IH , and returns the public key pki.
• Corrupted key generation Ocorrupt: The oracle obtains a new keypair (pki, ski)←
KeyGen(n), adds index i to IC, and returns the pair (pki, ski).
Phase 2:
• Re-encryption key generation Orkgen: On input a pair of public keys (pki, pkj),
the oracle returns the re-encryption key rki→j ← ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj).
The adversary is only allowed to make queries where i ￿= j, and either
i, j ∈ IH or i, j ∈ IC.
• Challenge oracle Ochallenge: This oracle can be queried only once. On input
(M0,M1), the oracle chooses a bit δ ← {0, 1} and returns the challenge
ciphertext C∗ ← Enc(pk∗,Mδ), where pk∗ corresponds to the public key of
target user i∗.
Phase 3:
• Decision: Eventually, A outputs guess δ￿ ∈ {0, 1}. A wins the game if and
only if δ￿ = δ.
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As already noted in [64], we only allow queries to Orkgen where users are either
both corrupt or both honest. Otherwise, in a bidirectional setting these queries
would corrupt honest users and could be used to simulate a decryption oracle,
which is not considered in CPA security. That is, we are adopting a static cor-
ruption model. Note that we have not included a re-encryption oracle. On the
one hand, in the case of CPA security and multihop schemes, the addition of a
re-encryption oracle that allows to re-encrypt ciphertexts from honest to corrupt
users could be used to simulate a decryption oracle, which is by definition out of
the scope of CPA. On the other hand, restricting the re-encryption oracle only to
the honest-to-honest and corrupt-to-corrupt cases would result in a superfluous
oracle, since the same capabilities are achieved by means of Orkgen. For these
reasons, a re-encryption oracle is not provided.
5.1.3 NTRUReEncrypt: A Bidirectional PRE Scheme Based
On NTRU
In this section we firstly introduce the conventional NTRU encryption scheme and
describe its operation. Then, we extend it in order to construct a bidirectional
multihop proxy re-encryption scheme.
The NTRU Encryption Scheme
The NTRU encryption scheme, originally proposed by Hoﬀstein, Pipher and Sil-
verman in [16], is one of the first public key encryption schemes based on lattices.
The main reason behind the interest in NTRU is its eﬃciency, which is much
better than other public-key cryptosystems and is even comparable to symmetric
ciphers. In addition, its security is conjectured to be based on hard problems
over lattices, although it lacks a formal proof.
We now briefly describe the operation of NTRU. The original NTRU cryptosys-
tem is defined over the quotient ring RNTRU = Z[x]/(xn− 1), where n is a prime
parameter. Thus, elements of the ring RNTRU are integer polynomials of de-
gree less than n; the operators + and · denote addition and multiplication in
RNTRU , respectively. Other parameters of NTRU are the integer q, which is a
small power of 2 of the same order of magnitude than n, and the small polyno-
mial p ∈ RNTRU , which usually takes values p = 3 or p = x + 2. In general,
operations over polynomials will be performed in RNTRU modulo q or p, which
will be denoted respectively as RNTRU/q and RNTRU/p.
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In NTRU, the private key sk consists of a polynomial f ∈ RNTRU chosen at
random, with a determined number of coeﬃcients equal to 0, -1, and 1. The
polynomial f must have an inverse in RNTRU/q and RNTRU/p, respectively, f−1q
and f−1p . For eﬃciency, f can be chosen to be congruent to 1 modulo p. The
public key pk consists of the polynomial h = p · g · f−1q mod q, where g ∈ RNTRU
is chosen at random.
The encryption process is very simple: a plaintextM from message spaceRNTRU/p
is encrypted to ciphertext C = h·s+M mod q, where s is a small random polyno-
mial in RNTRU . For decrypting a ciphertext C, one must first compute C ￿ = f ·C
and reduce it modulo q. If the original polynomial C ￿ is suﬃciently small then
the result of the reduction is pgs+ fM ∈ RNTRU/q. Next, C ￿ is reduced modulo
p, obtaining fM . Finally, this result is multiplied by f−1p to extract the original
message M ; note that the last step is redundant if f was selected congruent to 1
modulo p.
NTRUReEncrypt
Based on the NTRU encryption scheme, we define the proxy re-encryption scheme
NTRUReEncrypt. Our proposal is essentially an extension of the scheme that in-
cludes the definition of the re-encryption and re-encryption key generation algo-
rithms. One of the fundamental diﬀerences of our scheme with respect to the
original NTRU is that the secret polynomial f has to be congruent to 1 mod p,
not for eﬃciency reasons, but because it is necessary to correctly decrypt re-
encrypted ciphertexts.
The scheme Now we present our scheme NTRUReEncrypt. In the following,
the delegator is represented by user A, whereas the delegatee is user B. Our
scheme is specified by the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(): The output of the key generation algorithm for user A is a pair
of public and secret keys (pkA, skA). If first chooses a pair of polynomials
(fA, gA) ∈ R2NTRU at random, with a determined number of coeﬃcients
equal to 0, -1, and 1, as in the conventional NTRU scheme. The only added
requirement is that fA has to be congruent to 1 modulo p. As in the original
case, fA must have an inverse in RNTRU/q, denoted by f−1A . Note that now
it is not necessary the inverse of fA modulo p. The private key skA is
the polynomial fA, whereas the public key pkA consists of the polynomial
hA = p · gA · f−1A mod q.
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• ReKeyGen(skA, skB): On input the secret keys skA = fA and skB = fB,
the re-encryption key generation algorithm ReKeyGen computes the re-
encryption key between users A and B as rkA→B = skA · sk−1B = fA · f−1B .
The re-encryption key can be computed by means of a simple three-party
protocol, so neither A, B nor the proxy learns any secret key. The protocol,
originally proposed in [45], is as follows: A selects a random r ∈ RNTRU/q
and sends r · fA mod q to B and r to the proxy; next, B sends r · fA · f−1B
mod q to the proxy, who computes rkA→B = fA · f−1B mod q.
• Enc(pkA,M): On input the public key pkA and a message M ∈ RNTRU/p,
the encryption algorithm Enc generates a small random polynomial s ∈
RNTRU , and outputs the ciphertext CA = hAs+M .
• ReEnc(rkA→B, CA): On input a re-encryption key rkA→B and a ciphertext
CA, the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc samples a random polynomial e ∈
RNTRU and outputs ciphertext CB = CA · rkA→B + pe.
• Dec(skA, CA): On input the secret key skA = fA and a ciphertext CA, the
decryption algorithm Dec computes C ￿A = (CA ·fA) mod q and outputs the
original message M = (C ￿A mod p).
Note that if ciphertexts are not re-encrypted, NTRUReEncryptbehaves in exactly
the same way as the original NTRU encryption scheme.
Correctness Now, we informally explain the reason why the re-encryption pro-
cess works. Re-encrypted ciphertexts are of the form:
CB = CA · rkA→B + pe = (pgAf−1A s+M) · fAf−1B + pe = pgAf−1B s+ pe+ fAf−1B M
When decrypting a re-encrypted ciphertext, the delegatee multiplies the cipher-
text with the secret key fB:
CB · fB = (pgAf−1B s+ pe+ fAf−1B M) · fB = pgAs+ pefB + fAM
Now, taking modulo p, we get rid of the additional terms. Recall that we require
secret key polynomial fA to fulfill fA = 1 mod p, so (CB · fB) mod p = (pgAs+
pefB + fAM) mod p =M , which is the original message.
The inclusion of the random term e during the re-encryption phase is necessary
in order to prevent a simple ciphertext-only attack from the delegatee. Imagine
that a re-encrypted ciphertext is of the form CB = CA · rkA→B = CA · fA · f−1B ;
that is, without the random term e. Then, the delegatee could extract the secret
key of the delegator based on the observation that CB · fB = CA · fA holds, since
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Table 5.1: Space costs of NTRUReEncrypt
Element Size
Keys O(n · log2 q)
Message O(n)
Ciphertext O(n · log2 q)
Ciphertext expansion O(log2 q)
CB = CA · rkA→B. Next, assuming that CA is invertible modulo q, the attacker
can extract the secret key by computing fA = C
−1
A · CB · fB.
The scheme is also multihop, that is, it supports multiple re-encryptions. How-
ever, this property is limited, since the addition of the error term during the
re-encryption produces an increasing error that grows on each hop, until even-
tually, decryption fails. Our experiments show that this depends heavily on the
choice of parameters. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.5.
Analysis The resulting proxy re-encryption scheme preserves the performance
level of the original NTRU; a detailed experimentation on this matter is presented
in Sections 5.1.5 and 5.1.5. These experimental results show that NTRUReEncrypt
outperforms other proxy re-encryption schemes by an order of magnitude.
A theoretical analysis of the computational costs associated with NTRUReEn-
crypt shows that the main algorithms, namely encryption, decryption and re-
encryption, only need a single multiplication (actually, re-encryption takes an
additional multiplication for computing the term pe, but this can be computed
beforehand and, in addition, the polynomial p is small and known in advance).
As already stated in the introduction, the core operation in NTRU is the mul-
tiplication of polynomials, which can be done in O(n log n) time using the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT) [124].
As for the space costs associated to NTRUReEncrypt, Table 5.1 presents a the-
oretical analysis of the size of the messages, keys, and ciphertexts, as well as a
measure of the ciphertext expansion it produces. It can be seen that the ex-
pansion is logarithmic in the parameter q, and that the size of keys is within
O(n log2 q). This can be put in contrast with other lattice-based cryptosystems,
such as the proxy re-encryption scheme from Aono et al. [47], where keys and
messages are typically matrices whose dimensions grow linearly with the param-
eter n. This implies that the size of these matrices is at least quadratic with
respect to n.
Table 5.2 illustrates this fact by showing a comparison between Aono’s scheme
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Table 5.2: Comparison of space costs (in KB)
Size Aono et al. [47] NTRUReEncrypt
Public keys 60.00 1.57
Secret key 60.00 1.57
Re-Encryption key 2520.00 1.57
Ciphertext 0.66 1.57
and ours. The space costs from Aono’s scheme are determined by the parameters
shown in [47] for the case of 143 bits of security and 128-bit plaintexts, whereas our
figures are calculated using a parameter set that achieves 256 bits of security and
supports up to 186-bits plaintexts. More details about the parameters used are
given in Section 5.1.5. It can be seen that our space costs are lower in comparison,
even considering the diﬀerence in bits of security. In the case of re-encryption
keys, the diﬀerence in size is remarkable as it grows up to 3 orders of magnitude.
On the other hand, our ciphertexts are slightly bigger. Another interesting fact
is that we use the same kind of polynomials for conveying all the types of keys
and ciphertexts, so the space costs are the same in all cases (1.57 KB).
It is easy to check that our scheme is bidirectional. Given rkA→B = fAf−1B , the
proxy can easily compute rkB→A = (rkA→B)−1 = fBf−1A . This property is a
consequence of how re-encryption keys are constructed (rkA→B = skA · sk−1B ), in
the same way as in other bidirectional schemes [43, 45, 54].
With respect to the security of the scheme, we cannot overcome the problem of
NTRU lacking a formal security proof. However, we can study it from a practical
way, as NTRU does. For instance, the time required for a lattice-based attack to
the public key is conjectured to be exponential in n [16]. This is also relevant to
the re-encryption scheme since extracting private keys from the re-encryption key
is at least as hard as attacking NTRU public key, as they are constructed in the
same way: for instance, the public key of user B is of the form pgBf
−1
B , whereas
re-encryption key rkA→B is of the form fAf−1B . In NTRU, the polynomials f
are larger than the polynomials g, i.e., they have more non-zero terms, so the
term fA of a re-encryption key would be larger than the term pgB of a public
key. However, as it happens to the majority of bidirectional proxy re-encryption
schemes [43, 45, 54], our scheme is not collusion-safe. That is, it is vulnerable
to a collusion of the proxy and the users, since extracting the delegator’s secret
key fA is as simple as computing rkA→B · fB. The same problem applies to the
delegatee’s secret key.
As a way to provide a formal security proof of our scheme, we explored how this
problem has been addressed in the literature. An interesting approach is made
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by Stehle´ and Steinfeld in [73, 122], where they present a variant of NTRU which
is proven CPA-secure under lattice-based assumptions. Based on this solution,
we build a second version of our NTRU-based proxy re-encryption scheme, called
PS-NTRUReEncrypt, which is provably-secure.
5.1.4 A Provably Secure Version of NTRUReEncrypt
In this section we provide a second proxy re-encryption scheme, called
PS-NTRUReEncrypt, that is provable secure under a hard problem for lattices,
namely the Ring-LWE assumption. Before explaining our provably-secure scheme,
we must first establish some background concepts; after that, we describe the
NTRU variant proposed in [73, 122] by Stehle´ and Steinfeld, which serves as a
basis for our second scheme.
Notation and definitions
Most of these definitions and notation are taken from [73, 122], and were already
mentioned in Section 2.3.2, but we gather them here for the sake of convenience.
Let Φ(x) = xn + 1, with n a power of 2; that is, Φ(x) is the 2n-th cyclotomic
polynomial. Let q be a prime integer such that q = 1 mod 2n. Let R be the
ring Z[x]/Φ(x), and Rq = R/q = Zq[x]/Φ(x). We will denote the set of invertible
elements of Rq as R×q . Although elements of R are polynomials, we often treat
them as vectors.
The Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem is a hard decisional problem
based on lattices introduced by Lyubaskevsky et al. in [37], which we describe
in Definition 2.14. In this chapter, we use an adapted version of this problem
proposed in [73, 122] by Stehle´ and Steinfeld.
Definition 5.3 (The Ring-LWE problem [73, 122]). Let s ∈ Rq and ψ a distri-
bution over R×q , then we define A×s,ψ as the distribution that samples pairs of the
form (a, b), where a is chosen uniformly from R×q and b = a · s + e, for some
e sampled from ψ. The distribution A×s,ψ is also called the Ring-LWE distribu-
tion. The Ring-LWE problem is to distinguish distribution A×s,ψ from a uniform
distribution over R×q × Rq. The Ring-LWE assumption is that this problem is
computationally infeasible.
This variant of the Ring Learning With Errors problem is denoted in [73, 122]
as the R-LWE×HNF problem; however, we will not use that notation for simplicity.
The error distributions ψ are sampled from a family of distributions Ψα, with
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parameter α; for more details of the definition of these distributions, see [73,
122].
Provably Secure NTRU
Stehle´ and Steinfeld proposed in [73, 122] a variant of the NTRU primitive which
is proven CPA-secure under the hardness assumption of the Ring-LWE problem.
This scheme is defined over the rings R and Rq, determined by parameters n
and q, as defined in previous section. The plaintext space M corresponds to
the ring R/p, where p ∈ R×q is also a parameter of the scheme; as conventional
NTRU, typical values for this parameter are p = 3 and p = x + 2, but in this
scheme one may choose p = 2, since q is prime. The parameter α characterizes
the family of distributions Ψα, and the parameter σ is the standard deviation of
the Gaussian distribution used during the key generation algorithm. Thus, global
parameters are a tuple (n, q, p,α, σ). The algorithms of this encryption scheme
are the following:
• KeyGen(): The output of this algorithm for user A is the pair of public and
secret keys (pkA, skA) ∈ R×q ×R×q . Let DZn,σ be the Gaussian distribution
over Zn with standard deviation σ. The keys are computed as follows:
1. Sample f ￿ fromDZn,σ; let fA = 1+p·f ￿; if (fA mod q) ￿∈ R×q , resample.
2. Sample gA from DZn,σ; if (gA mod q) ￿∈ R×q , resample.
3. Compute hA = p · gA · f−1A .
4. Return secret key skA = fA and pkA = hA.
• Enc(pkA,M): On input the public key pkA and a message M ∈M, sample
noise polynomials s, e from a distribution from Ψα, and output ciphertext
CA = hAs+ pe+M ∈ Rq.
• Dec(skA, CA). On input the secret key skA = fA and a ciphertext CA, the
decryption algorithm Dec computes C ￿A = CA · fA and outputs the message
M = (C ￿A mod p) ∈M.
It can be seen that the operation of this scheme is very similar to the original
NTRU, except for the generation of the keys and the inclusion of a noise term
during encryptions. The authors prove that this NTRU variant is CPA-secure,
over the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem. They also prove the correctness
of their proposal, by establishing the conditions for avoiding decryption failures.
Both proofs will serve as a basis for ours.
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PS-NTRUReEncrypt
In this section we present the scheme PS-NTRUReEncrypt, which is based on the
provably-secure variant of NTRU described in the previous section. This scheme
uses the same global parameters as before, a tuple (n, q, p,α, σ). This scheme is
defined by the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(): The output of the key generation algorithm for user A is the pair
of public and secret keys (pkA, skA) ∈ R×q ×R×q . The keys are computed
as follows:
1. Sample f ￿ fromDZn,σ; let fA = 1+p·f ￿; if (fA mod q) ￿∈ R×q , resample.
2. Sample gA from DZn,σ; if (gA mod q) ￿∈ R×q , resample.
3. Compute hA = p · gA · f−1A .
4. Return secret key skA = fA and pkA = hA.
• ReKeyGen(skA, skB): On input the secret keys skA = fA and skB = fB,
the re-encryption key generation algorithm ReKeyGen computes the re-
encryption key between users A and B as rkA→B = skA · sk−1B = fA · f−1B .
• Enc(pkA,M): On input the public key pkA and a message M ∈ M, the
encryption algorithm Enc samples noise polynomials s, e from a distribution
from Ψα, and outputs ciphertext CA = hAs+ pe+M ∈ Rq.
• ReEnc(rkA→B, CA): On input a re-encryption key rkA→B and a ciphertext
CA, the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc samples noise polynomial e￿ from a
distribution from Ψα and outputs ciphertext CB = CA · rkA→B + pe￿ ∈ Rq.
• Dec(skA, CA). On input the secret key skA = fA and a ciphertext CA, the
decryption algorithm Dec computes C ￿A = CA · fA and outputs the message
M = (C ￿A mod p) ∈M.
It can be seen that this scheme is an extension of the one from Stehle´ and Steinfeld,
by including the definition of the re-encryption and re-encryption key generation
algorithms. Note also that the same three-party protocol for computing the
re-encryption key described in Section 5.1.3 for NTRUReEncrypt can be applied
here.
Analysis The properties of PS-NTRUReEncrypt are the same as our first scheme.
These properties are:
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Table 5.3: Time costs of PS-NTRUReEncrypt
Operation On-line Oﬀ-line
Encryption tm tm + 2ts
Re-Encryption tm tm + ts
Decryption tm –
• Bidirectional: Given rkA→B = fAf−1B , one can easily compute
rkB→A = (rkA→B)−1 = fBf−1A .
• Multihop: It supports multiple re-encryptions, as shown in Section 5.1.4.
Note that an error term is included during the re-encryption process, so the
noise grows on each hop. Nevertheless, the correctness conditions presented
before guarantee that the decryption succeeds with overwhelming probabil-
ity for proper parameters (which include the devised maximum number of
hops, N). See also the results presented on Section 5.1.5.
• Not collusion-safe: This scheme suﬀers from the same vulnerability as
NTRUReEncrypt, so secret keys can be extracted from the re-encryption
key if the proxy colludes with a user involved. This problem is common in
bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes.
Table 5.3 shows the computational costs associated to PS-NTRUReEncrypt. As
for our first scheme NTRUReEncrypt, the main operation here is the multipli-
cation of polynomials, which is denoted by tm. In addition, another potentially
costly operation is sampling from the noise distribution, denoted by ts. We distin-
guish here between on-line and oﬀ-line operations, as the latter can be performed
beforehand (e.g., sampling noise terms).
With regard to the theoretical space costs, this scheme shares the same results as
NTRUReEncrypt, presented in Table 5.1. However, when considering an experi-
mental instantiation, the parameters used would not be the same, which implies
that the experimental costs vary. In addition, given that we lack of a formal
analysis for quantifying the level of security that is provided by the scheme, it is
not possible to make a direct comparison. An experimental analysis of the costs
of PS-NTRUReEncrypt is presented in Section 5.1.5.
Security proof In this section, we proceed to prove that the scheme
PS-NTRUReEncrypt is CPA-secure. This proof is also based on the one given
in [122, Lemma 3.8].
Theorem 5.4. Suppose that n is a power of 2, and q a prime number such that
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q = 1 mod 2n. Let γ ∈ (0, 13), ε > 0, p ∈ R×q and σ ≥ n
￿
ln(8nq) · q 12+γ. If there
exists and IND-CPA attack against PS-NTRUReEncrypt with probability 12 + ε,
then there exists an algorithm that solves the Ring-LWE problem with probability
ε
2 − q−Ω(n).
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Let us assume, by contradiction, that we have an adver-
sary A that breaks PS-NTRUReEncrypt with probability 12 + ε. We construct an
algorithm B against the Ring-LWE problem as follows:
Let Osample be an oracle that samples tuples (h￿, C ￿) from either the uniform
distribution over R×q ×Rq or A×s,ψ. Algorithm B first gets a sample (h￿, C ￿) from
Osample. Next, B generates target public key pk∗ = h∗ = p ·h￿ and gives pk∗ to A.
Note that, regardless of the input distribution, h￿ will be sampled uniformly from
R×q , and since p ∈ R×q , then h∗ = p · h￿ is uniformly random in R×q ; however, by
[122, Theorem 3], h∗ is within negligible statistical distance q−Ω(n) to public keys
generated by KeyGen. B will also generate an invalid, but correctly distributed,
secret key polynomial f∗ as described in the first step of the key generation
process, so target secret key is sk∗ = f ∗.
Both honest and corrupted key generation are done as in the PS-NTRUReEncrypt
scheme. Re-encryption key generation queries are done using the secret keys
derived on the key generation queries. Once A queries the challenge oracle with
inputs M0 and M1, B randomly picks δ ← {0, 1}, and constructs the challenge
ciphertext as C∗ = p ·C ￿+Mδ. Adversary A receives C∗ and, eventually, outputs
its guess δ￿; if δ￿ = δ, then algorithm B outputs 1.
On the one hand, when the input to B is a sample from A×s,ψ, then it will be
of the form (h￿, C ￿ = h￿s + e), for some s, e ← ψ. In this case, the challenge
ciphertext C∗ is a correct encryption of Mδ under h∗, since C∗ = p · C ￿ +Mδ =
p(h￿s + e) +Mδ = h∗s + pe +Mδ, and A will succeed in distinguishing Mδ with
probability 12 + ε− q−Ω(n). Hence, B will determine that the sample was from the
A×s,ψ distribution with the same probability.
On the other hand, when the sample is from the uniform distribution over R×q ×
Rq then C ￿ is uniformly random in Rq, and since p ∈ R×q , so is p · C ￿. The
challenge ciphertext C∗ = p · C ￿ +Mδ will be then uniformly random in Rq, as
in the original distribution of ciphertexts, and independent of δ. In this case,
algorithm B does not have any advantage in distinguishing the distribution and
outputs 1 with probability 12 . Overall, algorithm B succeeds with probability
(12)(
1
2 + ε − q−Ω(n)) + (12)(12) = 12 + ε2 − q−Ω(n). This contradicts the Ring-LWE
assumption when ε is non-negligible.
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Note that in this simulation, each re-encryption key that involves the target public
key is invalid, as generating a re-encryption key implies knowledge of the secret
keys of the users involved. In this case, the target public key is constructed from
Osample, so the simulator does not know the corresponding secret key. However,
since the secret key of the target used generated at the beginning of the simulation
is correctly distributed, any re-encryption key computed from this secret key is
indistinguishable from a valid one. A similar argument is made in [13].
Correctness Following the description of the encryption, decryption and
re-encryption algorithms, it is easy to informally check that the correctness con-
ditions stablished in Definition 5.1 are fulfilled:
• For all (pkA, skA) output by KeyGen and all messagesM ∈M, it holds that
Dec(skA,Enc(pkA,M)) =M .
The evaluation of the encryption of an arbitraty message M ∈ M gives
Dec(psgAf
−1
A +pe+M, skA) as a result. Next, as described in the decryption
algorithm, we take C ￿ = fA · (psgAf−1A + pe +M) = psgA + pefA +MfA.
Finally, since fA = 1 mod p and psgA = pefA = 0 mod p, we have that
C ￿ mod p =M .
• For any sequence of pairs (pki, ski) output by KeyGen, with 0 ≤ i ≤ N , all
re-encryption keys rkj→j+1 output by ReKeyGen(skj, skj+1), with j < N , all
messages M ∈M, and all ciphertexts C1 output by Enc(pk1,M), it holds
that:
Dec(skN ,ReEnc(rkN−1→N , ...ReEnc(rk1→2, C1))) =M
If for any M ∈M correctness holds only with probability 1 minus a negli-
gible quantity, we say that the scheme is correct with respect to M.
Let us assume the sequence of secret keys f0, f1, ..., fN . Since our scheme is
multi-hop, a ciphertext re-encrypted N times will be of the form:
CN = pg0f
−1
N s+ pe0f0f
−1
N + pe1f1f
−1
N + ...+ peN−1fN−1f
−1
N + peN +Mf0f
−1
N
= pg0f
−1
N s+
￿
N−1￿
i=0
peifif
−1
N
￿
+ peN +Mf0f
−1
N (5.1)
where ei denotes the additional error terms added during the re-encryptions,
and e0 is the error term from the first (and unique) encryption. When
decrypting CN , and assuming there are no decryption failures, one obtains:
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C ￿N = CN · fN = pg0s+
￿
N￿
i=0
peifi
￿
+Mf0 (5.2)
Since, f0 = 1 mod p and pg0s = peifi = 0 mod p, for 0 ≥ i ≥ N , then we
have that C ￿N mod p =M .
In the informal proof above, we have not considered the possibility of decryption
failures. This is a recurrent issue from the first definition of the NTRU cryptosys-
tem. It can be seen that the re-encryption process produces an increase in the
error terms of the ciphertexts, which can potentially lead to decryption failures.
We will now describe the correctness conditions of NTRUReEncrypt and prove
that the decryption algorithm is capable of handling with this increase. This
proof is basically a slight extension of the one given in [122, Lemma 3.7] and gen-
eralizes single encryption as well as multiple re-encryptions; in this case, single
encryption is a handled as a particular case of multihop re-encryption (taking the
number of re-encryptions N = 0).
Before continuing, we require two secondary lemmas, both presented in [122].
The first lemma provides bounds for the secret keys generated using the key gen-
eration algorithm, whilst the second provides bounds to the product of arbitrary
polynomials of R with samples from a distribution from Ψα.
Lemma 5.5. Let n be a power of 2, q a prime so that q = 1 mod 2n, and
deg(p) ≤ 1. Let σ ≥ √n log n · q1/n. The secret key polynomials f and g returned
by the KeyGen algorithm satisfy ￿f￿ ≤ 4√n￿p￿σ and ￿g￿ ≤ √nσ, with probability
≥ 1− 2−n+3.
Lemma 5.6. Let y, r ∈ R, with r fixed and y sampled from a distribution from
Ψα, with αq ≥ n0.25. Then: Pr [￿yr￿∞ ≥ αqn−0.25ω(log n) · ￿r￿] ≤ n−ω(1)
Theorem 5.7. If deg(p) ≤ 1, ω(n0.25 log n)αN￿p￿2σ ≤ 1, and n0.75 ≤ αq, then
the decryption algorithm of PS-NTRUReEncrypt succeeds in recovering M with
probability 1− n−ω(1) over the choice of s, ei, fi, gi, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N .
Proof of Theorem 5.7. As stated, a ciphertext CN re-encrypted N times has the
form described in Equation 5.1. When decrypting CN , the decryption algorithm
computes C ￿N , as described in Equation 5.2. This computation is implicitly per-
formed modulo q, so C ￿N ∈ Rq. However, let us define C ￿￿N ∈ R, that is, not
modulo q:
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C ￿￿N = pg0s+
￿
N￿
i=0
peifi
￿
+Mf0 ∈ R
In order for the decryption algorithm to succeed ￿C ￿￿N￿∞ ≤ q/2, so C ￿N = C ￿￿N
in R. Since f0 = 1 mod p and pg0s = peifi = 0 mod p, for 0 ≤ i ≤ N ,
then we have that C ￿￿N mod p = C
￿
N mod p = M and the decryption algorithm
succeeds. Then, it is suﬃcient to give an upper bound on the probability that
￿C ￿￿N￿∞ ≥ q/2.
From Lemma 5.5, polynomials g0 and fi, for 0 ≥ i ≥ N , have Euclidean norms
≤ 4√n￿p￿σ, with probability ≥ 1 − 2−n+3. From the properties of the ring R
[5], we know that for all u, v ∈ R, ￿u · v￿ ≤ √n · ￿u￿ · ￿v￿. As a particular case,
since deg(p) ≤ 1, then ￿p · u￿ ≤ 2￿p￿ · ￿u￿. Hence, it follows that ￿pfi￿, ￿pg0￿ ≤
8
√
n￿p￿2σ, with probability ≥ 1 − 2−n+3. Now, from Lemma 5.6, if n0.25 ≤ αq
we have that with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1):
￿pfiei￿∞, ￿pg0s￿∞ ≤ 8αqn0.25ω(log n)￿p￿2σ
Apart from this, since ￿M￿ ≤ ￿p￿ [122], we know that:
￿f0M￿∞ ≤ ￿f0M￿ ≤ 4n￿p￿2σ
Hence ￿C ￿￿N￿∞ ≤ [8(N + 2)αqn0.25ω(log n) + 4n] ￿p￿2σ, and taking n0.75 ≤ αq,
then:
￿C ￿￿N￿∞ ≤ (8N + 20)αqn0.25ω(log n)￿p￿2σ
As we assumed initially that ω(n0.25 log n)αN￿p￿2σ ≤ 1, then we have that
￿C ￿￿N￿∞ ≤ q/2, with probability ≥ 1− n−ω(1).
It can be seen that for the case of single encryption (N = 0), the determined
bounds are the same than in [122, Lemma 3.7].
5.1.5 Some Experimental results
In order to validate the viability of the proposed proxy re-encryption schemes,
we have developed and tested an implementation of our proposals. Since we
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propose two schemes, we have two diﬀerent implementations. NTRUReEncrypt is
implemented on top of an available open-source Java implementation of NTRU
[78]. For PS-NTRUReEncrypt, due to its non-standard nature, we had to code it
from scratch; however, we made use of the functionalities provided by the Java
Lattice-Based Cryptography (jLBC) library [126]. Our execution environment
consists on an Intel Core 2 Duo @ 2.66 GHz. Although this processor has two
cores, our implementation only uses one of them, as it is not parallel.
Performance of NTRUReEncrypt
The first experiment consisted of measuring the performance of the first pro-
posed scheme using diﬀerent set of parameters. We have used the parameter
sets proposed in [79], although other parameters could be studied. Besides the
basic implementation, we have made also some optimizations, such as the possi-
bility of using product-form polynomials [79], which has a great eﬀect on perfor-
mance.
In Table 5.4, we give the execution times for the encryption, decryption and
re-encryption for each parameter set. Parameters are represented by a tuple (n,
prod, k), where prod is a boolean parameter that indicates the use of product-form
polynomials, and k is the claimed security level (in bits). Additional parameters
are fixed, such as q = 2048 and p = 3.
For each set of parameters, the experiment consisted of a looped execution, where
a randommessage from the plaintext space is sequentially encrypted, re-encrypted
and decrypted, and new keys are used on each iteration. The time for each
operation is computed as the average of 100 iterations. Since sampling random
elements is an operation that can be performed oﬀ-line, we decided to exclude it
from the time measurements; thus, times reflected in this experiment only reflect
the operations that must be performed on-line. This approach was also followed
by [124].
For example, the sixth set of parameters was already used for a previous NTRU
benchmark [124], and we can see that our results are consistent with their study,
where they obtained a measure of approximately 0.31 ms for encryption (3220
encryptions per second).
In addition, Table 5.4 also shows the average number of re-encryptions supported
by each parameter set. As stated in Section 5.1.3, the inclusion of the error
term pe during the re-encryption process produces an increasing error that grows
on each hop, causing a decryption failure at some point. It can be seen that
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Table 5.4: Computation time (in ms) and number of hops of NTRUReEncrypt
for diﬀerent parameters
Parameters Enc. Dec. Re-Enc. # Hops
(439, no, 128) 0.64 0.30 0.24 5
(439, yes, 128) 0.16 0.30 0.23 5
(1087, no, 256) 1.39 1.25 1.05 21
(1087, yes, 256) 0.48 1.26 1.07 15
(1171, no, 256) 0.80 1.12 1.14 21
(1171, yes, 256) 0.43 1.22 1.15 14
(1499, no, 256) 0.74 1.78 1.73 50
(1499, yes, 256) 0.32 1.67 1.66 42
this depends on the choice of parameters, so increasing the parameters actually
decreases the probability of decryption failure.
Comparison of NTRUReEncrypt with other proxy re-encryption schemes
In order to benchmark our proposal with respect to other proxy re-encryption
schemes, we have implemented three schemes. Two of them share similar proper-
ties than ours (i.e., bidirectional and multihop). One of them is the BBS scheme
[43], which is CPA-secure as ours, while the other is the one proposed by Weng
et al. [54], which is proven CCA-secure; note, however, that the latter scheme
achieves a better notion of security than ours, and hence, the comparison is un-
balanced in this case. Both of them are implemented in Java using elliptic curve
cryptography over a prime field. Specifically, we used the NIST P-256 curve,
which provides 128 bits of security [74]. In addition, and for the sake of compar-
ison, we have also implemented a third scheme from Aono et al. [47]; note that
in this case, this scheme is not bidirectional. For our scheme, we have used the
ees1171ep1 parameter set from [79], which achieves 256 bits of security. This pa-
rameter set corresponds to the sixth row of Table 5.4. We chose this parameter set
because it was already used for a previous NTRU benchmark [124]. With regard
to the experimental setting, we have used the same environment as before.
Figure 5.1 shows the results of our experiment. It can be seen that our scheme
outperforms the others, as it is between 10 and 20 times faster. The scheme from
Aono et al. shows a similar performance in encryption and decryption, but is 20
times slower for re-encryption. The results obtained for our scheme are consistent
with previous benchmarks for NTRU [124], as we used the same parameters.
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Figure 5.1: Comparison with other proxy re-encryption schemes
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Table 5.5: Computation time (in ms) of PS-NTRUReEncrypt for diﬀerent pa-
rameters
Parameters Enc. Dec. Re-Enc.
n = 32, log2 q = 23 0.93 0.99 1.05
n = 64, log2 q = 28 4.53 4.23 4.32
n = 128, log2 q = 32 17.28 17.32 17.45
n = 256, log2 q = 37 80.64 81.045 86.56
n = 512, log2 q = 41 333.75 334.07 359.54
n = 1024, log2 q = 46 1333.03 1344.10 1461.46
For our experiment, we also implemented other unidirectional schemes, specifi-
cally, the ones from Ateniese et al. [11] and Libert and Vergnaud [12]. However,
we exclude them from this comparison since they are much slower due to the use
of bilinear pairings.
Performance of PS-NTRUReEncrypt
Table 5.5 shows the computation time of the main operations of PS-NTRUReEncrypt.
It can be seen that the computation time for the main operations is approximately
the same for each parameter set. This is also shown in Figure 5.2. Note that
this figure is in logarithm scale, so the growth in computation time is exponential
as n increases. This is a consequence of requiring that n is a power of 2, which
restricts the choice of parameters.
Unlike the first scheme, we do not provide a comparison of PS-NTRUReEncrypt
to other proxy re-encryption schemes. We cannot directly compare it to other
schemes without properly analyzing the security level it achieves, which is done
indirectly through evaluating the security against the best known lattice attacks
[122].
With regard to the number of hops of this scheme, the results now are much
better than in NTRUReEncrypt, where we had just up to 50 re-encryptions, with
the parameter sets used. In this case, we were unable to find a maximum number
of hops, having executed more than 10000 re-encryptions for each parameter set,
without finding any decryption failure. This lead us to think that the param-
eters used in PS-NTRUReEncrypt are actually very conservative, which explains
also that its performance is lower than NTRUReEncrypt. These parameters are,
however, derived from the theoretic assumptions; it is an open problem to find
ways to decrease them.
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Figure 5.2: Performance of PS-NTRUReEncrypt
Table 5.6: Space costs (in KB) of PS-NTRUReEncrypt for diﬀerent parameters
Parameters Size of polynomials
n = 32, log2 q = 23 0.09
n = 64, log2 q = 28 0.22
n = 128, log2 q = 32 0.50
n = 256, log2 q = 37 1.16
n = 512, log2 q = 41 2.56
n = 1024, log2 q = 46 5.75
Other factor that could impact the results is that the implementation is not as
optimized as NTRUReEncrypt, since we had to code it from scratch. In order to
improve our implementation, we can make use of optimizations such as faster
algorithms for polynomial multiplication, based on the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT).
As for the space costs, Table 5.6 shows the size in KB of the polynomials produced
by diﬀerent parameters. Recall that in our schemes, all the elements of the
cryptosystem (i.e., public and secret keys, re-encryption keys, and ciphertexts)
are represented by the same kind of polynomials.
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5.1.6 Towards a Unidirectional Version of NTRUReEncrypt
There are several improvements that are desirable for our proposed schemes.
Apart from enhancing the security notion, which is discussed in the next section,
achieving a unidirectional (and non-interactive) version strikes as an obvious next
step.
The first ideas towards a unidirectional scheme come from the study of a multikey
fully homomorphic encryption scheme [127] that uses the NTRU version from
Stehle´ and Steinfeld as a building block. In this paper, the authors embed a secret
key into a ciphertext, using the NTRU variant, for constructing the evaluation key
of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme; this way, the secret key is stealthily
used during the homomorphic evaluation procedure. It can be seen that this is
somehow analogous to the re-encryption keys and re-encryption procedure, so a
natural question is to wonder whether this very same approach can be reused for
constructing unidirectional re-encryption keys.
Let us assume that the re-encryption key generation procedure of PS-NTRUReEncrypt
is modified, so that instead of re-encryption keys of the form rkA→B = fAf−1B ,
these are of the form rkA→B = hBz + pr + fA, where z, r are random vectors.
A first implication of this change is that the re-encryption key generation proce-
dure becomes non-interactive, since it does not require the delegator to know the
secret key fB of the delegatee, but the public one hB. A second implication is
that, considering that PS-NTRUReEncrypt is also one-way secure, then it should
not be possible to extract the secret key from the re-encryption key. The uni-
directional property is also obvious, as a particular re-encryption key cannot be
used to derive the converse re-encryption key.
Although this approach looks promising, it is important to check if the correct-
ness is preserved. In the case of PS-NTRUReEncrypt, this implies bounding the
ciphertext noise in order to study the occurrence of decryption failures. Let
CA = hAs + pe + M be a regular ciphertext. Recall that when decrypting a
re-encrypted ciphertext, the decryption algorithm first makes the following com-
putation:
C ￿B = fB · (rkA→B · CA)
= fB · (hBz + pr + fA)(hAs+ pe+M)
= p · [(gBz + fBr) · CA + gAfBs] + fAfBM (5.3)
Assuming no decryption failures, this expression is reduced modulo p, which
should yield a correct decryption, since, being fAfB mod p = 1, it holds that:
C ￿B mod p = fAfBM mod p =M
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However, these arguments can be false in the event of decryption failures. In fact,
the noise represented by the term p · [(gBz + fBr) · CA + gAfBs] in Equation 5.3
can be quite large. Preliminary experimental results show that this noise is too
big for allowing the decryption to be correct. This problem also seems to appear
when we follow a similar approach for NTRUReEncrypt, which was more tolerable
against noise. The fact that this approach does not yield immediate results for
both NTRUReEncrypt and PS-NTRUReEncrypt hints that solving this problem
is far from being obvious. An initial strategy towards solving this problem is
to find a set of parameters that minimize the probability of decryption failures,
while preserving the security of the schemes. This is still work in progress.
Apart from the decryption failures, the proposed approach, based on the en-
cryption of secret keys acting as re-encryption keys, poses new challenges. The
security concerns that arise when a secret key is encapsulated into a ciphertext
are modeled by the notion of circular security. Informally, this notion studies the
implications of providing the adversary with cycles of the following form:
{Enc(pk1, sk2),Enc(pk2, sk3), ...,Enc(pkn−1, skn),Enc(pkn, sk1)}
Cash et al. show in [128] that if it is possible to obtain certain type of key
cycles, then passive adversaries might be able to recover the secret keys involved,
even when CCA-secure encryption schemes are used. Potentially, this has serious
implications for this proposed approach, because re-encryption keys can be used
to create key cycles.
5.1.7 Summary
In this section we described NTRUReEncrypt, a highly-eﬃcient proxy re-encryption
scheme based on the NTRU cryptosystem. This scheme is bidirectional and mul-
tihop, but not collusion-resistant. The key strength of this scheme is its perfor-
mance. Experimental results show that this scheme outperforms previous propos-
als by an order of magnitude, and there is room for even more improvement, for
instance using parallelization techniques, as shown in [124]. We believe that the
level of eﬃciency shown by NTRUReEncrypt opens up new practical applications
of proxy re-encryption in constrained environments. In addition to this scheme,
we propose PS-NTRUReEncrypt, a provably-secure variant that is CPA-secure
under the hardness of lattice problems, namely the Ring-LWE problem.
116
5.2. Application of Generic CCA-Secure Transformations to PRE
5.2 Application of Generic CCA-Secure Trans-
formations to PRE
In the previous section, we described a proxy re-encryption scheme that is proven
CPA-secure. Once one obtains schemes like this, an immediate objective would
be to improve their security notion, hopefully achieving full CCA-security. To
this end, there are two diﬀerent strategies that can be applied: one is to redesign,
from scratch, a new scheme based on the original; a second option is to try to
bootstrap the achieved security notion into a stronger one by means of a generic
method.
Several generic methods exist for achieving CCA-secure public-key encryption
schemes from weakly secure cryptosystems, such as the Fujisaki-Okamoto and
REACT transformations [17, 18]. To the best of our knowledge, this is not the
case of proxy re-encryption. Therefore, it would be desirable to count on anal-
ogous constructions that allow PRE schemes to achieve better security notions.
In this section, we study the adaptation of these transformations to proxy re-
encryption and find both positive and negative results. On the one hand, we
show that a direct and naive application of these transformations leads to flaws
in the security proofs, which we spot in a dozen of schemes from the literature.
On the other hand, we propose an extension of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transforma-
tion for PRE, which achieves a weak form of CCA-security in the random oracle
model, and identify the suﬃcient conditions for applying it.
5.2.1 Introduction
A coveted goal for any cryptosystem is to satisfy a strong notion of security, rel-
evant to its security objectives. In the case of Public-Key Encryption (PKE),
indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) is widely re-
garded as the right notion of security [119]. Informally, the IND-CCA notion
describes a security model where any adversary, even with access to a decryption
oracle, is not able to distinguish messages for a given ciphertext.
The same desire for achieving right security notions drives the design of other
kinds of cryptosystems, and proxy re-encryption is no diﬀerent. Similarly to the
PKE case, the IND-CCA notion is also considered as the target security notion
for PRE schemes. In addition to the decryption capabilities, this notion natu-
rally considers the ability of the adversary to re-encrypt chosen ciphertexts by
means of a re-encryption oracle. However, this added capability poses an inter-
esting challenge since the possibility of re-encrypting ciphertexts conflicts with
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the traditional view of CCA-security, which implies non-malleability of cipher-
texts, as pointed out by Canetti and Hohenberger, the authors of one of the first
CCA-secure PRE scheme [45]. Given the peculiarities of IND-CCA security in
PRE, it is often not easy to devise schemes that achieve strong security notions.
Most CCA-secure PRE schemes usually resort to additional constructions such
as one-time signatures [45, 12], Schnorr signatures [54] and non-interactive zero-
knowledge proofs [62], which have to be carefully integrated in an ad-hoc manner.
Apart from this diﬃculty, there are also other factors, such as eﬃciency and design
simplicity, which are usually negatively impacted in CCA-secure schemes.
In the context of PKE, several generic methods exist for achieving CCA-secure
schemes from weakly secure cryptosystems. Fujisaki and Okamoto proposed in
1999 [71], and revisited recently in [17], a generic conversion for achieving CCA-
security in the random oracle model from a weakly secure asymmetric cryptosys-
tem and a symmetric encryption scheme. Similar transformations, such as RE-
ACT [18] and GEM [29], have been proposed since then.
A natural question is, then, to wonder whether an analogous transformation
can be constructed for proxy re-encryption schemes. Direct application of the
aforementioned transformations leads, in general, to flawed cryptosystems. In this
chapter we show several examples from the literature where a naive application
of this transformation leads to flaws in the security proofs.
On a positive note, we also describe suﬃcient conditions that allow to apply the
Fujisaki-Okamoto directly. These conditions include achieving a weak notion of
security, namely IND-CCA0,1 (defined in Chapter 4), where the adversary only has
access to the re-encryption oracle before the challenge, and the satisfaction of a
new property of PRE called “perfect key-switching”, which characterizes schemes
where the re-encryption process preserves the original randomness of ciphertexts.
The schemes resulting from this transformation achieve IND-CCA2,1 security in
the random oracle model, a notion slightly weaker than full CCA-security. As
an illustration, we present an example of a scheme that satisfies the application
conditions and we show the resulting scheme after the transformation. In addition
to the Fujisaki-Okamoto proposal, we also outline how the REACT [18] and GEM
[29] transformations could be extended for proxy re-encryption.
Finally, we discuss the applicability of the devised transformations to our PRE
schemes based on NTRU.
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5.2.2 Related work
The Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, originally proposed in [71] and recently
revisited in [17], was the first generic transformation from weakly secure encryp-
tion schemes to a CCA-secure public key cryptosystem. Later, Okamoto and
Pointcheval described a more eﬃcient construction, called REACT [18], which in
turn inspired Coron et al. to propose GEM [29], a more complex construction,
but that achieves shorter ciphertexts. Although both REACT and GEM are
more eﬃcient than the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, they require stronger
assumptions on the underlying public-key scheme (see Section 5.2.6).
There are several examples of the application and modification of such transfor-
mations for other kinds of cryptosystems. Kitagawa et al. study in [129] the
adaptation of both Fujisaki-Okamoto and REACT to Identity-Based Encryption,
and estimate their reduction costs. Similar works exist in the context of cer-
tificateless public-key encryption [130], and certificated-based encryption [131].
Although these extensions are relevant to our work, the inherent diﬃculties that
arise from the re-encryption capabilities of PRE pose a challenging problem.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior work on generic transformations for
PRE, in the sense of constructions that increase the security of existing proxy re-
encryption schemes. There are, however, a couple of works that propose generic
methods for constructing CCA-secure PRE schemes out of other kinds of cryp-
tosystems. Shao et al. propose in [132] a generic method based on a CCA-secure
threshold encryption scheme; additionally they describe variants for achieving
collusion resistance and Identity-based PRE. In a posterior work, Hanaoka et
al. present in [133] another generic method for constructing CCA-secure PRE
schemes, also based on the use of threshold encryption, together with a CCA-
secure PKE scheme and a strongly unforgeable signature scheme. However, this
latter method requires long keys and ciphertexts. For instance, a re-encryption
key is made of two PKE public keys, one PKE ciphertext, a threshold encryption
share and a signature.
5.2.3 Adapting the Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation to
PRE
In this section we describe the original Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation and de-
scribe the conditions that allow to apply it correctly to proxy re-encryption.
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The Fujisaki-Okamoto Transformation
Fujisaki and Okamoto proposed in 1999 a generic transformation for achieving
IND-CCA security in the random oracle model from a public key encryption
scheme with one-way security under chosen plaintext attacks (OW-CPA) [71]. In
order to do so, the generic transformation integrates the PKE scheme with an
IND-CPA-secure symmetric scheme and a pair of hash functions. Recently, the
authors presented a revised version [17], which will be the one we consider in this
chapter.
The hybrid transformation, which we denote as Hyb, is as follows. Let PKE be a
public-key encryption scheme, Sym a symmetric encryption scheme, and H and G
hash functions. PKE is non-deterministic, so in addition to the public key and the
message, its encryption function takes an additional parameter for introducing
randomness in the ciphertext.
In order to encrypt a message m, the hybrid transformation first samples ran-
domly a term σ from the message space of PKE. The messagem is then encrypted
with Sym using G(σ) as key, which produces the term c = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m).
Next, the σ term is encrypted with PKE, taking H(σ, c) as the random coins. The
hybrid transformation produces the following tuple as the encryption of message
m:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PKE.Enc(pk, σ, H(σ, c)), c)
When decrypting a ciphertext, which we will denote by the tuple (e, c), the
hybrid transformation performs the inverse procedures in reverse order: it de-
crypts σ from e, and computes G(σ) in order to extract the decryption key for
c, thus obtaining the original message m. However, an additional validation step
is performed during the decryption. This step involves re-computing the term
e = PKE.Enc(pk, σ, H(σ, c)) of the ciphertext, ensuring this way that the cipher-
text is valid. If this check does not succeed, the ciphertext is rejected.
This very last step is the reason why the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation fails
if applied as is in PRE: the re-encryption function change the ciphertexts in
such a way that the validation checking that takes place during the decryption
inevitably fails. In particular, the alteration produced by the re-encryption aﬀects
the original random coins introduced in the encryption; hence, the validation
check will fail once a ciphertext is re-encrypted. Section 5.2.4 shows how the
scheme from Aono et al. [47] is flawed precisely for omitting the validation step,
so the problem went unnoticed.
As a solution to this problem, it is interesting to think of PRE schemes where
the re-encryption does not alter the original randomness. In this section we
120
5.2. Application of Generic CCA-Secure Transformations to PRE
characterize a property of PRE schemes that captures this notion, called per-
fect key-switching, and use it as one of the conditions to successfully apply the
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation to PRE.
A New Property of PRE: Perfect Key-Switching
In the previous section we identified that the alteration of the original randomness
prevents Fujisaki-Okamoto’s decryption procedure from validating a re-encrypted
ciphertext. We are therefore interested on those schemes where the original ran-
domness is preserved. This notion is captured by the following property.
Definition 5.8 (Perfect Key-Switching). Let Π = (KeyGen,ReKeyGen,Enc,Dec,ReEnc)
be a PRE scheme, with message space M and random coins space R, and λ the
security parameter. We say that Π satisfies the perfect key-switching property
if for all keypairs (pki, ski), (pkj, skj) generated by KeyGen(λ), all m ∈ M, all
r ∈ R, and all rki→j = ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj), then
ReEnc(rki→j,Enc(pki,m, r)) = Enc(pkj,m, r)
It can be seen that the key-switching procedure that takes places during re-
encryption is “perfect”, in the sense that it does not aﬀect the random coins
used. Informally, the re-encryption simply “switches” one public key for another.
Examples of this type of scheme are the BBS [43] and CH [45] schemes. It is
easy to check that the former exhibits this property. The BBS scheme, based
on the ElGamal cryptosystem, is constructed over a group G of prime order q,
with generator g. Secret keys are of the form sk = a ∈ Zq, whereas public
keys are pk = ga ∈ G. Ciphertexts are of the form (pkr, gr · m), for a random
exponent r. Re-encryption keys are computed as rki→j =
skj
ski
, so the re-encryption
process simply consists on raising the pkr component of the ciphertext to the re-
encryption key. This scheme fulfills the perfect key-switching property since the
re-encryption process gracefully removes the original public key and substitutes
it with the new one, preserving the original randomness:
ReEnc(rki→j,Enc(pki,m, r)) = ReEnc(
b
a
, ((ga)r, gr ·m))
= ((gar)
b
a , gr ·m)
= (gbr, gr ·m) = Enc(pkj,m, r)
Therefore, the original ciphertext (gar, gr · m) is perfectly transformed after re-
encryption into (gbr, gr ·m).
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Note that Definition 5.8 can be generalized for PRE schemes with multiple en-
cryption (and consequently, decryption) functions. For example, for the case
of two encryption functions Enc1 and Enc2, as in the schemes from Ateniese et
al. [11], the perfect key-switching condition can be restated as follows:
ReEnc(rki→j,Enc2(pki,m, r)) = Enc1(pkj,m, r)
An immediate consequence of the perfect key-switching property is that it im-
plies proxy invisibility. A PRE scheme is said to be proxy-invisible if a delegatee
is unable to distinguish a ciphertext computed under her public key from a re-
encrypted ciphertext, originally encrypted under another public key [11]. That is,
the proxy is “invisible”, in the sense that the delegatee cannot discern whether
the proxy has transformed the ciphertexts. From this description, it is clear
that perfect key-switching implies proxy invisibility: a re-encrypted ciphertext
has exactly the same form as a ciphertext originally encrypted with the del-
egatee’s public key. However, the converse implication (i.e., proxy invisibility
implies perfect key-switching) is not necessarily true. For example, the third
proposal from Ateniese et al. [11] is proxy invisible, but does not satisfy the
perfect key-switching property, since the original randomness is altered after the
re-encryption; in particular, the original random component r is polluted during
the re-encryption with the original secret key a, so the new randomness becomes
r￿ = a · r. This does not aﬀect security of the scheme in any way because the
random elements are safely conveyed as exponents (i.e., exploiting this would
imply solving the discrete logarithm problem), but it is suﬃcient for disallowing
the reconstruction of a re-encrypted ciphertext from the original message and
randomness, breaking the perfect key-switching property. Another interesting re-
sult is that the perfect key-switching property also implies that the PRE scheme
cannot be key-private, a property of PRE schemes where the proxy cannot learn
the identity of the involved users from the re-encryption key. This property was
first defined in [64], where the authors formulated some necessary conditions for
achieving key privacy. One of this conditions is that the re-encryption function
must be probabilistic. However, it can be seen that our formulation of perfect
key-switching requires deterministic re-encryption. Therefore, if a PRE scheme
satisfies the perfect key-switching property, it cannot be key-private.
Extension of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation to PRE
The intuition behind how the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation can be extended
to PRE is simple: assuming the underlying PRE scheme satisfies the perfect key-
switching property, then a re-encrypted ciphertext is completely indistinguishable
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from an original ciphertext created with the same randomness. Therefore, the
re-encryption does not aﬀect the transformation.
The extended transformation Let PRE be a proxy re-encryption scheme and
Sym a symmetric encryption scheme. LetMpre, Cpre andRpre denote the message,
ciphertext and randomness spaces of PRE, respectively, while Msym, Csym and
Ksym denote the message, ciphertext and key spaces of Sym. The encryption
function in PRE is non-deterministic, so besides the public key and the message, it
takes a parameter from Rpre for introducing randomness in the ciphertext. Let H
and G be hash functions, where H :Mpre× Csym → Rpre and G :Mpre → Ksym.
We denote as Hyb to the hybrid scheme that results from applying the extended
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, which is generically defined as follows:
• Hyb.Setup(λ) → params￿. On input the security parameter λ, the setup
algorithm first computes params ← PRE.Setup(λ) and outputs the set of
global parameters params￿ = params ∪ {H(·), G(·)}.
• Hyb.KeyGen(λ) → (pki, ski). On input the security parameter λ, the key
generation algorithm outputs (pki, ski)← PRE.KeyGen(λ), which is the pair
of public and secret keys for user i.
• Hyb.ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj) → rki→j. On input the pair of public and
secret keys (pki, ski) for user i and the pair of public and secret keys
(pkj, skj) for user j, the re-encryption key generation algorithm outputs
the re-encryption key rki→j ← PRE.ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj).
• Hyb.Enc(pki,m) → (ei, ci). On input a public key pki and a message m ∈
Msym, the encryption algorithm first samples a random σ ∈Mpre, and com-
putes ci ← Sym.Enc(G(σ),m). Next, it computes ei ← PRE.Enc(pki, σ, H(σ, ci)).
Finally, it outputs ciphertext (ei, ci).
• Hyb.ReEnc(rki→j, (ei, ci)) → (ej, cj). On input a re-encryption key rki→j
and a ciphertext (ei, ci), the re-encryption algorithm outputs the ciphertext:
(PRE.ReEnc(rki→j, ei), ci)
• Hyb.Dec(ski, (ei, ci)) → m. On input the secret key ski and a ciphertext
(ei, ci), the decryption algorithm first computes σ ← PRE.Dec(ski, ei), and
verifies that σ ∈ Mpre; otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Next, it verifies that
ei = PRE.Enc(pki, σ, H(σ, ci)); otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Finally, it outputs
the result of the symmetric decryption algorithm Sym.Dec(G(σ), ci).
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Note that the resulting hybrid PRE scheme requires the public key during the
decryption, since it needs to reconstruct the input ciphertext for validation pur-
poses. Nevertheless, in order to preserve the generic syntax of PRE schemes,
one could compute the public key from the secret key (if the underlying PRE
scheme allows this possibility) or simply consider the public key as part of the
secret key. This extension could also implement countermeasures against reject
timing attacks, such as those proposed by Galindo et al. [134]; we will, however,
consider them out of the scope of this thesis.
Correctness of the transformation It is necessary to prove that the extended
hybrid transformation produces a correct PRE scheme. We assume that the
underlying PRE and symmetric schemes are correct. Recall that we additionally
require that the PRE scheme satisfies the perfect key-switching property. In
PRE, besides the usual PKE condition for correctness, schemes must verify that
re-encrypted ciphertexts are correctly decrypted, for any message m:
Dec(skj,ReEnc(rki→j,Enc(pki,m)) = m
Therefore, for the scheme that results from applying our hybrid transformation,
we must prove that the following equation holds:
Hyb.Dec(skj,Hyb.ReEnc(rki→j,Hyb.Enc(pki,m)) = m (5.4)
First, by definition of the encryption function of the hybrid transformation,
Hyb.Enc(pki,m)) = (ei, ci), for ci = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m) and ei = PRE.Enc(pki, σ, H(σ, ci))).
Then, the left side of Equation 5.4 can be written as:
Hyb.Dec(skj,Hyb.ReEnc(rki→j, (ei, ci))
Next, by definition of the re-encryption function of the hybrid transformation,
we have that:
Hyb.ReEnc(rki→j, (ei, ci)) = (PRE.ReEnc(rki→j, ei), ci)
By assumption, the underlying PRE scheme satisfies the property of perfect key-
switching. Then:
PRE.ReEnc(rki→j, ei) = PRE.ReEnc(rki→j,PRE.Enc(pki, σ, H(σ, ci)))
= PRE.Enc(pkj, σ, H(σ, ci)) = ej (5.5)
Therefore, Equation 5.4 is equivalent to:
Hyb.Dec(skj, (ej, ci)) = m
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Finally, we must check that the decryption is correct. By definition of the decryp-
tion algorithm of the hybrid transformation, we first compute σ￿ ← PRE.Dec(skj, ej),
and verify that σ￿ ∈ Mpre. By correctness of the PRE scheme, we have that
σ￿ = σ and σ ∈ Mpre, so the verification succeeds. Next, we must verify that
ej = PRE.Enc(pkj, σ￿, H(σ￿, ci)), which is true since σ￿ = σ and the result of
Equation 5.5. The last step outputs the result of the symmetric decryption al-
gorithm Sym.Dec(G(σ), ci), which is equal to m, since σ￿ = σ and the symmetric
encryption scheme is correct, by assumption. Therefore, Equation 5.4 holds, and
the hybrid transformation is correct.
Security of the transformation Although the transformation seems to be
rather straightforward, proving its security is a more elusive matter. The original
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation for PKE achieves IND-CCA2 security, requiring
the underlying PKE scheme to be only one-way secure under chosen-plaintext
attacks (OW-CPA). This is possible because, in the security proof, the decryption
oracle can be constructed without knowledge of the secret key, using only the
random oracle tables.
For PRE, it is also necessary to define a re-encryption oracle. A tempting pos-
sibility is to do it similarly to the decryption oracle: on input a re-encryption
query (pki, pkj, (ei, ci)), the simulator searches in the random oracle tables for a
tuple (σ, ci, h), such that ei = PRE.Enc(pki, σ, h). If such tuple is found, then the
re-encrypted ciphertext is (PRE.Enc(pkj, σ, h), ci); otherwise, the oracle cannot
respond to the query and returns ⊥.
This solution seems elegant and simple, but is flawed. If the adversary inputs
an ill-formed ciphertext where the randomness does not come from the random
oracle H, the oracle rejects the ciphertext, outputting ⊥. However, in a real
execution of the scheme, the re-encryption function is unable to verify whether
the input ciphertext was created using H or not, since σ must be kept secret
during re-encryption. Therefore, the security proof diﬀers at this point from the
real execution. Furthermore, the adversary can potentially make an arbitrary
number of such queries, so it is not possible to “patch” the security proof by
stilted techniques, such as the artificial aborts from Waters’ IBE proof [61]. This
very same problem seems to be common and appears in several PRE schemes
that make use of constructions inspired in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation,
rendering their security proofs invalid [55, 62, 54, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140,
141, 142]. Section 5.2.4 analyzes this problem in detail.
Therefore, since the re-encryption function of our extended transformation cannot
check whether the hash function H was used or not, it is necessary to construct
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the re-encryption oracle without the random oracle tables. Furthermore, since
the simulator does not have access to the target secret key sk∗, it is not possible in
general to compute re-encryption keys of the form rkpk∗→pkj , for any user j.
In order to bypass these problems, we strengthen the requirements on the un-
derlying PRE scheme: instead of OW-CPA security, we now require IND-CCA0,1
security. We then construct the security proof of the transformation as a reduc-
tion from the security of the underlying scheme, making use of its definition of
the re-encryption oracle. This also implies that the transformation only achieves
IND-CCA2,1 security.
The following theorem conveys our main security result. For simplicity in the
proofs, we have opted for using the one-time pad rather than a generic symmetric
encryption scheme, so the second component of ciphertexts is computed as c =
G(σ)⊕m, instead of c = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m).
Theorem 5.9 (Security of the transformation). Let Π be a PRE scheme that is
γ-spread [17], fulfills the perfect key-switching property and is IND-CCA0,1-secure.
Let Π￿ be the resulting scheme after applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation
for proxy re-encryption. Then, Π￿ is IND-CCA2,1-secure in the random oracle
model.
The proof for Theorem 5.9 is presented below. It basically consists on a reduction
from the IND-CCA0,1 adversary to the IND-CCA2,1 adversary; since, by assump-
tion, the underlying scheme is IND-CCA0,1-secure, then the transformed scheme
must be IND-CCA2,1-secure.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Here we prove that if proxy re-encryption scheme Π is
secure in the IND-CCA0,1 sense, then the scheme Πhyb, which results from applying
the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation to Π as described in Section 5.2.3, is IND-
CCA2,1-secure in the random oracle model. We show how to use an IND-CCA2,1
adversary that breaks Πhyb to construct an IND-CCA0,1 adversary that breaks Π.
Let B = (B1,B2) be a IND-CCA2,1 adversary attacking Πhyb; that is, it wins the
IND-CCA2,1 game with non-negligible advantage εhyb. We want to show that it is
possible to construct an adversary A = (A1,A2) attacking Π that wins the IND-
CCA0,1 security game with also non-negligible advantage. To this end, we follow a
strategy similar to Shoup and Gennaro’s proof for the TDH1 cryptosystem [143]:
if the IND-CCA2,1 adversary wins, then he must have queried any of the random
oracles with the same input used for creating the challenge; the simulation is
maintained up to this point, but after that, it is no longer necessary since we
already are able of producing the response for the IND-CCA0,1 adversary.
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Algorithm A1(pk∗)
(x0, x1, sB) = B1(pk∗)
Sample random m0,m1 ∈Mpre
sA = (x0, x1, sB)
Return (m0,m1, sA)
Algorithm A2(m0,m1, sA, e∗)
Parse sA as (x0, x1, sB)
Sample random β, µ ∈ {0, 1}
c∗ = xβ ⊕G(mβ)
Execute B2(x0, x1, sB, (e∗, c∗))
If B2 aborted, then return β
Else, return µ
Figure 5.3: Adversary A
Adversaries A and B have access to the oracles that correspond to their respective
attack models. In short, B has access to all oracles, except to the re-encryption
oracle in phase 2 (which corresponds to the CCA2,1 attack model), whereas A only
has access to the key generation oracles and the re-encryption oracle in phase 1
(which corresponds to the CCA0,1 attack model). Note also that B has access to
random oracles H and G. We assume that B makes at most qdec to the decryption
oracle.
Figure 5.3 shows how adversary A can be constructed using B. Basically, A
simulates the view of the IND-CCA2,1 game to B, using his own challenge to
construct B’s challenge. Since he does not know mδ, he randomly chooses mβ
for the rest of the challenge ciphertext. Therefore, half of the times, B’s view is
correct and A uses it for deciding δ.
Consequently, A should simulate the view of B, that is, it should answer B’s oracle
queries, including the random oracles. The latter are simulated by A so that their
output is generated on-demand. This corresponds to the typical intuition of the
random oracle: a function that returns a randomly assigned output for each
possible input, sampled uniformly from its output domain. A maintains a list of
tuples for each random oracle, where each tuple contains the input and output of
a query: LH is the list for oracle H and LG the list for oracle G. Key generation
oracle queries (i.e., Ocorrupt,Ohonest and Orkgen) are trivially answered by relaying
them to A’s oracles.
All that remains is to tackle with decryption and re-encryption queries. Figure 5.4
shows the algorithms that simulate B’s view of the decryption and re-encryption
oracles. Recall that, according to the CCA2,1 attack model, the decryption oracle
is available in both phases, whilst the re-encryption oracle is only available in
phase 1.
This definition of B’ decryption oracle is essentially the same than the one found
in Fujisaki and Okamoto’s proof [17] and does not need any secret keys. The
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Algorithm OBdec(pki, (e, c))
Search (σ, c, h) ∈ LH ,
such that e = PRE.Enc(pki, σ, h)
If such tuple does not exist, then return ⊥
Return c⊕G(σ)
Algorithm OBreenc(pki, pkj, (e, c))
e￿ = OAreenc(pki, pkj, e)
If e￿ =⊥, then return ⊥
Else, return (e￿, c)
Figure 5.4: Decryption and re-encryption oracles for B
perfect key-switching property of the underlying PRE scheme guarantees that
the simulation of this oracle is correct, even when the input ciphertext is a re-
encryption. Note also that it is possible that B submits a valid ciphertext without
having used the random oracles, so it gets wrongfully rejected. This event is called
Bad in Fujisaki and Okamoto’s proof; assuming that the underlying PRE scheme
is γ-spread, the probability of this event is bound by qdec · 2−γ .
Similarly, B’ re-encryption oracle does not require re-encryption keys, but relies
on A’s re-encryption oracle, which is provided in the IND-CCA0,1 security game.
The simulation of this oracle is perfect. Key generation oracles are also perfectly
simulated, since they depend exclusively on A’s oracles.
The simulation of the random oracles is perfect, until B queriesG(mβ) orH(mβ, ·).
If this event occurs, A aborts the simulation and outputs β, following the strategy
mentioned at the beginning. Otherwise, the simulation continues until B halts,
and A outputs a random bit µ.
Assuming that Bad does not occur, it can be seen that when β = δ in A2, which
happens with probability 12 , the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed as
the one defined by the security game; in this case, B should win the game with
probability 12+ε
hyb, and therefore, should query G(mβ) or H(mβ, ·) with the same
probability. Therefore, A wins the game with probability 12 + εhyb too. On the
contrary, when β ￿= δ, then B does not have any advantage for distinguishing the
challenge, since xβ is information-theoretically hidden, so A wins the game with
probability 12 . Therefore, the success probability of A under this assumption is:
Pr[δ = δ￿|¬Bad] = 1
2
· (1
2
+ εhyb) +
1
2
· 1
2
=
1
2
+
εhyb
2
Finally, taking into consideration the probability that Bad occurs, the overall
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success probability and advantage of adversary A are, respectively:
Pr[δ = δ￿] ≥ Pr[δ = δ￿|¬Bad]Pr[¬Bad]
≥ (1
2
+
εhyb
2
) · (1− qdec · 2−γ)
εpre ≥ ε
hyb
2
− (1 + ε
hyb) · qdec
2γ+1
An interesting question is why not aim for IND-CCA2,2 security. The answer is
that the extended transformation, as is, is vulnerable to certain type of attacks
that use the re-encryption oracle after the challenge. Since the re-encryption
function simply re-encrypts the asymmetric part, it cannot verify whether the
symmetric part is valid or not. For example, suppose that the adversary takes
the challenge ciphertext (e∗, c∗), produces (e∗, c∗ ⊕K) for some value K ∈ Csym,
and asks for the re-encryption of the resulting ciphertext from the target user
to a corrupt one. This query is legal because (e∗, c∗ ⊕ K) is, technically, not a
derivative of the challenge ciphertext. Now the adversary only has to decrypt the
response, once he removes the mask K.
As we have discussed before, the diﬃculty of constructing the re-encryption oracle
in the security proof constrains both the security requirements and expectations
of this transformation. An interesting possibility is to modify the transformation
so as to be able to construct the security proof without these constraints. To
this end, an option is to use some kind of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
proof in order to extract the randomness used during encryption, as well as to
sign the rest of the ciphertext. However, because of the rewinding problems that
appear in the security proof, which make it run in exponential time, this is not
possible in general. To solve this, Canard et al. propose in [144] the use of a NIZK
proof with online extractor (NIZKOE) as a way to patch the flawed scheme from
Chow et al. [135]. In this chapter, however, we focus only on what it can be
achieved without extending the transformation with new primitives.
5.2.4 An Account of Flawed Schemes
A Frequent Error in CCA-security Proofs in the Random Oracle model
In Section 5.2.3, we discussed the problems that arise in the security proof when
generic transformations are directly applied in PRE, in particular when the re-
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encryption oracle is based on the random oracle tables. This solution is incorrect,
as the security proof diﬀers from the real execution for certain re-encryption
queries.
We surveyed the literature of CCA-secure PRE schemes in the Random Oracle
model, looking for instances of this flaw. Our study yielded eleven vulnerable
schemes [55, 62, 54, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142], althought this list
might not be exhaustive.
Although these PRE schemes have diﬀerent characteristics, such as being bidi-
rectional [54], conditional [55] or identity-based [141], all of them share the same
intrinsic problem that arises from a wrong integration of the Fujisaki-Okamoto
transformation or other related techniques. It is important to note that this prob-
lem was first identified by Canard et al. in [144], but restricted to the analysis of
scheme from Chow et al. [135].
The problem is based on two diﬀerent issues. First, in the encryption function,
secret values are used as input to a hash function to produce the randomness
needed for encryption. For instance, in the original Fujisaki-Okamoto transfor-
mation [71], the session key σ and the original message m are used as this input:
it is clear that m should not be disclosed during re-encryption; in the same man-
ner, neither σ should be revealed, since this could be used to decrypt the message.
However, this also means that in a real execution of the re-encryption function,
it is not possible to verify that the hash function has been used correctly (i.e.,
(σ,m) was used as input to H).
Second, the CCA attack model in PRE implies that queries of the form (pk∗, pkj, cˆ),
where user j is corrupt and cˆ is not a derivative of the challenge, are legitimate
and must be answered correctly. This requirement can be inferred from usual
security models for CCA in proxy re-encryption, such as [45, 120], and in fact,
represents a critical, yet often overlooked, point in most CCA security proofs. In
particular, the simulation of these queries in the security proofs of the identified
schemes relies on examining the random oracle tables, which contain the input
and output of previous random oracle queries, as generally the challenger does
not have access to the target secret key sk∗, which is necessary for generating the
corresponding re-encryption key.
Taking both issues into consideration, let us suppose that the adversary creates an
ill-formed ciphertext cˆ under the target public key pk∗, where the randomness r is
not derived from H(σ,m), but chosen randomly. Next, the adversary calls the re-
encryption oracle with the input (pk∗, pkj, cˆ), for some corrupt user j. Note that
this query is legal, since it is not related to the challenge ciphertext (in fact, it can
occur in phase 1), and the simulator must answer it correctly since the adversary
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can check whether its decryption results in the same original message. The re-
encryption strategy based on the random oracle tables does not work in this
case, since the adversary did not use the random oracle, so the challenger cannot
respond to this type of queries. The security proofs in the identified schemes opt
for returning ⊥, indicating that the ciphertext is invalid. However, this approach
diﬀers from the real execution, where the re-encryption function is unable to check
whether the random oracle was used or not (i.e., that the ciphertext is valid or
not), since the input to the random oracle should be hidden from the proxy; the
re-encryption will work normally. Consequently, these security proofs are flawed,
as the security proofs diﬀer from the real execution.
Let us illustrate this flaw by analyzing one of the identified schemes. The PRE
scheme from Weng et al. [54, 50] is bidirectional, single-hop, interactive and is
allegedly CCA-secure in the random oracle model. Although this scheme does not
use the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, it integrates a variation of the Hashed
ElGamal scheme. Still, the same error in the security proof applies, since the
randomness is generated from a value that must be kept hidden from the proxy
(i.e., the original messagem), which implies it can only be correctly verified during
decryption, and not during re-encryption. The following is a slightly simplified
version of the scheme:
• Setup(λ): The setup algorithm first determines the cyclic group G of order
q, with q a prime of λ bits. A generator g ∈ G is chosen randomly. The
message space is M = {0, 1}n, where n is polynomial in the security pa-
rameter λ. It is also required a set of hash functions H1, H2 and H3, where
H1 : {0, 1}n ×G→ Zq, H2 : G→ {0, 1}n and H3 : G2 × {0, 1}n → Zq. The
global parameters are represented by the tuple:
params = (q,G, g,H1, H2, H3)
• KeyGen(params): Sample a random xi ∈ Zq, and compute the public and
private key of user i as pki = gxi and ski = xi.
• ReKeyGen(ski, skj): The re-encryption key from user i to user j is computed
as rki→j = skj/ski.
• Enc(pki,m): First, compute r = H1(m, pki). Next, sample random u ∈ Zq,
and compute D = (pki)u, E = (pki)r, F = H2(gr) ⊕ m, and s = u + r ·
H3(D,E, F ) mod q. The ciphertext is the tuple CTi = (D,E, F, s).
• ReEnc(rki→j, CTi = (D,E, F, s)): First, check that the condition (pki)s =
D · EH3(D,E,F ) holds; otherwise, output ⊥. The re-encryption of ciphertext
CTi is the tuple CTj = (pki, E ￿, F ), where E ￿ = Erki→j = (pkj)r.
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• Dec1(sk, CT = (pki, E ￿, F )): Given a first-level ciphertext CT , the original
message is computed as m = F ⊕ H2((E ￿)1/sk). Finally, check that E ￿ =
pkH1(m,pki) holds and return m; otherwise, return ⊥.
• Dec2(sk, CT = (D,E, F, s)): Given a second-level ciphertext CT , first check
that the condition pks = D · EH3(D,E,F ) holds; otherwise, output ⊥. The
original message is computed as m = F ⊕ H2(E1/sk). Finally, check that
E = pkH1(m,pk) holds and return m; otherwise, return ⊥.
Note that the check that is made during re-encryption is unable to verify whether
r = H1(m, pki). For instance, if the value r is chosen randomly, the re-encryption
still works normally. Therefore, the security proof should also behave in the same
way, but we will see below that this is not the case. Figure 5.5 shows the definition
of the re-encryption oracle given in the security proof of this scheme.
Algorithm Oreenc(pki, pkj, CTi = (D,E, F, s))
If (pki)s ￿= D · EH3(D,E,F ) return ⊥
If i and j are both honest or corrupt
Compute E ￿ = Exj/xi
Else
Search tuple (m, pki, r) ∈ LH1 , such that (pki)r = E
If such tuple exists, then compute E ￿ = (pkj)r
Else return ⊥
Return CTj = (pki, E ￿, F )
Figure 5.5: Re-encryption oracle from Weng et al.’s security proof [54]
It can be seen that when users i and j are both honest or corrupt, the re-
encryption oracle simply computes the re-encryption keys; otherwise, it resorts
to examining LH1 , the random oracle table for H1.
However, as pointed out previously, this oracle is unable to correctly answer
queries of the form (pk∗, pkj, cˆ), where cˆ is an ill-formed ciphertext under the
target public key pk∗ whose randomness r is not derived from H1(m, pk∗). In
this case, the target user is honest, by definition, whereas user j is corrupt, so
the re-encryption oracle resorts to the random oracle table LH1 , which does not
contain any tuple of the form (m, pk∗, r), and returns ⊥. This behavior deviates
from the real-world execution of the re-encryption function, where no ciphertext
is rejected when r ￿= H1(m, pk∗).
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Another example of wrong usage of the transformation
In addition to the flawed schemes presented in the previous section, we describe
here a scheme where the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation is incorrectly applied.
In [47], Aono et al. proposed a lattice-based encryption scheme which is proven
CPA-secure in the standard model. Then, on top of this scheme, they construct
a “CCA-secure” version in the random oracle model, using the generic conver-
sion from Fujisaki and Okamoto [71]. However, this version is flawed because it
does not perform the validation step during decryption. If one forces this check,
decryption will always fail for re-encrypted ciphertexts, breaking the correctness
of the scheme.
The PRE scheme from Aono et al. In this subsection we describe the
scheme from Aono et al. This scheme is based upon a lattice cryptosystem from
Lindner and Peikert [33], whose hardness relies on the Learning With Errors
(LWE) problem [32]. Some details are omitted for clarity; we refer the interested
reader to [47] and [33] for a complete description of the scheme.
Let n be the security parameter, q a prime number, and l a fixed message length.
Set k = log q. Let the randomly generated matrix A ∈ Zn×lq be publicly known.
Let Dn1×n2 be a gaussian noise distribution over Zn1×n2 . Auxiliary function
Power2 : Zn×lq → Znk×lq is defined as
Power2(X) =

X
2X
...
2k−1X

while function Bits : Z1×nq → {0, 1}1×nk produces a bit representation of the
elements of input vector v, such that Bits(v) ·Power2(X) = v ·X ∈ Z1×lq . Details
about noise distribution D and functions Power2(·) and Bits(·) are omitted here,
but can be found on [47, 33].
The scheme is as follows:
• KeyGen(n): Sample R, S ← Dn×l. The public key is pk = P = R − AS ∈
Zn×lq , while the secret key is sk = S ∈ Zn×l.
• Enc(pk = P,m ∈ {0, 1}l): Sample gaussian noise vectors f1, f2 from D1×n,
and f3 from D1×l. Encode the message m ∈ {0, 1}l to m · ￿ q2￿ ∈ Z1×lq .
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Output the ciphertext e = (e1, e2) ∈ Z1×(n+l)q , where
e1 = f1A+ f2
e2 = f1P + f3 +m · ￿q
2
￿
• Dec(sk = S, e = (e1, e2)): Compute m¯ = e1S + e2 ∈ Z1×lq . Let (m¯1, ..., m¯l)
be the individual elements of m¯. Output the decrypted message m =
(m1, ...,ml), where mi = 0 if m¯i ∈ [−￿ q4￿, ￿ q4￿) ⊂ Zq, and mi = 1 oth-
erwise.
• ReKeyGen(ski = Si, pkj = Pj, skj = Sj): Sample X ∈ Znk×nq from the
uniform distribution and E from Dnk×l. Output the re-encryption key
rki→j = (Pj, Q), where
Q =
￿
X −XSj + E + Power2(Si)
0 I
￿
• ReEnc(rki→j = (Pj, Q), e = (e1, e2)): Sample gaussian noise vectors g1, g2
from D1×n, and g3 from D1×l. Compute
g1[A|Pj] + [g2|g3] + [Bits(e1)|e2] ·Q ∈ Z1×(n+l)q
and parse the result as [e￿1|e￿2], where e￿1 ∈ Z1×nq and e￿2 ∈ Z1×lq . Output the
re-encrypted ciphertext e￿ = (e￿1, e
￿
2). It can be seen that
e￿1 = g1A+ g2 + Bits(e1)X
e￿2 = g1Pj + g3 + Bits(e1)(E −XSj) + e1Si + e2
Description of the flaw The flaw is based on the fact that a direct applica-
tion of the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion does not work in general for proxy re-
encryption, since the validity check during the decryption fails for re-encrypted
ciphertexts. In the definition of their CCA scheme, they only consider the validity
of decryption in the case of original ciphertexts. However, when one considers re-
encrypted ciphertexts, it can be seen that the validity check during the decryption
always fails.
Let us consider the CCA-secure version of the scheme, after applying directly the
Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, and let us define a scenario with two users i
and j, with public keys Pi and Pj, respectively. A ciphertext originally encrypted
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for user i is a tuple (e1, e2, c) where:
e1 = f1A+ f2
e2 = f1Pi + f3 + σ · ￿q
2
￿
c = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m)
The terms (e1, e2) are the encryption of σ with the PRE scheme, where the term
c is the symmetric encryption of the original message, with key G(σ). Thus,
the original random coins in this case are the noise vectors (f1, f2, f3), which by
the definition of the transformation, are computed from H(σ, c). In the random
oracle model, if this query to H has not been done previously, H produces a
random output and records the tuple (σ, c, f1, f2, f3) for future queries.
Now lets consider that this ciphertext, originally intended for user i, is re-encrypted
for some user j. Let g1, g2, g3 be the random vectors introduced by the re-
encryption function, X,E random matrices defined by user j during the interac-
tive process for generating re-encryption keys and Si, Sj the secret keys of users
i and j. The transformation only re-encrypts the terms (e1, e2), so the result is a
tuple (e￿1, e
￿
2, c) of the form:
e￿1 = g1A+ g2 + Bits(e1)X
e￿2 = g1Pj + g3 + Bits(e1)(E −XSj) + e1Si + e2
c = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m)
Now user j decrypts this ciphertext. Recall that the Fujisaki-Okamoto conver-
sion dictates that the output of the asymmetric encryption must be reconstructed,
using the same inputs. By the correctness of the original PRE scheme, she cor-
rectly receives σ. However, the output of H(σ, c) must be again (f1, f2, f3), by the
definition of the random oracle. When trying to reconstruct (e￿1, e
￿
2) she would
obtain eˆ￿1 = f1A + f2, eˆ
￿
2 = f1Pj + f3 + σ · ￿ q2￿, and the validation would fail
since (eˆ￿1, eˆ
￿
2) ￿= (e￿1, e￿2). Therefore, the decryption of re-encrypted ciphertexts
will always fail.
5.2.5 Applying the proposed transformation
For illustration purposes, in this section we present a PRE scheme that is secure
in the sense of IND-CCA0,1, assuming the 3-wDBDHI problem [12] is hard. We
later apply our extended Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation for obtaining a IND-
CCA2,1-secure scheme.
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The original scheme
This scheme is based on a scheme from Ateniese et al. [11] that lacked a security
proof. In order to prove that this scheme is IND-CCA0,1 secure, we borrowed some
ideas from the RCCA secure scheme from Libert and Vergnaud [12]. The scheme
is as follows:
• Setup(1λ): The setup algorithm first determines the cyclic groups G and
GT of order q, with q a prime of λ bits, and a bilinear pairing e, so that
e : G × G → GT . A set of generators g, u, v ∈ G is chosen randomly, and
Z = e(g, g). Function F : Zq → G is defined as F (t) = ut · v. The global
parameters are represented by the tuple:
params = (g, u, v, F (·), Z)
• KeyGen(params): Sample a random xi ∈ Zq, and compute the public and
private key of user i as pki = gxi and ski = xi.
• ReKeyGen(ski, pkj): The re-encryption key from user i to user j is computed
as
rki→j = (pkj)1/ski = gskj/ski
• Enc2(pki,m): Sample random r, t ∈ Zq. The second-level encryption of m
under pki is the tuple CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2), where
C0 = F (t)
r C1 = Z
r ·m
C2 = (pki)
r = gxir
• Enc1(pki,m): The first-level encryption of m under pki is exactly as the
second-level, except that C2 = e(g, pki)r = Zxir.
• ReEnc(rki→j, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2)): Check that the condition e(C0, pki) =
e(C2, F (t)) holds; otherwise, output ⊥. The re-encryption of the second-
level ciphertext CTi is the tuple CTj = (t, C0, C1, C ￿2), where C
￿
2 = e(C2, rki→j) =
Zxjr.
• Dec1(ski, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2)): Given a first-level ciphertext CTi, the orig-
inal message is computed as
m =
C1
C1/ski2
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• Dec2(ski, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2)): Given a second-level ciphertext CTi, the
original message is computed as
m =
C1
e(g, C2)1/ski
The first important characteristic of this scheme is that it fulfills the perfect key-
switching property, since the original randomness used in second-level ciphertext
is preserved after re-encryption, so a re-encrypted ciphertext is equal to first-level
ciphertext encrypted with the same randomness. More formally, for all messages
m, randomness t, r and public keys pki, pkj, it holds that:
ReEnc(rki→j,Enc2(pki,m; t||r)) = Enc1(pkj,m; t||r)
Assuming we use the same randomness t||r for both encryptions, then it can be
seen that a re-encrypted ciphertext is computed with the same operations than
a first-level encryption, except for element C2. The C2 component of a first-
level encryption under pkj is computed as C2 = e(g, pkj)r = Zxjr, while the same
component in a re-encrypted ciphertext is C ￿2 = e((pki)
r, rki→j) = e(gxir, gxj/xi) =
Zxjr, yielding the same result. Therefore, this scheme satisfies the perfect key-
switching property.
In addition, it can be seen that it is also well-spread, since for any message m
there can be q2 ≈ 22λ diﬀerent ciphertexts: component t is sampled randomly
from Zq, and the rest of the components resemble an ElGamal ciphertext, for
random r ∈ Zq.
Proving IND-CCA0,1 security
In this section we prove that the scheme is secure under the IND-CCA0,1 notion,
assuming the 3-wDBDHI problem is hard. We use an alternative definition of
this hard problem, due to Libert and Vergnaud [12].
Definition 5.10 (3-wDBDHI problem). Given a tuple (g, ga, ga
2
, g1/a, gb, e(g, g)d),
the 3-weak Decisional Bilinear DH Inversion problem (3-wDBDHI) in (G,GT ) is
to decide whether d = b/a2.
The proof consists on a reduction from the 3-wDBDHI problem to the IND-
CCA0,1 security of the scheme. Suppose that the scheme is not IND-CCA0,1 secure,
then there is an adversary B that wins the IND-CCA0,1 game with non-negligible
advantage ε, so its success probability is 12 + ε. From this adversary, we can
construct an algorithm A that solves the 3-wDBDHI problem with probability
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1
2 +
ε
2 − qreenc · 2−λ−1, where qreenc is the number of queries to the re-encryption
oracle made by B.
A receives as input a tuple (g, ga, ga2 , g1/a, gb, Zd), and uses it to simulate the
environment for the adversary B. First, A samples random t∗,α1,α2 ∈ Zq, and
sets u = (ga)α1 and v = (ga)−t∗α1(ga2)α2 , so F (t) = gaα1(t−t∗)ga2α2 . Note that
F (t∗) = ga2α2 ; we will use this later in the proof.
The public key of the target user is set as pk∗ = ga2 . For honest users, A samples
random wi ∈ Zq and sets pki = gawi . For corrupt users, A simply runs the
key generation algorithm and return the resulting public and private key pair
(pki = gxi , ski = xi).
Re-encryption keys rki→j are generated as follows:
• Honest user to target user: rki→∗ = (ga)1/wi
• Target user to honest user: rk∗→j = (ga)wj
• Honest user to honest user: rki→j = gwj/wi
• Honest user to corrupt user: rki→j = (g1/a)xj/wi
• Corrupt user to another user: rki→j = (pkj)1/xi
Since the attack model is CCA0,1, it is only necessary to simulate the re-encryption
oracle in Phase 1 (i.e., before the challenge). It is possible to simulate correctly all
possible re-encryption queries Oreenc(pki, pkj, CTi) using the re-encryption keys
described, except for the case when pki = pk∗ and user j is corrupt. These
queries are solved as below, without requiring the corresponding re-encryption
key. Since pki = pk∗, the ciphertext CTi is a tuple (t, F (t)r,m · Zr, (pk∗)r) =
(t, (gaα1(t−t∗)ga2α2)r,m ·Zr, ga2r). In order to compute the re-encryption, the chal-
lenger produces the auxiliary value gar in the following way:
gar =
C0
Cα22
1
(t−t∗)α1
=
￿
F (t)
ga2α2
￿ r
(t−t∗)α1
Once A computes gar, the re-encryption of C2 (which, as mentioned before, is
the only component of the ciphertext that changes after re-encryption) is as
follows:
C ￿2 = e((g
1/a)xj , gar) = Zxjr
Note that this procedure is correct except for the case then t = t∗. Since t∗ is not
disclosed by A in Phase 1, and t is sampled randomly, the case when t = t∗ can
happen only with negligible probability 1/q ≈ 2−λ, for each re-encryption query.
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We assume that the adversary B can make up to qreenc queries, so the overall
probability of this type of events is qreenc · 2−λ.
The challenge ciphertext is constructed as:
CT ∗ = (t∗, (gb)α2 ,mδ · Zd, gb)
A runs adversary B to obtain the guess δ￿ and decides that d = b/a2 when δ = δ￿.
Note that when d = b/a2, the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of mδ
under pk∗, where the random exponent r is defined implicitly as r = b/a2.
CT ∗ = (t∗, F (t∗)b/a
2
,mδ · Zb/a2 , (ga2)b/a2)
Therefore, in this case B guesses δ correctly with probability 12 + ε− qreenc · 2−λ
and A solves the 3-wDBDHI problem with the same probability. On the contrary,
when d is random, mδ is information-theoretically hidden, so the probability of
B guessing δ correctly is 12 . The overall success probability of A is then 12 + ε2 −
qreenc · 2−λ−1.
A IND-CCA2,1-secure PRE scheme
Since the previous scheme is IND-CCA0,1-secure, satisfies the perfect key-switching
property and is well-spread, then it can be extended for IND-CCA2,1 security using
our transformation. The resulting scheme is very similar, except that now r and
t are not chosen randomly, but using a hash function H. The scheme is as
follows:
• Enc2(pki,m): Sample random σ ∈ GT and compute C3 = G(σ)⊕m. Next,
the randomness used for encryption is produced as t||r = H(σ, C3). The
second-level encryption ofm under pki is the tuple CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2, C3),
where
C0 = F (t)
r C1 = Z
r ·m C2 = (pki)r = gxir
• Enc1(pki,m): The first-level encryption of m under pki is exactly as the
second-level, except that C2 = e(g, pki)r = Zxir.
• ReEnc(rki→j, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2, C3)): Check that the condition e(C0, pki) =
e(C2, F (t)) holds; otherwise, output ⊥. The re-encryption of the second-
level ciphertext CTi is the tuple CTj = (t, C0, C1, C ￿2, C3), where C
￿
2 =
e(C2, rki→j) = Zxjr.
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• Dec1(ski, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2)): Given a first-level ciphertext CTi, first
decrypt σ as σ = C1
C
1/ski
2
, and use it to extract the original randomness
t||r = H(σ, C3). Next, check that F (t)r = C0, Zrσ = C1, and e(g, pki)r =
C2 hold and return m = G(σ)⊕ C3; otherwise, return ⊥.
• Dec2(ski, CTi = (t, C0, C1, C2)): Given a second-level ciphertext CTi, first
decrypt σ as σ = C1
e(g,C2)1/ski
, and use it to extract the original randomness
t||r = H(σ, C3). Next, check that F (t)r = C0, Zrσ = C1, and (pki)r = C2
hold and return m = G(σ)⊕ C3; otherwise, return ⊥.
According to Theorem 5.9, this scheme is IND-CCA2,1-secure in the random oracle
model.
5.2.6 Towards Other Generic Transformations for Proxy
Re-Encryption
It is worthwhile thinking about other possible generic transformations for achiev-
ing strong security notions in the context of proxy re-encryption. In Section 5.2.3,
we have shown how to directly apply the Fujisaki-Okamoto generic transforma-
tion. However, this transformation has two main drawbacks:
• During the decryption procedure it is necessary to encrypt again the cipher-
text with the PRE scheme to check if it is the same as the one received.
This, of course, produces a computational overhead in the decryption.
• The underlying PRE scheme has to satisfy the perfect key-switching prop-
erty. This is not always the case, since often the re-encryption function
leaves “remnants” of the previous public key, which would make the de-
cryption check to fail inevitably.
It is desirable to come up with other transformations that achieve better security
without requiring the perfect key-switching property and the overhead produced
by re-computing the ciphertext during decryption. The latter problem is solved
in the PKE context by some transformations such as REACT [18] and GEM [29].
These transformations achieve CCA security, also in the random oracle model,
by including a hash of the ciphertext that acts as a checksum. For example, the
encryption output Hyb.Enc(pk,m) in REACT is a ciphertext of the form:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PKE.Enc(pk, σ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e
, Sym.Enc(G(σ),m)￿ ￿￿ ￿
c
, H(σ,m, e, c)￿ ￿￿ ￿
h
)
The decryption process is simple. It first deciphers σ from e; next, it extracts m
from c using the key G(σ); and, finally, it verifies that H(σ,m, e, c) = h.
140
5.2. Application of Generic CCA-Secure Transformations to PRE
As in the case of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, directly applying REACT
to a PRE scheme would not work in general, since the re-encryption process
invalidates the validity check. This check is based on a hash of rest of ciphertext,
so a re-encrypted ciphertext will not produce the same hash value h. However,
we could modify the transformation so the hash does not include the component
e, which is altered during the re-encryption. Then, ciphertexts would be of the
form:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PRE.Enc(pk, σ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e
, Sym.Enc(G(σ),m)￿ ￿￿ ￿
c
, H(σ,m, c)￿ ￿￿ ￿
h
)
It can be seen that the only diﬀerence with respect the original transformation is
in the component h. The re-encryption process would be similar to our Fujisaki-
Okamoto extension, re-encrypting the component e with the underlying PRE
scheme:
Hyb.ReEnc(rk, (e, c, h)) = (PRE.ReEnc(rk, e)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e￿
, c, h)
Assuming the PRE scheme is correct, the decryption process will work too. De-
crypting e￿ will output σ, so the process remains the same, except for the checksum
h, which now does not consider the e￿ term.
The modification we introduced in this transformation can be seen as a relaxation
of the validity check that takes place during the decryption, since we change it
from H(σ,m, e, c) to H(σ,m, c). Dropping the term e from the checksum implies
that we are not concerned anymore with possible alterations on this part; however,
the checksum still contains the original message m, its encryption c, and the term
σ. This prompt us to analyze what alterations are possible in the term e so that
the decryption is still correct.
It is clear that σ cannot be altered, since this would imply not being able to recover
the key for extracting m from c, so the only options are changing the public key
(which is precisely the goal of PRE) or the original random coins used (which
is what happens in PRE schemes that do not satisfy the perfect key-switching
property). Therefore, any ciphertext that decrypts to the original message would
be deemed valid, regardless of being altered (e.g., by re-encryption).
This idea corresponds precisely to the notion of Replayable CCA (RCCA) from
[145], which can be considered suﬃciently secure for many existing applications
of CCA security, and indeed, is the target security notion for some PRE schemes,
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such as the one from Libert and Vergnaud [12]. Note that RCCA also allows
any possible kind of alterations, even those not related to the re-encryption of
ciphertexts, as long as it decrypts to the original message.
It would appear, then, that a modified REACT transformation could be defined
for PRE, achieving a security notion similar to RCCA. However, some of the
problems mentioned in Section 5.2.3 also arise here: it is still not possible to
perform the validation step during re-encryption, since the hash input contains
information that is hidden during this process, and the construction of the re-
encryption oracle in the security proof cannot be based on the random oracle
tables either. This poses similar challenges to the Fujisaki-Okamoto case when it
comes to proving the security of the transformation.
Moreover, REACT puts additional restrictions on the underlying asymmetric
scheme. In particular, it requires the scheme to be one-way secure under plaintext-
checking attacks (OW-PCA), in order to enable the construction of the decryption
oracle in the security proof. Informally, this notion means that the scheme must
not allow the adversary to recover the plaintext from a given ciphertext, even if she
has access to a plaintext-checking oracle. This oracle is able to tell whether, for
input (m, c), the ciphertext c is an encryption of the plaintext m. An implication
of this requirement is that, when considering a PCA adversary, the hardness
assumption may vary with respect to traditional adversary models, such as CPA.
For instance, the ElGamal encryption scheme, which is OW-CPA secure under the
Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) assumption, is OW-PCA secure under the
Gap Diﬃe-Hellman (gap-DH) assumption [18]. The explanation of this change is
that the PCA oracle usually is equivalent to a solver of a hard decisional problem
(e.g., the PCA oracle for ElGamal is equivalent to a DDH oracle). Therefore, the
security of the scheme under OW-PCA must be based on a hardness assumption
that still holds when the adversary has access to an oracle of some hard decisional
problem (i.e., the PCA oracle). Some computational problems are still hard when
one has a solver for the decisional version, and this is precisely the essence behind
the concept of “gap problems”, defined by Okamoto and Pointcheval in [28].
In the same way, the extension of REACT to PRE would require the underlying
PRE schemes to be OW-PCA. This is the case of several PRE schemes. For
instance, it can be shown that the BBS scheme [43] is OW-PCA-secure under the
gap-DH assumption, as ElGamal. However, at the same time, in order to be
able to define the re-encryption oracle, the security proof for this modification
of REACT seems to require to take the form of a reduction to the security of
the underlying scheme under a notion that provides a re-encryption oracle. For
the Fujisaki-Okamoto case, we opted for requiring IND-CCA0,1 so as to simplify
the proof, but in this case OW-CCA0,1 is a more proper choice. Therefore, the
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underlying scheme should satisfy the notion of one-wayness under an attack model
that combines PCA and CCA0,1.
The resulting transformation would achieve an intermediate notion between RCCA
and IND-CCA2,1, and may be applicable to a wider class of PRE schemes than
the Fujisaki-Okamoto extension, since it does not require the schemes to satisfy
the perfect key-switching property. However, it is an open issue to analyze these
security definitions in detail, in order to provide a complete proof of the security
of this potential generic transformation for PRE.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there is at least another generic transforma-
tion, to which the same argumentation seems to apply. The GEM transforma-
tion [29] is very similar to REACT, but with a more involved construction that
achieves shorter ciphertexts. In GEM, ciphertexts are of the form:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PKE.Enc(pk, σ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e
, Sym.Enc(G(σ, e),m)￿ ￿￿ ￿
c
)
where r is a random term, s = F (m, r), and σ = s||(r⊕H(s)). In order to decrypt
a ciphertext (e, c), it first deciphers σ from e, and extracts m from c using the
key G(σ, e); next, it parses s||t from σ and computes r = t ⊕H(s); and, finally,
it verifies whether F (m, r) = s.
Being similar to REACT, the strategy for modifying GEM for proxy re-encryption
would be similar too. The part of the ciphertext produced by the underlying PRE
scheme would not be used as input to the hash function G, so the re-encryption
procedure does not break the validation. Thus, the encryption is modified for
producing ciphertexts of the form:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PRE.Enc(pk, σ)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e
, Sym.Enc(G(σ),m)￿ ￿￿ ￿
c
)
Therefore, re-encryption is identical to that of the Fujisaki-Okamoto extension:
Hyb.ReEnc(rk, (e, c)) = (PRE.ReEnc(rk, e)￿ ￿￿ ￿
e￿
, c)
The arguments regarding the security of this extension of GEM are very similar
to those for the extension of REACT.
5.2.7 Applicability to NTRUReEncrypt
At the beginning of this section, we mentioned that our original motivation for
this contribution was to improve the security notion of the schemes we proposed
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in the first half of this chapter. Our results are mixed: although our proposed
transformations can be applied to a wide range of PRE schemes, unfortunately,
they cannot be applied to our NTRU-based schemes.
The application to NTRUReEncrypt is out of scope since this scheme is not prov-
ably secure, while all our proposals require the original scheme to fulfill some pre-
determined security notion. In contrast, the second variant PS-NTRUReEncrypt
was, indeed, proven CPA-secure under the LWE assumption.
However, it is easy to see that PS-NTRUReEncrypt does not fulfill the perfect key
switching property, so it is not possible to directly apply our variant of Fujisaki-
Okamoto. With respect to our REACT and GEM proposals, recall that they
require the scheme to be OW-PCA, which means that the adversary should not
be able to break the one-wayness even if he has access to a plaintext checking
oracle. In practice, this oracle is usually implemented as a decisional oracle
of the corresponding hard problem, thus forcing the scheme to rely on a gap
variant of the original problem. This represents a unavoidable obstacle, since
the decisional and computational version of LWE are equivalent, as pointed out
by Peikert in [146], which negates the possibility of defining a gap problem for
LWE. This problem aﬀects several schemes, such as [47, 46, 48] and our proposal
PS-NTRUReEncrypt, so they cannot achieve OW-PCA security.
5.2.8 Summary
In this section we analyze the integration of generic transformations to proxy
re-encryption and find both positive and negative results. On the one hand, we
first describe why it is not possible to directly integrate known transformations,
such as Fujisaki-Okamoto and REACT, with weakly-secure PRE schemes due to
general obstacles coming from the constructions and the security models, and we
show twelve PRE schemes that are flawed as a consequence of these problems.
These transformations are artifacts conceived for securing public-key encryption
schemes, and cannot be used as is for proxy re-encryption due to the special
nature of the re-encryption capability. On the other hand, we also show that,
under some assumptions that include the satisfaction of a new property of PRE
called “perfect key-switching”, the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation can be used
to generically bootstrap a weak notion of security (IND-CCA0,1) into a much
stronger notion (IND-CCA2,1), in the random oracle model. However, to achieve
full CCA-security (i.e., IND-CCA2,2), it appears to be necessary to apply ad-
hoc modifications. For illustrating our proposal we present a PRE scheme that
satisfies the conditions for applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto extension and show the
resulting scheme after the transformation.
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Other generic transformations for public-key encryption are also discussed for
its application in proxy re-encryption. We show how the REACT and GEM
transformations [18, 29] can be modified to support re-encryptions. Since the
perfect key-switching property is no longer required, these proposals are poten-
tially applicable to a wider class of schemes, which makes them very attractive.
In addition, they are more eﬃcient than the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation,
since they do not require to reconstruct the ciphertext during decryption. The
resulting transformations seem to achieve an intermediate notion between Re-
playable CCA (RCCA) and IND-CCA2,1, although it is an open issue to analyze
these security definitions in detail, in order to provide a complete proof of the
security of these constructions. This is left as future work.
Other future lines of research include working towards concrete estimations of the
obtained security level of the extended Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation. Finally,
the transformations discussed here are all defined for the random oracle model.
It is an open problem to devise generic transformations that are valid in the
standard model.
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Chapter 6
Applications of Proxy
Re-Encryption
The final part of this thesis is devoted to concrete applications of proxy re-
encryption. In the introduction of this thesis we presented the secure data sharing
scenario as our motivating starting point. Section 3 further discusses this scenario,
as it is often addressed in the applications of PRE in the current scientific litera-
ture. This fact is in line with one of the research postulates of this thesis, namely,
that PRE is a suitable tool within solutions to the secure data sharing scenario.
The applications presented in this chapter can be seen as particular instantiations
of this generic setting, all of them solved using proxy re-encryption.
The first application is a privacy-preserving model for Identity Management as a
Service, called BlindIdM. In this model, identity information is stored encrypted
at cloud identity providers and processed in a blind manner, which removes the
necessity of trusting that the cloud identity provider will not read the data. One
of the prime aspects of this model is that it is integrated to standard identity
management protocols, in particular with the SAML 2.0 framework.
The second application is inspired by one of the application use cases discussed in
the introduction to this thesis: the case of Big Data Analytics in the cloud. We
show here a cryptographically-enforced access control system for Hadoop, which
is one of the most prominent Big Data Analytics frameworks in use nowadays.
In this system, the data is in encrypted form and the owner can delegate access
rights to computing clusters in the cloud for processing.
These two applications are obvious instances of the generic secure data sharing
scenario: encrypted information is stored and managed by a semitrusted cloud
provider. In contrast, the third application is a less evident instantiation, since
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it describes the construction of an escrowed decryption system using proxy re-
encryption. The basic idea is to use the conventional PKE-based functions of the
PRE scheme as a regular PKE scheme, and to use the re-encryption function to
define an escrowed decryption capability. A diﬀerential aspect of this proposal
is that this capability is distributed among a set of trusted parties called escrow
custodians, which can respond to petitions from escrow authorities (e.g., the
government) by re-encrypting ciphertexts; only if all of the custodians participate
in this process, the escrow authority can achieve the escrow decryption.
6.1 BlindIdM: Privacy Preserving Identity Man-
agement as a Service
6.1.1 Introduction
Cloud computing has recently burst onto the technology and business scenes,
promising great technical and economic advantages. One of the principal bene-
fits of cloud computing is that it represents a model of utility computing, capa-
ble of oﬀering on-demand provisioning of computing resources, such as storage,
processing and networking. This provision of resources is metered for billing
purposes, making a “pay-as-you-go” model possible that permits companies and
organizations to transform capital expenditures, such as acquisition of specific
hardware, into operational expenditures; this paradigm can be contrasted with
previous models, based on the acquisition of equipment and software licences.
The main benefits that organisations expect from adopting the cloud computing
paradigm are an improved flexibility and scalability of their IT services, as well
as the resulting cost savings from the outsourcing of such services [1].
Within the internal processes of most organizations, identity management stands
out for its ubiquitous nature, as it plays a key role in authentication and ac-
cess control. However, it also introduces an overhead in cost and time, and in
most cases, specialized applications and personnel are required for setting up and
integrating identity management systems, as well as for managing identity infor-
mation. As has already happened for other kinds of services, the cloud paradigm
represents an innovative opportunity to externalize the identity management pro-
cesses, oﬀering what has been called Identity Management as a Service (IDaaS )
[147]. Identity Management as a Service is the cloud industry’s response to the
problem of identity management within companies and organizations, allowing
them to outsource the identity management service from their internal infras-
tructures and deploy it in the cloud provider. In other words, it permits moving
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identity management from an on-premise delivery model to an on-demand model.
Additionally, IDaaS opens up a new business opportunity for cloud providers and
vendors, broadening their service oﬀering.
As described in the introduction of this thesis, the advent of cloud computing
has raised great expectations regarding eﬃciency, cost reduction and simplifica-
tion of business processes, but at the same time has also increased security and
privacy risks. This very same conflict also applies to the IDaaS case: although it
oﬀers organizations a great opportunity to cut capital costs (as well as some op-
erational ones, such as specialized personnel), it also introduces a variant of one
of the classic problems of cloud computing: the loss of control over outsourced
data, which in this case is information about users’ identity. For instance, ac-
cording to a recent survey from Cisco to IT specialists and decision makers [148],
data protection is regarded as the top barrier that impedes the migration to the
cloud.
The principal motivation behind this contribution is putting the identity provider
into the cloud landscape, where data storage and processing could be oﬀered by
possibly untrusted cloud providers, but still oﬀer an identity management ser-
vice that guarantees user’s privacy and control. To this end, we define BlindIdM,
a privacy-preserving IDaaS model where identity information is stored and pro-
cessed in a blind manner, removing the necessity of trusting that the cloud identity
provider will not read the data. Such a concept is a novel contribution to both
the field of identity management and privacy-enhanced technologies. Our model,
which uses the standard SAML 2.0 as the underlying identity management proto-
col, applies proxy re-encryption techniques to achieve end-to-end confidentiality
of the identity information, while allowing the cloud to provide an identity ser-
vice. This can be seen as an instantiation of the secure data sharing scenario,
applied to the problem of outsourcing the identity management service.
6.1.2 The Path to Identity Management as a Service
Identity information is steadily becoming an essential enabler of today’s digital
society, as it is considered a key component in the interactions between end-users,
service providers, and intermediaries. At the same time, it is also becoming more
and more valuable for the organizations that manage this kind of information
because of its usefulness for marketing and strategic development purposes or,
simply, to be sold to interested third parties [149]. Thus, identity management
remains an important challenge in the field of information security and privacy,
and spans several subareas, such as usability and user experience, authentication
methods, or trust and reputation management [150].
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Within the organizations’ environment, identity management is one of the most
commonly deployed services because of its importance for authentication and
access control. However, it is regarded by enterprises as one of the most time-
consuming and complex tasks within their internal business processes. It intro-
duces an overhead in cost and time, and in most cases, specific applications and
personnel are required for managing, integrating and maintaining this service.
This is even more troublesome when some kind of identity service is oﬀered to
external users, such as clients, contractors, or providers.
An identity management system (IMS) facilitates the creation, storage, and usage
of the identity information of the individuals from a organization [151]. Tradi-
tionally, identity management systems were designed to be used internally in the
organizations and companies, in a centralized and local manner, which has been
called the silo model. However, as the Internet has gained in popularity, the
number of possible interactions that a user can have with service and resource
providers has increased dramatically. This fact leads to an unwanted eﬀect called
identity fragmentation, since users are then obliged to register several accounts,
one for each service provider; that is, their identity information is partially repli-
cated and fragmented throughout a group of service providers. Furthermore, each
of these fragments of identity is normally associated with passwords that must
be memorized by the users, which is prone to usability and security problems,
such as password reuse. The problem of identity fragmentation evidences the
drawbacks of the traditional isolated model of identity management, and has mo-
tivated the development of more flexible schemes that are centered on enhancing
the interoperability.
Federated Identity Management
Federated Identity Management (FIM ) is a solution to overcome these diﬃcul-
ties. FIM is a set of distributed technologies and processes that enable information
portability between diﬀerent domains, which permits both a dynamic distribution
of identity information and delegation of associated tasks, such as authentication
or user provisioning. Thus, organizations coordinate with each other to form
federations for exchanging identity information. One of the key aspects of this
model is the establishment of trust relationships between the members of the fed-
eration, which enables them to believe the statements made within the federation.
This way, although users are authenticated by their local organization, they are
able to access services and resources from other organizations of the federation.
SAML [19], Shibboleth [152] and WS-Federation [153] are examples of systems
and standards for federated identity management.
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The parties involved in a federated identity interaction are required to mutu-
ally exchange identity information for identification and authentication purposes
regardless of whether they have previous knowledge of each others’ identity in-
formation or not. The main actors that participate in these interactions are
[154],[155]:
• Users, the subjects of the identity information; most of the times they
are also the principal source of this information. Users are generally the
actors that request resources and services through their interaction with
applications and online services. Users perform this interaction through
a user agent, which is usually a browser, but it could also be a specific
application.
• Service Providers (SP), the entities that provide services and resources
to users or other entities. In a federated identity management context,
service providers outsource the processes of authentication and management
of users to identity providers. Because of this, service providers act as
consumers of user’s identity information, following a determined identity
management protocol.
• Identity Providers (IdP), which are specialized entities that are able to
authenticate users and to provide the result of this authentication to service
providers, without revealing additional information about the user. The
information that they exchange with service providers may even be just
a statement about the success of the authentication of the user, enabling
the user to access the service anonymously. Identity providers are also
responsible for managing the identity information of their associated users,
and in some cases, they may certify it.
Figure 6.1 shows a high-level view of a federated identity setting, where a host
organization acts as a federated identity provider. In this setting, an employee
from the host organization requests a service from the service provider, who in
turn asks the organization for identity information about its employee.
Before accepting the supplied identity information, the service provider must trust
the host organization, acknowledging it as a reliable identity provider. Trust in
this case is normally achieved out of band through some physical transaction such
as a legal agreement, and later reflected in the identity federation system through
some technical mechanisms such as WS-Trust or SAML Metadata; in practice,
each consumer entity has a list of trusted issuers of identity information.
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Figure 6.1: Federated Identity Management System
Identity Management as a Service
The federated identity model is widely used in organizations, deployed as an
on-premise service. Although it has led to great advantages with respect to inter-
operability of identities, it has also introduced cost and time overheads, since it
usually requires specialized applications and personnel for setting up, integrating
and managing this process.
However, the emergence of the cloud as a ubiquitous technology within today’s
organizations, has led to Identity Management as a Service, a natural answer from
the cloud industry to the enterprise identity management problem. Examples of
such cloud-based identity services are Windows Azure Active Directory [156] and
CA CloudMinder Identity Management [157]. IDaaS can be seen as a refinement
of the federated model, which takes the eﬃciency of the cloud in its favor for
oﬀering specialized outsourcing of identity management. Among the benefits of
Identity Management as a Service we find:
• More flexibility, scalability and stability for high demand environments,
with a growing number of users and thousands of identities.
• Reduction of costs, since IDaaS providers can focus on providing more eﬃ-
cient and specialized identity services to organizations.
• Better security measures and mechanisms, implemented in dedicated sys-
tems and facilities.
• Improved compliance and business processes audits due to the high spe-
cialization that an IDaaS provider can achieve. These providers can also
implement common policies for all their customers at a lower cost.
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There are, however, multiple risks associated with Identity Management as a
Service; most of them are a consequence of the identity providers managing and
storing a large amount of identity information [158], while some of them are
inherent to the cloud computing paradigm [159, 160]. We identify the following
principal risks:
• Identity providers are appealing targets to attackers as they represent a
single point of failure because they centralize users’ personal information;
security breaches and insider attacks are potentially dangerous as they may
disclose the personal information of a large number of users. The fact that
this kind of information is protected by specific regulations, such as the
European Data Protection Directive, in the case of the EU [161], demands
a strong protection of its storage, processing and communication.
• Cloud providers are susceptible to being subpoenaed for users’ data, in the
case there is some legal, administrative or criminal investigation running
[162]. What is worse, it is possible that providers respond positively to
these requests for information, even if they are not made with the proper
judicial guarantees, due to a lack of legal understanding.
• Identity providers are in a privileged position to collect additional informa-
tion about users without their consent, such as the sites the user visits, for
profiling purposes.
• In the absence of cryptographic means, it is not possible to actually limit
the access of cloud providers to the data they must steward. That is, there
is almost no risk of being discovered accessing users’ information without
their consent.
• Another major risk is the existence of cloud providers in foreign countries
(i.e., located in a diﬀerent country to the owner of the data) with diﬀerent,
and possibly conflicting, laws and regulations regarding privacy and data
protection. For example, in the case of the US, the USA PATRIOT Act
[163] allows the government to check the data that is processed or stored
within its jurisdiction, even without the knowledge of the owner of the data.
• The security guarantees and requirements of the cloud providers are dis-
parate. These requirements not only include technological aspects, but also
policies regarding the hiring of staﬀ, access to premises and equipment,
physical security measures, etc.
Hence, it is obvious that externalizing the management of identity information
to the cloud implies a loss of control for users and organizations. This in turn
signifies an empowerment of cloud identity providers; that is, there is an inversion
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of the control over the identity information. This leads to the identity provider
accumulating enough power for the users to incur damages, losses or risks in the
case of a disclosure of private data.
6.1.3 BlindIdM: Privacy-Preserving IDaaS
We have seen before that in an IDaaS scenario, organizations entrust their corpo-
rate identity information to cloud identity providers, which are then responsible
for storing and managing this information. These systems rely on the existence
of a strong relationship of trust between the organizations and the cloud identity
providers, since they trust that their identity information will be managed prop-
erly and that the provider will respect the confidentiality; however, current cloud
providers do not implement real mechanisms for preventing themselves from be-
traying this trust. This concern led us to conceive of the concept of Blind Identity
Management (BlindIdM), a system whereby the cloud identity provider is able to
oﬀer an identity information service, without knowing the actual information of
the users; that is, it provides this service in a blind1 manner.
This is a great innovation with respect to current identity management systems,
where users’ identity information is managed by the identity provider and the
user is obliged to trust that the provider will make proper use of his data and
will guarantee its protection. Our intention is that this model will enable orga-
nizations to choose a cloud identity provider without necessarily establishing a
strong bond of trust with it; i.e., they do not have to trust that the cloud iden-
tity provider will respect data privacy. Instead, the sturdiness of the underlying
cryptographic schemes should be suﬃcient to guarantee such protection.
In contrast to a full outsourcing of the identity management system, we have
opted for a hybrid approach, where the authentication remains on-premises at the
host organization. The novel aspect of our proposal lies in the protection of data:
the host organization encrypts users’ identity information prior to outsourcing it
to the cloud, in such a way that it is still usable by the cloud identity provider
without being able to be read.
Before continuing, we will firstly describe the general setting and trust model
that we will consider; secondly, we will briefly describe the underlying identity
management framework, SAML 2.0; thirdly, we will explain in detail our proposal
1The term blind is used here in an analogous way as in blind signature, which is a signature
scheme that enables the signer to perform a signature without knowing the content of the
underlying message.
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Figure 6.2: Relationships between entities
for privacy-preserving Identity Management as a Service; and finally, we will
provide an analysis of our proposal.
Trust Model and Assumptions
In our model, we will assume a federated identity setting, similar to that shown in
Figure 6.1, but where the host organization partially outsources the identity man-
agement processes to a cloud identity provider, while retaining the authentication
service on-premises. The cloud identity provider now acts as an intermediary in
the identity interactions, and is also in charge for storing and supplying iden-
tity information; Figure 6.2 shows this setting. Optionally, other kinds of actors
may come into play such as attribute issuing authorities, certification providers,
identity brokers, etc; however, we will restrict the scope of this work to the basic
case.
The goal of our approach is to provide a means for constructing blind identity
providers, which could be capable of operating without having access to users’
information. In other words, we consider the cloud identity provider as an ad-
versary, as described in Section 1.1.1. In that section, we identified three types
of cloud providers depending on their capabilities and their level of trust: fully
trusted, honest-but-curious, and malicious. In turn, the honest-but-curious cat-
egory can be subdivided in data-curious and access-curious, which denote if the
main interest of the cloud provider is the data itself or the access patterns, respec-
tively. In the BlindIdM model, as in the rest of this thesis, we restrict ourselves to
data-curious providers; we will assume then that the identity provider may have
some incentive to read users’ data without their consent, but will not try to track
users’ behavior and access patterns.
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The problem that arises from considering access-curious providers has been widely
studied, as it is what one normally encounters when privacy is addressed in the
context of identity management; anonymization techniques, such as pseudonyms
[164], are among the solutions that are usually proposed in this respect. As
aforementioned, in this thesis we will not tackle this problem and we will focus
instead on protecting data privacy; however, a more complete solution that takes
this issue into account is left open as future work.
As stated before, Figure 6.2 depicts the main interactions in our proposed model.
With regard to trust relationships, the introduction of the cloud identity provider
makes them more complex than in the federated identity setting. On the one
hand, we still assume that the service provider fully trusts the host organization
as a reliable and valid source of identity information; this trust is achieved as in
the federated case, through out-of-band agreements and metadata. On the other
hand, since the host organization outsources part or all of its identity management
system, it is clear that the organization must have some level of trust in the cloud
identity provider. In this case, trust is reflected in SLAs and in metadata as well.
As a consequence of these direct trust relationships, we assume that in this setting
the service provider indirectly trusts the cloud identity provider, as there is an
implicit chain of trust between the two entities. That is, there is no explicit
agreement or metadata that expresses this trust relationship, but the service
provider can be confident of the trustworthiness of the cloud provider.
Underlying Identity Management Framework
Apart from the use of proxy re-encryption, our system is based in SAML 2.0 as
the underlying identity management protocol. We have chosen SAML because of
its wide adoption, its extensibility and its ingrained mechanisms for establishing
trust between the entities.
SAML 2.0 (Security Assertion Markup Language) [19] is a standard XML-based
framework that enables the description and exchange of identity information be-
tween diﬀerent security domains. With SAML, identity information is expressed
in the form of assertions, which are a set of statements about a subject; these
statements cover diﬀerent aspects, such as authentication, authorization and iden-
tity attributes.
The SAML framework also specifies the protocols for issuing and exchanging
assertions, such as the Authentication Request protocol, a request/response pro-
tocol that permits entities to ask for an authentication statement, and optionally
identity attributes. In this protocol, the requester sends a SAML AuthnRequest
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<saml:Attribute Name="givenName"
ext:OriginalIssuer="http://idp.host.org"
xmlns:ext="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:attribute:ext">
<saml:AttributeValue>John</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
Figure 6.3: SAML Attribute
message to an identity provider, which in turn replies with a SAML Response con-
taining assertions about the request. The technical details about how to achieve
this message exchange depend on the specific SAML bindings and profiles in use;
here, we will use the Web Browser SSO Profile and HTTP POST Binding as
a basis for the identity interactions. The Authentication Request protocol also
permits the hybrid approach for authentication we have chosen, as this possi-
bility is considered in the SAML specification. In this case, the cloud identity
provider acts as a proxying identity provider, and the host organization is the
authentication provider.
SAML attributes are used to express identity information about the subject of
the assertion; Figure 6.3 shows an example of such element. In our proposal, we
make extensive use of this construction, as we take it as the basic medium for
conveying encrypted identity information.
SAML also allows the expression of metadata for both service and identity providers
using the SAML Metadata specification [165]. Metadata is what enables the ex-
pression of prior trust relationships and makes secure transactions possible.
Description of BlindIdM
We now describe BlindIdM, a privacy-preserving model for blind Identity Manage-
ment as a Service. In this model, as in the usual identity management systems,
there are three main types of actors, namely, users, service providers and identity
providers. In our scenario, the host organization (including all the employees)
acts as the user, and the identity management of the organization is outsourced
to a cloud identity provider. These entities are capable of interacting following
a pre-defined identity management protocol. From a high-level viewpoint, the
goal of these interactions is the exchange of identity information, that generally
flows from the user (in our case, from the host organization), acting as a source
of information, to the service provider, acting as a consumer of information. Blin-
dIdM permits this information to leave the source and arrive at its destination in
an encrypted form, achieving end-to-end confidentiality. Our goal now is to de-
scribe how encrypted information can flow from the host organization to service
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Figure 6.4: Data flow of BlindIdM
providers, without the identity provider being able to read it.
A high-level diagram of our proposal is shown in Figure 6.4; this diagram de-
picts the main flow of information in our system, where the host organization
encrypts the identity information under its public key pkH and sends it to the
cloud identity provider. The use of proxy re-encryption enables the identity
provider to transform these ciphertexts into encrypted attributes under the pub-
lic key of the service provider, pkSP ; in order to do so, the identity provider needs
a re-encryption key rkH→SP generated by the host organization and provided
beforehand.
We will now proceed to detail the steps of the operation of the BlindIdM system.
Note that we are using SAML as the underlying protocol; here, we will describe
an identity interaction using the SAML Authentication Request protocol. As for
proxy re-encryption, our model does not require a specific scheme.
Phase 1. Generation of public and private keys. Both the host orga-
nization and the service provider create their pairs of public and private keys,
respectively (pkH , skH) and (pkSP , skSP ). For illustration purposes we will as-
sume that there is only one service provider, but there could be any number of
service providers. Furthermore, the service provider can create its pair of keys at
any moment, as long as it is done before phase 3.
Phase 2. Encryption of identity information and outsourcing. The
host organization must encrypt the identity information of its employees prior
to externalizing it to the cloud. To do so, they use their public key pkH ; for
simplicity we will assume that identity information is in the form of attributes,
where each attribute a is a tuple (a.metadata, a.value), wheremetadata describes
any metadata about the attribute, including its name and format. Therefore, the
identity information of each employee U is a pair (IDU , {a : a is an attribute of
the employee U}), where IDU is the identifier of such employee.
In our approach we encrypt just the attribute value, leaving the attribute meta-
data in clear, which eases the integration of our solution with existing directory
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<saml:Attribute Name="givenName"
ext:OriginalIssuer="http://idp.host.org"
xmlns:ext="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:attribute:ext">
<saml:AttributeValue>
<!-- Encrypted AttributeValue content -->
<xenc:EncryptedData
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content">
<!-- Symmetric encryption algorithm (AES-128) used -->
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm=".../xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<!-- Encapsulated symmetric key using AFGH scheme -->
<ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:EncryptedKey
Recipient="http://serviceprovider.com">
<!-- Proxy re-encryption algorithm (AFGH05)
used for key encapsulation -->
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="urn:proxyreencryption:afgh05"/>
<!-- Encapsulated symmetric key -->
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>
Ke41X+w...
</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<!-- Encrypted SAML Attribute Value content -->
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>39UCe3/sA...</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
Figure 6.5: SAML Attribute with encrypted AttributeValue content
services. The cloud provider is aware of the name of the attributes, but not
of their content. It is also worth mentioning that we do not directly encrypt
attribute values with the PRE encryption function PRE.Enc; instead, we use a
hybrid approach, encrypting a fresh key Ka for each attribute a, which is then
passed to a symmetric encryption algorithm Sym.Enc (such as AES) for encrypt-
ing the attribute value. This way, the PRE encryption function is only used to
cipher a fixed-length input (the key Ka), whilst the symmetric algorithm per-
forms the bulk of the work. This approach is used not only for eﬃciency, but for
input length reasons, since attribute values have a wide range of possible lengths.
Thus, an outsourced attribute ca is generated in the following way:
ca = (a.metadata,PRE.Enc(pkH , Ka), Sym.Enc(Ka, a.value))
An example of the SAML representation of an outsourced attribute ca with an
encrypted value is shown in Figure 6.5; this is the encrypted version of the same
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attribute shown in Figure 6.3. SAML permits putting any arbitrary content
within the AttributeValue element, so we have used the XML Encryption spec-
ification [166] (used also in the SAML core specification) to express the hybrid
encryption mechanisms and convey the cipher data and the key material.
Once the encryption process is complete, the host organization outsources the
identity information to the cloud identity provider. The identity information in
the cloud for each employee is in the form (IDU , {ca : ca is an outsourced attribute
of the employee U}). It is important to note that this same approach can be used
to update attributes, so it does not represent any diﬃculty for our system; the
new encrypted attribute simply substitutes the previous one.
Phase 3. Trust establishment and generation of re-encryption keys.
During this phase, service providers establish a trust relationship with the host
organization, which is needed for deeming as valid the claims it makes. This
relationship is bidirectional, since the host organization must also trust the service
provider in order to release the identity information. As in the case of federated
identity management, this trust relationship is usually a consequence of a prior
out-of-band agreement.
SAML permits the expression of metadata for both service providers and identity
providers using the SAML Metadata specification [165]; indeed, metadata is es-
sential to the proper operation of some of the SAML protocols. The publication
of keys and certificates, such as X.509 certificates, through the KeyDescriptor
element, is among the crucial aspects that are covered in the metadata; we can
make use of this method to publish the service provider’s public key pkSP . SAML
also permits expressing which attributes are required during authentication re-
quests, using a specific element called AttributeConsumingService. Figure 6.6
shows an extract of the metadata file of the service provider, where these elements
appear.
The cloud identity provider also needs a metadata file, but in this case, it does not
require special attention, as the cloud provider does not have any key material
prone to be distributed, other than its X.509 certificates. This metadata also
contains the information about service endpoints for SAML protocols.
Once the host organization trust a certain SP, they use its public key pkSP to-
gether with their private key skH to create the re-encryption key rkH→SP , which
is then sent to the cloud identity provider. The host organization obtains the
public key from the service provider’s metadata. This key allows the identity
provider to re-encrypt the ciphertexts in order to be decryptable by the service
provider using its private key skSP . The re-encryption key can be seen also as
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<md:EntityDescriptor
entityID="http://www.serviceprovider.com" ...>
<md:SPSSODescriptor ...>
<!-- Proxy re-encryption public key of SP -->
<md:KeyDescriptor use="encryption">
<ds:KeyInfo>
<ds:KeyName>
Proxy Re-Encryption Public Key
</ds:KeyName>
<ds:KeyValue>
<pre:PublicKey
Type="urn:proxyreencryption:afgh05">
YTdUs3...
</pre:PublicKey>
</ds:KeyValue>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</md:KeyDescriptor>
...
<!-- AttributeConsumingService elements -->
<md:AttributeConsumingService index="1">
<md:ServiceName>Service Provider</md:ServiceName>
<md:RequestedAttribute
Name="givenName" isRequired="false"/>
<md:RequestedAttribute
Name="cn" isRequired="true"/>
</md:AttributeConsumingService>
...
</md:SPSSODescriptor>
</md:EntityDescriptor>
Figure 6.6: SAML Metadata of the service provider
an authorization token, and can be revoked by the host organization by asking
the cloud identity provider to remove it. Bear in mind that we are assuming an
honest-but-curious cloud provider, which will follow the instructions given by the
host organization. Another possibility could be to encrypt again the attributes
with a new public key pk￿H , and upload them to the cloud provider; this option
is highly ineﬃcient but does not require any other changes in our model.
Phase 4. Identity information interaction. Once our system is properly
deployed, an employee may want to retrieve a resource from the service provider,
which requires authentication and additional identity information from the em-
ployee. The goal in this phase is the dispatch of identity information of an
employee, which is stored in the cloud identity provider, to the service provider.
Moreover, the authentication takes place within the hosted organization, so its
result must also be communicated to the service provider. As stated before, we
are using SAML as the underlying identity protocol, and in particular, we will
describe how our model fits within the Authentication Request protocol. In our
case, this protocol permits the service provider to request an assertion about the
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Figure 6.7: Sequence diagram of the authentication request
identity of the employee, including encrypted attributes.
Figure 6.7 shows the protocol interaction that takes place between the four enti-
ties involved: the employee as a user, the service provider as requester, the cloud
provider as a proxying identity provider, and the host organization as authenti-
cation provider. The full sequence, assuming there is no security context for the
employee at the service provider, works as follows:
1. The employee tries to access a protected resource oﬀered by the service
provider.
2. A discovery process occurs between the service provider and the user to find
out the location of the identity provider; this process is out of the scope of
both SAML and our system. The simplest option is that the user simply
provides the location of the identity provider; a more complex option could
be to integrate SAML with other discovery mechanisms, such as Yadis or
XRI.
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3. The service provider creates a SAML AuthnRequest.
4. The user agent gets redirected to the cloud identity provider through an
HTML form, as explained in the SAML HTTP POST binding [167].
5. The cloud identity provider receives the authentication request. As we
have mentioned before, BlindIdM uses a hybrid IDaaS approach, where the
authentication remains at the premises of the host organization; as a con-
sequence, the cloud provider must devolve the authentication to the host
organization using the proxying mechanisms defined in the SAML Authen-
tication Request protocol. In this case, the cloud identity provider issues a
second authentication request, addressed to the host organization.
6. The user agent gets redirected to the host organization.
7. The employee is authenticated to the host organization. The authentication
method is beyond of the scope of this work; for simplicity, we will assume
that a password-based method is used.
8. The cloud provider constructs a SAML Response that responds to the sec-
ond authentication request, and that conveys the authentication result and
the identifier of the employee.
9. Once again, the user agent gets redirected to the cloud identity provider,
delivering the authentication response from the host organization.
10. The cloud identity provider gets the encrypted attributes associated to
the provided employee’s identifier and, using the proper re-encryption key
rkH→SP (obtained during the previous phase), proceeds to re-encrypt the
ciphered attributes; actually, for each attribute a, it only has to re-encrypt
the ciphered symmetric key Ka. Let ca = (ca,1, ca,2, ca,3) be one of the out-
sourced attributes, and PRE.ReEnc be the re-encryption function; then, the
re-encrypted attribute c￿a is:
c￿a = (ca,1,PRE.ReEnc(rkH→SP , ca,2), ca,3))
Once the attributes are re-encrypted, the cloud provider issues a SAML
Assertion that includes the encrypted attributes within an attribute state-
ment, as well as the authentication statement from the host organization
(obtained in the previous step); an AuthenticatingAuthority element is
also included in the authentication statement, which references the authen-
tication provider (in this case, the host organization). The cloud provider
then encloses the assertion in the authentication response. Figure 6.8 shows
the SAML Assertion.
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<saml:Assertion ID="#ASSERTION_ID" IssueInstant="2012-05-06T11:39:08Z" Version="2.0">
<saml:Issuer>https://cloudidp.com</saml:Issuer>
<ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">...</ds:Signature>
<saml:Subject>
<saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">
jdoe@host.org
</saml:NameID>
<saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
<saml:SubjectConfirmationData Recipient="http://serviceprovider.com"
InResponseTo="#REQUEST_ID" NotOnOrAfter="2012-05-06T11:43:36Z"/>
</saml:SubjectConfirmation>
</saml:Subject>
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2012-05-06T11:38:36Z" NotOnOrAfter="2012-05-06T11:43:36Z">
<saml:AudienceRestriction>
<saml:Audience>http://serviceprovider.com</saml:Audience>
</saml:AudienceRestriction>
</saml:Conditions>
<saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2012-05-06T11:38:36Z" SessionIndex="#SESSION_ID">
<saml:AuthnContext>
<saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport
</saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
<saml:AuthenticatingAuthority>http://idp.host.org</saml:AuthenticatingAuthority>
</saml:AuthnContext>
</saml:AuthnStatement>
<saml:AttributeStatement>
<!-- SAML Attribute with encrypted AttributeValue content -->
<saml:Attribute Name="givenName" xmlns:ext="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:attribute:ext"
ext:OriginalIssuer="http://idp.host.org">
...
</saml:Attribute>
</saml:AttributeStatement>
</saml:Assertion>
Figure 6.8: SAML Assertion including an encrypted AttributeValue
11. Once again, the user agent gets redirected to the service provider, delivering
the authentication response from the cloud identity provider, which includes
the re-encrypted attributes.
12. The service provider verifies the authentication response and extracts the
encrypted attributes from the assertion. Now, it simply has to decrypt the
ciphertexts using its private key skSP . Lets assume that c￿a = (c
￿
a,1, c
￿
a,2, c
￿
a,3)
is one of the received attributes, Sym.Dec is the symmetric decryption al-
gorithm, and PRE.Dec is the PRE decryption function; then, the decrypted
attribute a￿ is:
a￿ = (c￿a,1, Sym.Dec(PRE.Dec(skSP , c
￿
a,2), c
￿
a,3))
= (a.metadata, Sym.Dec(Ka, c
￿
a,3))
= (a.metadata, a.value)
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Analysis
The main requirement of our model is to achieve end-to-end confidentiality for the
identity information, enabling it to be stored in the cloud and managed blindly.
Taking into account the trust model that we are using, that is, honest-but-curious
providers, we argue that this requirement is fulfilled since the identity provider
does not have access at any moment to the decryption keys.
The cloud provider has control only over the re-encryption process, but requires
re-encryption keys that are generated by the host organization using its private
key. As we have stated before, the re-encryption key, apart from making the
re-encryption of ciphertexts possible, also acts as an authorization token, since
it is generated by the host organization to give access to service providers to the
identity information of its employees. Since we are assuming a honest-but-curious
cloud provider, we can assume that it will remove the re-encryption key when
asked. Ideally, temporary re-encryption keys that are valid only for a specific
period of time would be used, so keys should not be valid if used at any other
moment; this way, the re-encryption process could be cryptographically controlled
by the host organization. To date, we have not seen any proxy re-encryption
scheme that deals with re-encryption keys that are valid for a particular period
of time only.
It is important to note that our proposal does not require any change in the
SAML framework, as we are respecting its protocols and constructions. Our
model requires just a few extension points in the cloud identity provider and
service provider, in order to re-encrypt and decrypt the attributes, respectively.
We provide explicit SAML constructions that reflect how to realize our system
using this framework.
Discussion: Privacy and Confidentiality
Privacy is a vague concept that on many occasions is used as an umbrella term,
including other related concepts, such as confidentiality, unlinkability, anonymity,
etc. For example, the term privacy is often used in the context of the unlinkability
property; however, as we have already mentioned, unlinkability is not what we
are addressing in this thesis, but rather data confidentiality, as one of our goals is
that identity information remains inaccessible to attackers, unauthorized entities,
and even the cloud provider itself.
According to [168], privacy is defined as “the right of an entity (normally a per-
son), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact
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with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share
information about itself with others”, while data confidentiality is defined as “the
property that data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been autho-
rized to know the data”.
Taking these definitions into consideration, we argue that our system is privacy-
preserving because it provides a data confidentiality service, in our case through
the use of proxy re-encryption. This service cryptographically protects users’
identity information and controls and limits the disclosure of private information
with regard to the cloud provider, who acts as an intermediary in the identity
management interactions.
6.1.4 Related Work
The problem of privacy in identity management is a widely studied subject. How-
ever, the data confidentiality aspects of privacy are seldom tackled. In [169], we
proposed an early version of our model, a user-centric IDaaS system based in
OpenID and proxy re-encryption. An overview of this system is shown in Fig-
ure 6.9. It can be seen how the basic information flow of BlindIdM is already
present here. Although conceived as a proof of concept, this is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first work that achieves blind processing of identity information;
however, trust issues arise as OpenID does not provide proper mechanisms for
establishing trust. This proposal is useful for user-centric scenarios where service
providers can fully trust end-users without the identity provider being able to
assert any claim. One interesting aspect of this work is an economic assessment
of the viability of the proposal; in rough numbers, they estimate that the cost
for 2000 operations (i.e., encryptions, re-encryptions or decryptions) is 1 USD
cent. This assessment is very relevant to our proposal, since the cryptographic
procedures are very similar, and therefore, the economic assessment is relevant
for our case.
In [170], the authors propose a solution based on deploying active bundles in
the cloud provider. An active bundle is a mobile agent, in this case a virtual
machine, which contains the identity information of the user and that is protected
by cryptographic means. Every time an operation involves the use of identity
information, the cloud provider interacts with an active bundle to retrieve this
information. However, this approach seems to be impractical because of the large
overhead that the use of a large container for data (a VM) introduces. Moreover,
the proposal does not detail any procedure to transport these active bundles to
the cloud in an eﬃcient manner.
166
6.1. BlindIdM: Privacy Preserving Identity Management as a Service
OpenID 
Provider 
Encrypted 
attributes
Re-encryption
OpenID 
Consumer
Decryption
User
Service Provider
Encryption
Identity Provider
1. Requests
access
2. Asks for authn. 
and attributes
3. User
authenticates
5. sends authn. result 
and re-encrypted
attributes
4. Retrieves ciphered 
attributes and re-
encrypts them
6. Decrypts
attributes
Figure 6.9: IDaaS system based in OpenID and proxy re-encryption
Another proposal, based on the use of sticky policies and trusted computing, is
presented in [149]. This paper presents an interesting approach where informa-
tion, together with a specific policy that should be enforced in order to disclose
the data, is obfuscated before leaving the users’ domain. In this approach, a
trusted authority is in charge of giving the receiver the means to de-obfuscate the
information, after verifying that the receiver complies with its associated policy;
trusted computing is used to ensure the integrity of both software and hardware
environments of the receiver. However, this work focuses on the direct sharing of
information, which makes it unusable in an identity management setting, where
an identity provider is used as an intermediary and must somehow manage this
information.
Much work has been carried out regarding unlinkability of users with respect to
the other entities involved in the identity management processes. For example,
in [171] the authors present PseudoID, a model for private federated login that
achieves unlinkability of users to visited sites. To this end, a blind signature
service participates during the generation of an access token that is handed to
the identity provider; this access token consists of a pseudonym and a secret value,
that are both used to anonymously authenticate the user. Although this work
presents an interesting contribution to privacy-enhanced identity providers, it is
centered on the unlinkability aspects of the authentication of users. Moreover, this
model is not suitable for maintaining users’ information in the identity providers,
since the providers are unable to correlate users to their pseudonyms.
With regard to the intersection of identity management, privacy and cloud com-
puting, there has also been some research done. In [172], the authors propose
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SPICE, an identity management system for cloud environments whose main goal
is to preserve users’ privacy. SPICE satisfies a set of properties that the authors
claim an identity management system in the cloud should fulfill, such as unlinka-
bility and delegatable authentication. In order to accomplish this, SPICE uses a
re-randomizable group signature scheme. However, the goal of SPICE is not the
same as ours, since we are not tackling unlinkability, but data confidentiality. In
[173], a privacy-preserving identity management system for cloud environments
is presented; this system is based on zero-knowledge proofs that allow the user
to prove the knowledge of a set of attributes without revealing their value. The
problem of heterogeneity of attributes representation is also addressed in this
work by using ontology mapping techniques. However, the authors do not tackle
the privacy issues that are the main concern of our work, since in their setting,
identity providers store in clear the values of the attributes of the users.
6.1.5 Summary
We proposed a solution to the problem of privacy, in the sense of data confiden-
tiality, for Identity Management as a Service. BlindIdM is a model for Identity
Management as a Service that guarantees user’s privacy and control even when
data storage and processing is performed by untrusted clouds. Our main contri-
bution is the construction of a privacy-preserving IDaaS system, where the cloud
identity provider is able to oﬀer an identity information service without knowing
the actual personal information of the users. Our system uses SAML 2.0 as the
underlying identity management protocol and proxy re-encryption as a means
for achieving blind handling of identity information; this way, the cloud provider
transforms encrypted attributes by the host organization into ciphertexts for the
service provider, without being able to read their content during this process. In
addition, we use standard SAML constructions for conveying this information.
We believe that this approach opens up new possibilities regarding privacy in the
field of identity management.
6.2 Data Confidentiality in Cloud-Based Hadoop
Clusters
In the introduction of this thesis, we described several application use cases that
can be seen as instances of the secure data sharing problem that serves as mo-
tivation. In particular, the Big Data Analytics in the Cloud was one of these
use cases. In this section, we describe a cryptographically-enforced access control
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system for Hadoop, a widely-used Big Data framework. By using it, the data
is in encrypted form and the owner can delegate access rights to the computing
cluster for processing. Our proposed solution fits in well with the outsourcing of
Big Data processing to the cloud, since information can be stored in encrypted
form in external servers in the cloud and processed only if access has been dele-
gated. Experimental results show that the overhead produced by our solution is
manageable, which makes our proposal suitable for some applications
6.2.1 Introduction
Data exploitation is quickly becoming one of the main drivers of the economy in
this century. Companies, organizations and governments are steadily adopting
technologies to leverage the value of large and heterogenous repositories of data,
in order to improve their operations and increase their profit. The exploitation
of these large quantities of data, along with the technological solutions created
to enable it, is what is being called “Big Data”.
In simple words, Big Data implies the use of vast amounts of data, usually in
the form of a collection of datasets, which makes processing and maintenance
virtually impossible from the traditional perspective of information management.
According to NIST [174], “Big Data refers to digital data volume, velocity, variety
and/or veracity that: (1) enable novel approaches to frontier questions previously
inaccessible or impractical using current or conventional methods; (2) and/or ex-
ceed the capacity or capability of current or conventional methods and systems”.
Thus, the paradigm of Big Data implies the exploitation of large datasets, the
volume of which tips over the edge of being tractable by traditional (current)
approaches. It is important to understand that as our technology evolves and
our capacity to process and store data increases, the concept of Big Data evolves
in parallel; thus, basically, what is Big Data today, will be “small data” tomor-
row.
Apart from the inherent diﬃculties that the management of massive amounts of
data entails, the use of Big Data faces the problems posed by the protection of
the information itself, since in a lot of cases the information stored is sensitive
or personal data. The presence of high quantities of unprotected and sensitive
information is a magnet for malicious agents (insiders and outsiders), which can
make a profit by selling or exploiting these large repositories. Companies and or-
ganizations that manage these vast amounts of data face the problem of handling
extremely diverse kinds of delicate information, which in most cases is stored in
clear, since security is delegated to access control enforcement layers, which are
implemented on top of the actual data stores. Data disclosures in such contexts
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could cause great harm to individuals, businesses and governments. Nevertheless,
the truth is that although enforcement mechanisms exist that control access to
data, some technical staﬀ, such as system administrators, are often able to by-
pass these traditional access control systems and read data at will, e.g., directly
in clear on the file system. Therefore, it is of paramount importance to rely on
stronger safeguards such as the use of cryptography. As recently noted by the
Cloud Security Alliance in [175]: “[...] sensitive data must be protected through
the use of cryptography and granular access control”.
Within the Big Data community, Apache Hadoop [20] stands out as the most
prominent framework for processing big datasets. Apache Hadoop is a frame-
work that enables the storing and processing of large-scale datasets by clusters
of machines. The strategy of Hadoop is to divide the workload into parts and
spreading them throughout the cluster. However, even though Hadoop was not
designed with security in mind, it is widely used by organizations that have strong
security requirements regarding data protection.
In this section we propose a delegated access solution for Hadoop, which uses
proxy re-encryption to construct a cryptographically-enforced access control sys-
tem. The goal of our proposal is to enable Hadoop to achieve data protection
while preserving its capacity to process massive amounts of information. This way
organizations can securely leverage the value of Big Data for their business, in
compliance with security and privacy regulations, such as HIPAA and PCI.
In the introduction to this thesis, we described an example of application use case
based on the concept of Big Data Analytics in the cloud. This is a very appeal-
ing solution for small organizations, which are not in position of acquiring and
maintaining the necessary infrastructure to run Big Data frameworks on premise;
instead, they can use on-demand high-end clusters in the cloud for analyzing
massive amounts of data. Nevertheless, the adoption of the cloud paradigm does
not come at no price. There are several risks, such as the ones that stem for a
multi-tenant environment. Jobs and data from diﬀerent tenants are then kept
together under the same cluster in the cloud, which could be unsafe when one
considers the weak security measures provided by Hadoop. As already noted by
several works [176, 175], the use of encryption for protecting data at rest can
decrease the risks associated to data disclosures in such scenario. Our proposed
solution fits in well with the outsourcing of Big Data processing to the cloud,
since information can be stored in encrypted form in external servers in the cloud
and processed only if access has been delegated.
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Figure 6.10: Map and Reduce phases in a Hadoop job
6.2.2 The Hadoop Framework
Before introducing our proposal, we will give a brief overview of what is the
Hadoop framework and how it works. Hadoop is a framework for processing
massive amounts of data in a large-scale, distributed way. In order to do so,
Hadoop adopts the MapReduce programming paradigm, which permits to spread
the workload across a cluster of machines, usually hundreds or thousands. In
Hadoop, all the operations or tasks are executed by nodes in the cluster. There
are two kinds of active elements in Hadoop: (i) the JobTracker, which distributes
the workload across the cluster by assigning individual tasks to worker nodes and
is in charge of its coordination, and (ii) the TaskTrackers, which simply execute
the tasks they are assigned.
In the MapReduce paradigm, each portion of the workload must be independent
from the others, in order to leverage the potential of massive parallelization. For
this reason, a MapReduce job is designed to be executed in two phases, Map and
Reduce, as shown in Figure 6.10. In the Map phase, the input data is split and
processed in parallel by the cluster. For each data split, the JobTracker assigns
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a Map task to a TaskTracker that has an available slot (a single TaskTracker can
handle several tasks). The output of each Map task is a list of key-value pairs.
Roughly speaking, each individual data record in a split is used for producing a
key-value pair during this phase. Next, this intermediate data is partitioned and
sorted with respect to key, and stored locally. For each partition, the JobTracker
assigns a Reduce task to an available TaskTracker. Now the Reduce tasks have
to fetch the intermediate data generated in the previous phase; for this reason,
this part represents the main communication bottleneck in a MapReduce job.
Once intermediate data is retrieved, each Reduce task sorts and merges all his
partitions, and the Reduce operation is executed. Finally, the data is combined
into one or a few outputs.
The Hadoop framework also defines a special filesystem designed for achieving
fault-tolerance and high throughput for large-scale processing, called Hadoop
Distributed File System (HDFS); however, Hadoop can be used with other data
sources, such as databases or FTP. In HDFS, files are split in large blocks of a
determined size (default size is 64MB), which are randomly distributed across the
cluster of machines. HDFS also replicates each block into diﬀerent machines in
order to achieve data redundancy. The number of replicas for each block is dic-
tated by the redundancy factor, which is 3 by default. Thus, blocks corresponding
to a single file will be distributed into several machines, and each of them will be
replicated several times. In case that a node of the cluster is not accessible due
to a failure, there are more available copies of the same block.
One of the most prominent characteristics of Hadoop is that it leverages data
locality for reducing communication overhead. In order to do so, Hadoop exploits
the topology of the cluster by assigning tasks to nodes that are close to the input
data, preferably local to it. Another important aspect is the way it provides fault-
tolerance. In the event of task failure, Hadoop handles the failure automatically
by re-assigning the task to a diﬀerent node, taking advantage of the multiple
copies of each block.
Hadoop clusters usually store huge amounts of data from diﬀerent sources, owners
and degrees of sensitivity. However, because of its nature, Hadoop can be consid-
ered as a multi-tenant service and several jobs from diﬀerent users can be executed
at the same time on the cluster. Also, in the case of HDFS, data is distributed
evenly through the cluster, so it is possible that one node stores and process data
from diﬀerent tenants at the same time, which can also introduce security threats,
such as accessing to intermediate output of other tenants, to concurrent tasks of
other jobs or to HDFS blocks on a node through the local filesystem [177]. Some
of these problems could be mitigated using a cryptographically-enforced access
control approach, such as our proposal.
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6.2.3 PRE-based Delegated Access System for Hadoop
In this section, we describe a cryptographically-enforced access control system
for Hadoop, based on proxy re-encryption. By using it, the data is stored in
encrypted form and the owner can delegate access rights to the computing cluster
for processing.
Before proceeding with the description of the system, it is necessary to specify
the requirements of the proxy re-encryption scheme. An obvious one is to be very
eﬃcient, since Big Data applications are extremely intensive from a computational
point of view. A second requirement is that the scheme has to be transitive. This
property will allow us to derive re-encryption keys from a single “master” re-
encryption key generated by the data owner; this is explained in more detail in
Section 6.2.3. Examples of schemes that fulfill these characteristics is the one from
Weng et al. [54], which unlike most of others proxy re-encryption schemes it is
not based in costly bilinear pairing operations, and our scheme NTRUReEncrypt,
described in Section 5.1.
The data lifecycle of our proposal is composed of three phases:
1. Production phase: during this phase, data is generated by diﬀerent data
sources, and stored encrypted under the owner’s public key for later pro-
cessing.
2. Delegation phase: in this phase, the data owner produces the necessary
master re-encryption key for initiating the delegation process; once this
phase concludes, data owner does not need to participate again.
3. Consumption phase: This phase occurs each time a user of the Hadoop
cluster submits a job; is in this phase where encrypted data is read by the
worker nodes of the cluster. At the beginning of this phase, re-encryption
keys for each job are generated.
Production phase
This phase comprises the generation of the data by diﬀerent sources, and its
storage in encrypted form. We assume a scenario where for each dataset, the are
multiple data sources and only one dataset owner. In our proposal, we establish
that data of each owner is stored encrypted using his public key pkDO. One
advantage of using here a public key cryptosystem is that input data can be
generated from disparate sources and still be protected from its origin, without
requiring to agree on a common secret key for all the sources. This aspect is in
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accordance to the domains associated to the secure data sharing scenario (see
Section 1.1.1).
Let us assume that a data producer (which can be either the dataset owner
himself or an external source) stores a file into a cluster with HDFS, and this
file is split in N blocks (b1, ..., bN). Recall that, when a job is submitted to the
cluster, Hadoop first splits input data and then assigns a Map task for each split.
In the most common case, Hadoop is implemented using HDFS as the underlying
filesystem, so each split will usually match a HDFS block. From now on, we will
assume then that data is encrypted on a block-by-block basis since this is the
more eﬃcient approach, although our solution could be adapted to other levels
of granularity and other filesystems.
For each data block bi, the data producer will generate a fresh symmetric key ri
that is used for encapsulating the data through a symmetric encryption scheme
Sym.Enc, such as AES. Encrypted data is then of the form Sym.Enc(ri, bi). The
data key ri is in turn encapsulated using the encryption function PRE.Enc of
the proxy re-encryption scheme with the public key of the dataset owner, pkDO,
obtaining an encrypted lockbox PRE.Enc(pkDO, ri). Thus, for each block bi, we
obtain an encrypted pair of the form (PRE.Enc(pkDO, ri); Sym.Enc(ri, bi)), which
is the data that is finally stored.
Delegation phase
The goal of this phase is that the dataset owner produces a master re-encryption
key mrkDO to allow the delegation of access to the encrypted data. This master
re-encryption key is used to derive re-encryption keys in the next phase. The
delegation phase is done only once for each computing cluster and involves the
interaction of three entities:
• Dataset Owner (DO), whose public key pkDO is used to encrypted generated
data for consumption. The data owner also has a secret key skDO.
• Delegation Manager (DM), which belongs to the security domain of the
data owner, and it is trusted by him. This entity can either be local or
external to the computing cluster. One of the benefits of being external
to the cluster is that the data owner can then control the issuing of re-
encryption keys during the consumption phase, since this entity is involved
in all the subsequent access delegations. The delegation manager has a pair
of public and secret keys, pkDM and skDM .
• Re-Encryption Key Generation Center (RKGC): This entity is local to the
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Figure 6.11: Delegation protocol
cluster and will be responsible for generating all the re-encryption keys
needed for access delegation during the consumption phase.
In order to create the master re-encryption keymrkDO, which is actuallymrkDO =
rkDO→DM = skDM · sk−1DO, these three entities follow a simple three-party proto-
col, so no secret keys are shared, as depicted in Figure 6.11. The value t used
during this protocol is simply a random value that is used to blind the secret
key. At the end of this protocol, the RKGC possesses the master re-encryption
key mrkDO that later will be used for generating the rest of re-encryption keys
in the consumption phase, making use of the transitive property of the proxy
re-encryption scheme.
Consumption phase
This phase is performed each time a user submits a job to the Hadoop cluster.
First, the client application submits a job configuration to the JobTracker. This
configuration includes the specification of the Map and Reduce functions, the
path to the input files and the path of the desired output. Additionally, a pair of
public and private keys for the TaskTrackers is initialized in this step; these keys
will be used later during the encryption and decryption process. For simplicity,
we assume that a common pair of public and private keys, pkTT and skTT , is
shared by all the TaskTrackers; however, each TaskTracker could have a diﬀerent
pair if necessary and the process would be the same.
Next, we need to generate re-encryption keys for each TaskTracker, in our case
only one, as we assumed only one pair of public and secret keys. In this step,
the Delegation Manager, the Re-Encryption Key Generation Center, the Job-
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Figure 6.12: Re-Encryption Key Generation protocol
Tracker and one of the TaskTrackers with public key pkTT interact in order to
generate the re-encryption key rkDO→TT , as depicted in Figure 6.12; in this case,
u is the random blinding value. The final output of this interaction is a re-
encryption key rkDO→TT held by the JobTracker, who will be the one performing
re-encryptions. This process could be repeated in case that more TaskTrackers’
keys are in place.
Now that re-encryption keys have been generated, the JobTracker determines
the input set, which is specified by the job configuration, in order to find the
number of input splits. Recall that the number of map tasks depends on the
number of input splits. Following Hadoop’s data locality principle in order to
save network bandwidth, the JobTracker will select a set of TaskTrackers that
are close to the input data in terms of network proximity, and will send the task
requests to this set of TaskTrackers. Before each TaskTracker being able to do
any processing, encrypted blocks must be deciphered. In order to do so, each
TaskTracker needs to request the re-encryption of the encrypted lockbox for each
block to the JobTracker. When the re-encryption is done, the JobTracker sends
back the re-encrypted lockbox, which is next deciphered by the TaskTracker for
extracting the symmetric key of the content. Once the block is decrypted, data
is ready for being extracted by the TaskTracker. The map process now continues
in the same way than in regular Hadoop: each TaskTracker invokes the map
function for each record in the input split, producing a set of key-value pairs. This
intermediate data is sorted and partitioned with respect to the key and stored in
local files, one for each reducer. These intermediate files are also encrypted, but
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Figure 6.13: Main diagram of the proposed solution
this time with the public key of the Reducer TaskTrackers. Since we assume that
all TaskTrackers share the same pair, this key will be pkTT ; however, a diﬀerent
set of keys could be used.
When the map task finishes, its TaskTracker notifies the JobTracker about the
completion, and once all the TaskTracker complete their map tasks, the Job-
Tracker will select a set of TaskTrackers for performing the Reduce tasks. Each
reduce task will first read the intermediate output files remotely and decrypt them
using their secret key skTT . Now that the intermediate files are in clear, they
sort and merge the output files and execute the reduce function, which produces
an aggregated value for each key; the results are written in one output file per
reduce task. The final output can be encrypted using the public key of the client;
for simplicity, we can assume that the client in this case is the data owner, so the
public key is pkDO. Finally, output files are stored in HDFS.
The full procedure is depicted in Figure 6.13. It can be seen that our solution ba-
sically extends the regular Hadoop flow to support the encryption and decryption
of input splits; see Figure 6.10 for comparison.
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6.2.4 Experimental results
For our experiments, we have executed the main part of the consumption phase
of a job, where the processing of the data occurs. The other phases are, from
the Hadoop perspective, oﬄine processes, since are not related with Hadoop’s
flow. Our experiments are executed in a virtualized environment on a rack of
IBM BladeCenter HS23 servers connected through 10 gigabit Ethernet, running
VMware ESXi 5.1.0. Each of the blade servers is equipped with two quad-core
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 @ 2.70GHz. We set up a cluster of 17 VMs
(the master node, which contains the JobTracker and the NameNode, and 16
slave nodes, each of them holding a TaskTracker and a DataNode). Each of the
VMs in this environment is provided with two logical cores and 4 GB of RAM,
running a modified version of Hadoop 1.2.1 that implements a prototype of our
proposal.
As for the cryptographic details, the proxy re-encryption scheme is implemented
using elliptic curve cryptography over a prime field. In particular, we imple-
mented the proxy re-encryption scheme from Weng et al. using the NIST P-256
curve, which provides 128 bits of security and is therefore appropriate for encap-
sulating 128 bits symmetric keys [74]. With respect to the symmetric encryption
algorithm we chose AES-128. We will also make use of the built-in support for
AES included in some Intel processors through the AES-NI instruction set.
The experiment consisted on the execution of one of the sample programs included
in Hadoop, the WordCount benchmark, a simple application that counts the
occurrence of words over a set of files. In the case of our experiment, the job
input was a set of 1800 encrypted files of 64 MB each; in total, the input contains
28.8 billions of words and occupies approximately 112.5 GB. The size of each
input file is slightly below 64 MB, in order to fit HDFS blocks.
We executed two runs over the same input: the first one using a clean version
of Hadoop and the second one using a modified version with a prototype of our
proposal. The total running time of the experiment was 1932.09 and 1960.74
seconds, respectively. That is, a diﬀerence of 28.74 seconds, which represents a
relative overhead of 1.49% for this experiment. We believe that this overhead is
acceptable for most applications.
The most critical part of the execution is at the beginning of each Map task,
when for each encrypted split the TaskTracker has to ask for the corresponding
re-encrypted lockbox to the JobTracker, decrypt it and perform a symmetric de-
cryption of the data block. The duration of this process is more or less constant,
as it mostly depends on the size of the encrypted data block. The implication of
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Table 6.1: Time cost for the main cryptographic operations
Operation Time (ms)
Block Encryption (AES-128, 64 MB) 214.62
Block Decryption (AES-128, 64 MB) 116.81
Lockbox Encryption (PRE scheme) 17.84
Lockbox Re-Encryption (PRE scheme) 17.59
Lockbox Decryption (PRE scheme) 11.66
this is that relative overhead will depend drastically on the duration of the map
phase. On the one hand, if the map phase is very intensive, then the overhead in-
troduced by our solution will be relative small, in comparison with the processing
of the input splits. On the other hand, if the map phase is light, then the over-
head will be very significant. In the case of our experiment, where the processing
of input splits in each map task takes approximately 34 seconds, the overhead
introduced by our solution is very small, as the duration of the cryptographic op-
erations is within the order of milliseconds. Table 6.1 shows the measured time
cost associated to the main cryptographic operations of our solution.
6.2.5 Related work
The integration of encryption technologies in Hadoop is a topic that is being
explored recently. Park and Lee present in [178] a modification of the Hadoop
architecture in order to integrate symmetric encryption in HDFS. They also a
perform an experimental evaluation of their solution and claim that the overhead
is less than 7%. However, as their solution only considers the use of symmetric
encryption, the secret keys used for encrypting have to be shared with the com-
puting nodes. In a similar work, Lin et al [179] show the impact of integrating
RSA and pairing-based encryption on HDFS. In their experiments, performance
is aﬀected by between 20% and 180%.
On the industry side there has also been some eﬀorts for improving access control
in Big Data environments. For instance, Apache Accumulo [180] is a distributed
key-value store which provides cell-level access control. This feature is among
the key diﬀerentiators of Accumulo with respect to other non-relational data
stores. The data model of Accumulo includes a Visibility field for each cell, which
describes the access control policy for said cell. However, data confidentiality
depends on the enforcement layer of Accumulo, so the data is still stored in
clear.
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6.2.6 Summary
In this section we have addressed the problem of how to integrate data confiden-
tiality and massive processing in the Big Data scenario; widely accepted solutions,
such as Hadoop, do not oﬀer the proper means to protect data at rest. We propose
a cryptographically-enforced access control system for Hadoop, based on proxy
re-encryption. In our solution, stored data is always encrypted and encryption
keys do not need to be shared between diﬀerent data sources. Nevertheless, the
use of proxy re-encryption allows stored data to be re-encrypted into ciphered
data that the cluster nodes can decrypt with their own keys when a job is sub-
mitted. In order to permit this, the data owner has to first grant access rights (in
the form of decryption capabilities) to the Hadoop cluster. Experimental results
show that the overhead produced by the encryption and decryption operations is
manageable, so our proposal is suitable for some applications. In particular, the
main insight we extract from this experiment is that our proposal will fit well in
applications with an intensive map phase, since then the overhead introduced by
the use of cryptography will be reduced.
6.3 Escrowed Decryption System
The applications we discussed before were immediate instances of the secure data
sharing problem: data is outsourced to cloud providers, which are in charge of
storing and sharing it in a secure way, without being able to learn anything
about this information. In this section, however, we propose a diﬀerent, yet
related, application: the construction of a public-key encryption with escrowed
decryption. The innovative aspect of this proposal is that proxy re-encryption is
used to build the escrowed decryption capability, which allows to not resort to
escrowing private keys, which is the usual approach; instead, the escrow authority
only gets re-encryptions of the requested ciphertexts, which can be decrypted with
the authority’s private key.
6.3.1 Introduction
Let us consider the scenario posed by the dichotomy between data confidentiality
and law enforcement investigations in digital communication networks, such as
the Internet. There is a growing concern coming from governments and law en-
forcement agencies (LEAs) with respect to the alleged “impunity” that is derived
from the use of private and confidential communications. This has motivated
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the proposal of surveillance mechanisms as a means to detect and prevent illegal
activities (e.g., child pornography) and national threats (e.g., terrorism). There
is no doubt that the goal of protecting citizens from these dangers is noble; the
same cannot be said of all the methods to achieve this.
There is an on-going debate nowadays regarding whether mechanisms for breaking
confidentiality of communications are a legitimate method to fight the mentioned
threats. One of the most immediate concern is the perceived lack of account-
ability from the government and LEAs; in other words, if such mechanisms were
available, there is no hindrance for the government and LEAs to use it as an
eﬀective mass surveillance system.
Concerning this problem, Liu, Ryan and Chen proposed in [181] a protocol for Ac-
countable Escrowed Encryption, which, on the one hand, allows escrow authorities
(a term that subsumes government and LEAs) to decrypt suspicious ciphertexts,
but on the other hand, enables to hold them accountable. Their proposal consists
on a special encryption scheme, similar to ElGamal, which has a built-in escrowed
decryption capability. In order to use this capability to decrypt a ciphertext, es-
crow authorities have to follow a protocol involving a set of trusted entities called
custodians ; only if every custodian collaborates, the requesting escrow authority
is capable of decrypting the ciphertext. Note that this solution does not require
key escrow (i.e., a “backdoor” in the encryption scheme for extracting users’ pri-
vate key), since only the decryption capability is escrowed. Another core aspect
of this proposal is that the custodians are able to inform citizens of the number
of escrow requests they receive by recording such information on a public log,
facilitating the society to react through democratic procedures (i.e., demanding
“less/more decryption” from escrow authorities); this way, the authors argue, a
balance between societal security and individual privacy can be achieved.
In this paper we propose an alternative construction for the Accountable Es-
crowed Encryption scheme from [181]. Our proposal solves several problems from
the original scheme, related to security and eﬃciency. The proposed construction
is similar in essence but makes use of proxy re-encryption as a means for build-
ing the escrowed decryption capability; that is, the trusted custodians re-encrypt
ciphertexts, in a distributed way, upon request from the escrow authority; the
re-encrypted ciphertext can be opened them by the escrow authority.
It can be seen that this setting is reminiscent of the secure data sharing sce-
nario, although with some diﬀerences. In this case, there is no encrypted data
outsourced to cloud storage providers, but encrypted data circulating on commu-
nication networks, that is susceptible of being intercepted by the government and
LEAs. Consequently, there are no cloud storage providers, but trusted custodi-
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ans, which are requested by government and LEAs to perform escrow decryption
of ciphertexts. In other words, government and LEAs are data consumers that
request delegated access to encrypted information, as in the secure data sharing
scenario.
6.3.2 PKE with PRE-based Escrowed Decryption
In this section we describe our proposal. Formally, it is a new type of cryp-
tosystem that consists of a public-key encryption scheme with an added escrowed
decryption capability, which we construct through proxy re-encryption.
Recall that our proposal is intended to solve some problems of the original scheme
from Liu, Ryan and Chen [181]. One of these problems is that a collusion of custo-
dians can potentially decrypt any message if they have access to a full ciphertext.
That is, one have to make the assumption that the custodians are trusted for not
doing this. In our proposal, the custodians are never able to see the underlying
message, even if they have access to the whole ciphertext.
Another problem of the original scheme is the eﬃciency of the solution. The pro-
tocol for escrow decryption in the original proposal is composed of 2 synchronous
rounds, and each round involves all custodians; that is, the escrow authority has
to first engage all custodians in a first round of interactions (ideally in parallel),
and only when all of them have responded, it can continue with a second round
of interactions. The reason behind this characteristic is that the escrow authority
has to make some intermediate computations that are required for the second
round, and it needs all the responses from the first round to do this. In our
proposal, we reduce the escrow decryption protocol to a single round.
Our idea is to base the escrowed decryption protocol on a “shared” re-encryption
by the custodians, in a way similar to the decryption procedure of a (n, n)-
threshold encryption scheme [143]; that is, our solution ensures that the escrow
authority is able to decrypt ciphertexts intended for suspicious users as long as
he engage the collaboration of all the escrow custodians. Inspired by this idea,
the following is the generic syntax of this new cryptosystem:
• Setup(λ) → params. On input the security parameter λ, the setup al-
gorithm outputs the set of global parameters params, which includes the
public and private key of the escrow authority (pkEA, skEA).
• KeyGen(pkEA) → (pk, sk, {κi}ni=1). On input the escrow authority’s public
key pkEA, the key generation algorithm outputs the public and private key
of user U , (pk, sk), and a set of escrow shares), {κi}ni=1.
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• Enc(pk,m)→ CT . On input a public key pk and a message m, the encryp-
tion algorithm outputs ciphertext CT .
• Dec(sk, CT ) → m. On input the secret key sk and a ciphertext CT , the
decryption algorithm outputs the original message m.
• ShareReEnc(κi, CT )→ ρi. On input a re-encryption share κi and a cipher-
text CT , this algorithm outputs the re-encryption share (or escrow share)
ρi.
• Comb(skEA, CT, {ρi}ni=1)→ m. On input the escrow authority’s secret key
skEA, a ciphertext CT , and a complete set of re-encryption shares {ρi}ni=1,
the combination algorithm outputs the original message m.
Our proposal
Since our proposal in actually an enhancement of the one from Liu, Ryan and
Chen [181], we maintain the same setting, with the same actors. Apart from the
actors mentioned before, namely users, escrow authority and custodians, their
proposal also contained a Certification Authority (CA) that participates in the
key generation process, ensuring that the escrow capabilities are properly pre-
served.
We base our solution on the PRE scheme from Ateniese et al. [11], with two main
modifications:
• Re-encryption is split among several custodians. The re-encryption key is
split into n shares, so rk =
n￿
i=1
rki. Then, for the decryption of re-encrypted
ciphertexts, we make use of the multiplicative homomorphic properties of
the scheme, as ReEnc(rk, CT ) =
n￿
i=1
ReEnc(rki, CT ).
• The original scheme from Ateniese et al. allow to encrypt ciphertexts that
are not re-encryptable (called “first-level ciphertexts”), which can be used
to bypass our re-encryption-based escrow. We get rid of this functionality
by modifying the key generation in such a way that users’ public key cannot
be used to create first-level ciphertexts.
Our scheme is defined as follows. Note that although in the generic syntax we
described functions, our solution requires some of them to be implemented as
two-party protocols.
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Setup. Let G and GT be cyclic groups of order q, and e : G × G → GT be a
bilinear pairing. Let g be a generator of G, and Z = e(g, g). The public key of
the escrow authority is pkEA = ga, and the corresponding secret key skEA = a.
This public key is certified by the CA in the usual way.
Key Generation. This subprotocol can be seen as a secure two-party protocol
between the user and the CA that realizes the functionality of the KeyGen algo-
rithm. The result of this subprotocol is that the user gets his public and private
keys certified, without the CA learning the private key, but with the assurance
that valid escrow shares are generated.
The user U first selects random secrets u, β ∈ Zq. He chooses a set of custodi-
ans who he trust. We denote as C to the set of indices of such custodians; for
simplicity, we will assume that C = {1, ..., n}.
For each custodian Ci, where 2 ≤ i ≤ n, user U chooses a random ￿κi ∈ G. For
custodian C1, he computes ￿κ1 = (pkEA)β/u · ￿ n￿
i=2
￿κi￿−1. Consequently, n￿
i=1
￿κi =
gaβ/u. He sends (gu,C, {￿κi}ni=1, gβ) to CA for certification.
CA verifies that the set of partial escrow shares is valid by checking that the
following equation holds:
e(
n￿
i=1
￿κi, gu) = e(pkEA, gβ) (6.1)
CA chooses s, γ ∈ Zq and compute user U ’s public key pk = ((gu)s, e(gβ, g)sγ) =
(gsu, Zsv), which implicitly defines v = β · γ. This public key is then signed and
certified by the CA. Now, the CA concludes the generation of the set of escrow
shares, by computing κi = (￿κi)γ for each custodian. Note that n￿
i=1
κi = (
n￿
i=1
￿κi)γ =
(gaβ/u)γ = gav/u. The CA sends each escrow share to a diﬀerent custodian in
C through a secure channel. Finally, CA returns (pk, gγ) to user U , who sets
sk = (gγ)β/u = gv/u. Figure 6.14 shows the interactions of this subprotocol.
Encryption. Anyone can produce a ciphertext under user U ’s public key pk =
(gsu, Zsv) as follows: choose a random r ∈ Zq and output the ciphertext
CT = ((gsu)r, (Zsv)r ·m) = (gsur, Zsvr ·m)
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U CA
u, β ← Z∗q￿κi ∈ G, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n￿κ1 = (pkEA)β/u · ￿ n￿
i=2
￿κi￿−1
gu,C, {￿κi}ni=1, gβ
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify Equation 6.1
s, γ ← Z∗q
pk = ((gu)s, e(gβ, g)sγ)
κi = (￿κi)γ
pk, gγ
←−−−−−−−−−−−−
sk = (gγ)β/u = gv/u
Figure 6.14: Key Generation subprotocol
Decryption. User U can decrypt a ciphertext CT = (CT1, CT2) = (gsur, Zsvr ·
m) as follows:
m =
CT2
e(CT1, sk)
=
Zsvr ·m
e(gsur, gv/u)
Escrow decryption. This subprotocol is basically the combination of the
ShareReEnc and Comb algorithms, as seen in Figure 6.15. When the escrow
authority wants to decrypt a ciphertext CT = (CT1, CT2) = (gsur, Zsvr ·m) that
is encrypted under user U ’s public key, they give CT1 = gsur to each custodian
in C, and obtain the re-encryption share ρi = ShareReEnc(κi, CT1) = e(κi, gsur)
in response. Note that although we defined the syntax of ShareReEnc such that
it takes the whole ciphertext as input, in our proposal only the first component
is necessary.
After getting the re-encryption shares {ρi}ni=1 from all custodians, the escrow
authority executes the combination algorithm Comb to decrypt the ciphertext.
In our proposal, this algorithm is defined as follows:
Comb(skEA, CT, {ρi}ni=1) =
CT2
(
n￿
i=1
ρi)1/skEA
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EA Ci
CT = (CT1, CT2)
For each custodian Ci ∈ C:
CT1
−−−−−−−−→
ρi = ShareReEnc(κi, CT1)
ρi
←−−−−−−−−
Collect {ρi}ni=1
m = Comb(skEA, CT, {ρi}ni=1)
Figure 6.15: Escrow Decryption subprotocol
6.3.3 Analysis of our solution
In this section we evaluate the correctness and security of our solution. Addi-
tionally, we analyze its performance, by comparing it with the scheme from Liu,
Ryan and Chen [181].
Correctness
Let CT = (CT1, CT2) = (gsur, Zsvr ·m) be a ciphertext encrypted under user U ’s
public key. The regular decryption procedure works since:
Dec(sk, CT ) =
CT2
e(CT1, sk)
=
Zsvr ·m
e(gsur, gv/u)
=
Zsvr ·m
Zsvr
= m
Assuming the Key Generation subprotocol is correct (which is ensured by the
CA), then the escrow decryption procedure is also correct. Recall that when
the escrow authority wants to decrypt a ciphertext CT , he gives CT1 to each
custodian in C, and obtain the re-encryption share ρi = ShareReEnc(κi, CT1) =
e(κi, gsur) in response. In the next step, the escrow authority combines all the
escrow shares:
n￿
i=1
ρi =
n￿
i=1
e(κi, g
sur)
Thus, by the bilinear property of the pairing:
n￿
i=1
e(κi, g
sur) = e(
n￿
i=1
κi, g
sur)
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Next, since the Key Generation subprotocol ensures that
n￿
i=1
κi = gav/u, then:
n￿
i=1
ρi = e(g
av/u, gsur) = Zsavr
Finally, in the combination algorithm, the escrow authority uses this value to
decrypt the ciphertext:
Comb(skEA, CT, {ρi}ni=1) =
CT2
(
n￿
i=1
ρi)1/skEA
=
Zsvr ·m
(Zsavr)1/a
= m
Security
In order to evaluate to security of our proposal, we prove that it complies with
the IND-CPA notion, as is usual in PKE schemes. We are not targeting here the
corresponding PRE notion, since this is not a PRE scheme: it is only possible to
re-encrypt to the escrow authority, not to any other regular user. Note, however,
that in our case, the key generation protocol provides additional information that
should be known by the adversary. In addition, since we are targeting a CPA
attack model, there is no need to describe any oracle.
Let us assume that there is an adversary B that wins the IND-CPA game with
non-negligible advantage ε. Then, we can use B to construct an algorithm A
that solves the 1-wDBDHI problem (see Definition 2.12) with the same advan-
tage.
A receives as input a tuple (g, gu, gw, Zd), and his goal is to decide whether
d = w/u; he uses this tuple to simulate the environment for the adversary B.
First, A publishes the global parameters (q, e,G,GT , g), as usual; next, sam-
ples random a ∈ Zq and sets the escrow authority’s public and private keys
(pkEA, skEA) = (ga, a).
The next step is simulating the key generation subprotocol; in this case, A releases
to B all the information that is produced in the subprotocol, except for the user’s
secret values and the escrow shares, since this would allow to corrupt the target
user and would make B win the game trivially. A samples random s, β, γ ∈ Zq,
and sets the public key of the target as pk∗ = ((gu)s, Zsβγ) = (gus, Zsv). Now A
returns B the tuple (gu, gβ, s, γ); the first two elements are the user’s input to the
subprotocol, while the last two are the CA’s input.
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Table 6.2: Computational costs of selected PRE schemes
Algorithm Liu, Ryan and Chen [181] Our proposal
Key Generation (User) 3te 4te
Key Generation (CA) 3te 2tp + 2te + teT
Encryption 3te te + teT
Decryption 2te tp
Escrow Decryption (Custodian)
Round 1: te
Round 2: te
tp
Escrow Decryption (Escrow Agent) – teT
The challenge ciphertext is constructed as:
CT ∗ = ((gw)s,mδ · (Zd)sβγ) = (gws,mδ · (Zd)sv)
A runs adversary B to obtain the guess δ￿ and decides that d = w/u when δ = δ￿.
Note that when d = w/u, the challenge ciphertext is a valid encryption of mδ
under pk∗, where the random exponent r is defined implicitly as r = w/u.
CT ∗ = ((gus)w/u,mδ · (Zsv)w/u)
Therefore, in this case B guesses δ correctly with probability 12 + ε and A solves
the 1-wDBDHI problem with the same probability. On the contrary, when d is
random, mδ is information-theoretically hidden, so the probability of B guessing
δ correctly is 12 . Thus, the overall success probability of A is 12 + ε2 .
Performance
Similarly to the study done in Section 3.3.3, we analyze computational costs in
terms of the main operations performed, which in this case are the exponentiation
and the pairing (denoted by te and tp, respectively). In the case of pairing groups,
the computational costs of exponentiations of group elements are diﬀerent. For
this reason, when necessary we will make the distinction between exponentiations
in G (denoted by te) and in GT (denoted by teT ). We ignore other minor costs,
such as multiplications and inversions. Note, however, that both in our solution
and in [181], the number of multiplications depends mainly on the number of
custodians; we can safely assume that a realistic implementation will involve
only a reduced number of custodians.
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The results of our performance comparison are shown in Table 6.2. The price
of solving the problems in [181] implies increased costs in all the operations,
although there are some remarks on this matter. Firstly, communication costs
are not addressed here, since they depend on the specific communication network
in use, but our costs in this dimension are half than in [181] because we get rid
of the second round. Secondly, the Key Generation in [181] do not consider any
specific mechanism for ensuring that the users’ input is valid; since this is not
defined in their solution, we do not count anything for them on this respect.
6.3.4 Summary
In this section we have described a public-key encryption scheme that allows an
escrow authority to decrypt messages, without escrowing users’ secret keys, but
only the decryption capability. We construct the escrow capability by means of
proxy re-encryption. Our solution, inspired by the Accountable Escrow Encryp-
tion scheme from Liu, Ryan and Chen [181], solves some of the problems that
arise in this proposal, such as removing the possibility of a collusion of custodians
and halving communication costs.
As future work, it is necessary to further formalize the security notions of this
new cryptosystem. In particular, it is interesting to define an equivalent of CCA-
security on this context, and to propose a solution that satisfies this notion.
Another line of research is to solve the trust problem. The proposed solution
involves a high level of trust in the CA, since it must be trusted to not combine
all the escrow shares; otherwise, the CA could render useless the custodians,
and the government could collude together with the CA to decrypt messages
bypassing the accountability provided by the custodians. In order to solve this,
a possible extension is that the custodians have also a public-private key pair,
which is necessary during re-encryption.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This final chapter constitutes a brief recapitulation of the work done on this
thesis. We first summarize the secure data sharing problem as the motivational
scope and discuss the readiness of proxy re-encryption as part of the solution.
We then present a description of each of our contributions, which we classify
from the viewpoint of the goals we established in the introduction of this thesis.
To conclude, we discuss future lines of work, motivated by open problems that
require further research.
7.1 Proxy Re-Encryption and the Secure Data
Sharing Scenario
As described in the introduction, one of the postulates of this thesis is that proxy
re-encryption is a prime candidate for the construction of viable solutions to the
secure data sharing problem. In this scenario, data owners entrust their data
to cloud providers, who are then responsible for storing and managing it. This
implies the existence of a strong trust relationship between the data owners and
the cloud providers, since the former trust that their information will be managed
properly and that the provider will respect the confidentiality; however, current
cloud providers do not implement real mechanisms to prevent themselves from
betraying this trust. This concern led us to advocate for the use of proxy re-
encryption as a viable solution to this problem, so that cloud providers are still
able to oﬀer a storage and sharing service, without having access to the actual
data.
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7.1.1 Incentives
At this point is useful to think about what kinds of incentives may motivate a
cloud provider to oﬀer a storage service without being able to read the outsourced
information. From a strictly economic point of view, it may not make sense to
provide these services for free, since they will probably incur more expenses as
a result of implementing additional security mechanisms. Furthermore, they will
lose control over the user’s data, which is currently a valuable asset. Still, there
are some incentives that could encourage cloud providers to oﬀer such a blind
service.
Compliance with Data Privacy Laws and Regulations Cloud providers
may be seen in the eyes of the law as stores and processors of sensitive information.
In consequence, they are obliged to comply with specific laws and regulations
regarding data protection, such as the EU Data Protection Directive, in case of
Personal Identifiable Information(PII ), or the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA) [8], in the case of healthcare information. Some
of these regulations demand that sensitive information must be protected using
appropriate encryption techniques.
Therefore, a solution to secure data sharing based on proxy re-encryption, which
achieves data confidentiality through encryption mechanisms and permits cloud
providers to still provide storage and sharing services without having the chance
to access the data, could be very useful to help them comply with these kinds
of regulations. We argue that, given the proper cryptographic safeguards, en-
crypted data is no longer private, and could even be freely distributed without
compromising users’ privacy.
Minimization of Liability Currently there is a lot of discussion, especially
from the cloud industry and lawmakers, with regard to liability in cloud comput-
ing due to its nature of outsourced service provision. Although cloud providers
currently try to reduce their liability through specific clauses in SLAs, legal re-
sponsibility for the data in the cloud also lies on the side of the cloud provider.
There are a lot of examples from blog sites, Internet forums, or file hosting ser-
vices (such as the Megaupload case in 2012 [182]), where the owners of these
services are indicted for hosting illegal or defamatory material, even though they
have not generated said content.
In contrast, given that in our proposed approach to the problem, outsourced data
is encrypted prior to arriving the cloud and the cloud provider does not hold the
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decryption keys, liability is drastically reduced, as they are unable to read user’s
data. Take a shipping service as an analogy: they will not be liable for any illegal
or dangerous item delivered through their service, since they cannot open the
packages and inspect their content (or at least, every delivered package). As a
consequence of this, users should be the ones designated as liable and subject to
the enforcement of key disclosure laws.
Data Confidentiality as an Added Value An interesting incentive for cloud
providers could be the possibility of oﬀering secure data processing and confiden-
tiality as an added value. Setting aside legal and regulatory aspects, this model
could help a cloud provider to oﬀer a competitive advantage over the rest. We
expect the topics addressed in this thesis to contribute to the blossoming of a
business model based on respect for users’ privacy and data confidentiality. Cur-
rently, there are some cloud services, such as PrivateSky [183] or CipherCloud
[184] that have built their business model on data confidentiality as an added
value.
7.1.2 Towards application to the Real World
It is also worth finding out whether there are industrial initiatives towards the
application of PRE in real commercial solutions. Although we are not presently
aware of widely-used real-world applications of proxy re-encryption, there are
some indications that show that the IT industry is becoming increasingly inter-
ested in it, particularly with regard to its application to the secure data sharing
scenario. Nishimaki and Xagawa recently noted in [70] that Toshiba has released,
on the Japanese market, a cloud storage service that use proxy re-encryption to
ensure data confidentiality, called “Digital Kashikinko” [185] (which means “dig-
ital safety box”). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first commercial ap-
plication of proxy re-encryption. Although the specific details are not known (as
for most commercial applications), the associated publication describes a typical
PRE-based architecture.
An interesting way of probing the industry’s interest in the topic is to look for
patents that use proxy re-encryption. As conjectured in this thesis, the applica-
tion of PRE to the cloud seems to be recurring, given its natural potential in this
scenario. We have found patents from Toshiba [186], Huawei [187, 188], Nokia
[189], and Gemalto [190], among others, which present approaches that are, es-
sentially, instances of the secure data sharing scenario. With regard to other use
cases, Apple has patented a solution for DRM protection based in PRE [191].
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The authors of one of the first PRE schemes [11] also presented a patent [192]
that essentially covers their original proposal. We foresee a growing number of
patents in these areas, which would ultimately lead to new products and services
based on this cryptographic primitive.
7.2 Contributions
Throughout this thesis we have worked on several topics, always with proxy
re-encryption as the backbone. In this section we provide a summary of our
contributions, classified from the point of view of the goals presented in the
introduction.
7.2.1 Better understanding
As proxy re-encryption is the central topic of this thesis, it became necessary
to first perform an extensive review of the scientific literature around this cryp-
tosystem. One of the contributions of this thesis is that we survey and analyze
the current state of research on proxy re-encryption, for both constructions and
applications. The most prominent proxy re-encryption schemes are studied in
light of relevant properties and security models. We have additionally provided
a comparative analysis of the performance of selected schemes, both from the
theoretical and experimental points of view. With regards to applications of
PRE, we have performed an extensive review of the available literature following
a bibliometric approach.
A core contribution of this thesis that is related to this goal is the identifica-
tion of a parametric family of attack models for PRE, which not only considers
the availability of the decryption oracle (as in PKE), but also the re-encryption
oracle. These attack models for PRE allow us to define a collection of security
notions, whose relations we analyze, and that is useful for achieving a better un-
derstanding of the definitions of security upon which proxy re-encryption schemes
are designed. Of particular interest is the study of the separations between the
obtained notions of security. We have focused on those that arise by exploit-
ing the private re-encryption keys property – or more accurately – the failure
to fulfill this property. The consequence of these separations is that schemes
that leak re-encryption keys through queries to the re-encryption oracle cannot
achieve strong security notions. These results strengthen the idea that meaningful
chosen-ciphertext attacks for PRE should consider both oracles (i.e., decryption
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and re-encryption). We illustrated these findings by showing an attack on a recent
PRE scheme from PKC 2014 [48] that is said to be “CCA1-secure”.
7.2.2 More security
A substantial part of this thesis has been devoted to the security of proxy re-
encryption. A first contribution on this matter is the definition of a parametric
family of attack models, mentioned before. This contribution can be seen as a de-
sign aid, which can be used by cryptographers to devise PRE schemes that achieve
intermediate security notions or to reason about the actual security of schemes.
The second contribution in this area is the definition of a generic transformation
that bootstraps weakly-secure PRE schemes into stronger ones. This construc-
tion extends the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation to the PRE context, which is
far from being obvious. The most immediate challenge we had to tackle here
is that the possibility of re-encrypting conflicts with the validity checks that are
necessary during decryption; we identified twelve PRE schemes that are flawed as
a consequence of this problem. We proved that, under some assumptions, which
include the satisfaction of a new property of PRE called “perfect key-switching”,
the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation can be used to generically bootstrap a weak
notion of security (IND-CCA0,1) into a much stronger notion (IND-CCA2,1), in the
random oracle model.
Other generic transformations for public-key encryption are also studied for its
application in proxy re-encryption. We discussed how the REACT and GEM
transformations [18, 29] can be modified to support re-encryptions. Since the
perfect key-switching property is no longer required, these proposals are poten-
tially applicable to a wider class of schemes, which makes them very attractive.
In addition, they are more eﬃcient than the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation,
since they do not require to reconstruct the ciphertext during decryption.
7.2.3 Better performance
Another contribution of this thesis is NTRUReEncrypt, a highly-eﬃcient proxy
re-encryption scheme based on the NTRU cryptosystem. This scheme is bidirec-
tional and multihop, but not collusion-resistant. The key strength of this scheme
is its performance: experimental results show that this scheme outperforms pre-
vious proposals by an order of magnitude, and there is room for even more im-
provement, for instance using parallelization techniques, as shown in [124]. We
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believe that the level of eﬃciency shown by NTRUReEncrypt opens up new prac-
tical applications of proxy re-encryption in constrained environments.
7.2.4 Bringing theory and practice together
From the beginning of this research eﬀort, we wanted to make contributions to
both theory and practice. This conviction is indeed reflected in the title and
organization of this dissertation.
An example of this research philosophy is found in our study of the eﬃciency of
selected PRE schemes. This analysis is performed, not only from a theoretical
perspective (which is the usual practice in current literature), but also empirically,
using our own implementation. We believe this aspect is especially important,
since it has a direct impact on the incurred costs of any solution based on proxy
re-encryption.
Another example is found in the proposed applications, where we have strived to
not only define generic architectures, but also integrate our solutions with real-
world technologies. For instance, in the case of our model for privacy-preserving
identity management in the cloud, we tightly integrated it with SAML 2.0, a
standard protocol for identity management, while in the the case of the Big Data
application, we instantiated it with the Apache Hadoop system, a widely used
framework for Big Data Analytics.
7.3 Future work
The last part of this chapter is devoted to several research questions that we have
identified in the course of this thesis and which remain open for further study.
Although some of them have been discussed in their corresponding chapters, we
gather them together here for the reader’s convenience.
From the systematic analysis of the literature we performed in Chapter 3, we
detected a very interesting trend with regard to PRE schemes. The experimental
results presented in Section 3.3.3 show that lattice-based PRE schemes seem to be
more eﬃcient in comparison to previous constructions (our NTRU-based proposal
is an example). However, at the same time, the highest notion achieved so far
by lattice-based PRE is IND-CCA1,0 through the scheme from Kirshanova [48].
This clearly represents a weakness of the current state of research regarding these
kinds of schemes. Therefore, further work is required in order to devise more
secure lattice-based schemes.
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In Chapter 4 we defined a family of attack models and security notions for proxy
re-encryption, and studied some of the relations that arise between these notions.
However, we do not rule out the possibility of other possible separations and
implications; it is therefore an open question to further study additional relations
among security notions.
With regard to the PRE schemes based on NTRU proposed in Section 5.1, there
are several areas with potential for improvement. The most pressing are achieving
CCA-security and the definition of a unidirectional and collision-resistant scheme.
The former issue was the initial motivation for the generic transformations that we
proposed in Section 5.2, although, in the end, it could not benefit from them; the
latter issue is sketched in Section 5.1.6 and looks promising, although it requires
further work. Another subject is improving the parameters of NTRUReEncrypt,
since this could decrease the probability of decryption failures after multiple re-
encryptions. Additionally, it would be interesting to come up with better bounds
for the provably-secure version and an analysis of the selection of parameters
based on the best known lattice attacks.
As for the generic transformations we proposed in Section 5.2, future lines of
research include working towards concrete estimations of the obtained security
level of the extended Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation; this could allow sets of
parameters to be fixed and to perform meaningful comparisons with other schemes
to be made. A more ambitious problem is to propose transformations that are
not defined in the random oracle model.
Finally, there are also potential lines of improvement for the applications proposed
in Chapter 6. Most of them are of a technical nature: for instance, the BlindIdM
model can be refined in order to adapt it to the System for Cross-domain Identity
Management (SCIM) specification [193], an open standard from the IETF that
is designed to simplify user management in cloud-based services and applications
by facilitating the exchange of identity information; in the case of the Big Data
application, it would be interesting to improve the integration of our solution
with the Hadoop architecture, in particular, with the HDFS layer, which has a
lot of potential. With respect to the escrowed decryption system, an immediate
improvement would be to devise a scheme that achieves CCA-security and that
reduces the trust assumption on the Certification Authority.
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Resumen
La externalizacio´n de la gestio´n de la informacio´n es una pra´ctica cada vez ma´s
comu´n, siendo la computacio´n en la nube (en ingle´s, cloud computing) el paradig-
ma ma´s representativo. Sin embargo, este enfoque genera tambie´n preocupacio´n
con respecto a la seguridad y privacidad debido a la inherente pe´rdida del control
sobre los datos. Las soluciones tradiciones, principalmente basadas en la aplica-
cio´n de pol´ıticas y estrategias de control de acceso, solo reducen el problema a
una cuestio´n de confianza, que puede romperse fa´cilmente por los proveedores
de servicio, tanto de forma accidental como intencionada. Por lo tanto, prote-
ger la informacio´n externalizada, y al mismo tiempo, reducir la confianza que es
necesario establecer con los proveedores de servicio, se convierte en un objetivo
inmediato. Las soluciones basadas en criptograf´ıa son un mecanismo crucial de
cara a este fin.
Esta tesis esta´ dedicada al estudio de un criptosistema llamado recifrado delega-
do (en ingle´s, proxy re-encryption), que constituye una solucio´n pra´ctica a este
problema, tanto desde el punto de vista funcional como de eficiencia. El recifra-
do delegado es un tipo de cifrado de clave pu´blica que permite delegar en una
entidad la capacidad de transformar textos cifrados de una clave pu´blica a otra,
sin que pueda obtener ninguna informacio´n sobre el mensaje subyacente. Desde
un punto de vista funcional, el recifrado delegado puede verse como un medio
de delegacio´n segura de acceso a informacio´n cifrada, por lo que representa un
candidato natural para construir mecanismos de control de acceso criptogra´ficos.
Aparte de esto, este tipo de cifrado es, en s´ı mismo, de gran intere´s teo´rico, ya
que sus definiciones de seguridad deben balancear al mismo tiempo la seguridad
de los textos cifrados con la posibilidad de transformarlos mediante el recifrado,
lo que supone una estimulante dicotomı´a.
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Las contribuciones de esta tesis siguen un enfoque transversal, ya que van desde
las propias definiciones de seguridad del recifrado delegado, hasta los detalles
espec´ıficos de potenciales aplicaciones.
A.1 Motivacio´n, retos y contribuciones
Existe un creciente intere´s por el modelo de computacio´n en la nube, debido
en parte al abaratamiento de costes que supone, sobre todo para las pequen˜as
empresas, a la hora de escalar y redimensionar su negocio. La idea ba´sica tras el
concepto de cloud es la de proveer al usuario de una abstraccio´n de un conjunto
disponible de recursos de computacio´n, almacenamiento y comunicaciones; en este
caso, el modelo de negocio se basa en que los usuarios pagan en funcio´n del uso
de los servicios ofrecidos por el cloud. Sin embargo, la externalizacio´n inherente
a este paradigma implica tambie´n un riesgo para los usuarios, que ahora esta´n
obligadas a confiar en la honestidad y fiabilidad de un proveedor de servicios de
cloud. En principio, nada impide a cualquier proveedor acceder a la informacio´n
de los usuarios, por lo que estos u´ltimos solo pueden confiar en que esto no
suceda.
La mayor parte de las medidas de seguridad en entornos cloud (como sistemas de
control de acceso, cortafuegos de red, etc.) esta´n destinadas a la proteccio´n frente
a atacantes externos; no obstante, las amenazas internas son potencialmente ma´s
peligrosas, ya que a menudo pueden sortear las medidas de seguridad habituales.
Por tanto, una premisa ma´s realista es que los atacantes (ya sea externos o inter-
nos), pueden acceder a los datos almacenados. La consecuencia lo´gica, por tanto,
es que es necesario introducir mecanismos de cifrado para mantener la confiden-
cialidad y privacidad. Aunque el uso de mecanismos de cifrado ofrece proteccio´n
ante atacantes externos e internos, dificulta (y en algunos casos, imposibilita) la
gestio´n y procesamiento de los datos. Es por ello necesario recurrir a mecanismos
de cifrado que trasciendan los tradicionales, de forma que se pueda contar con
ciertos niveles de funcionalidad sin perjudicar la seguridad. Una de las funciona-
lidades ma´s ba´sicas que podemos considerar es la comparticio´n de los datos, que
es la que vamos a considerar como motivacio´n de esta tesis.
En un escenario de comparticio´n segura de datos, identificamos los siguientes
actores (y dominios asociados), como se ilustra en la Figura A.1:
• Productores de datos: Son las entidades que generan datos. En nuestro
escenario diferenciamos quie´n crea los datos de quie´n es el duen˜o, lo que
nos permite incluir en este escenario casos de uso ma´s diversos y complejos.
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Figura A.1: Actores y dominios en el escenario de comparticio´n segura de datos
Los productores pueden cifrar la informacio´n desde su dominio, e incluso,
enviarla directamente al proveedor de almacenamiento, de forma que la
interaccio´n con el duen˜o de los datos no es un requisito en este escenario.
• Duen˜o de los datos: La entidad que posee los datos y que quiere compartir-
los. Su principal funcio´n es autorizar consumidores a acceder a sus datos.
• Proveedor de almacenamiento: Es una entidad especializada en gestionar
datos de usuarios y de proporcionar un servicio de comparticio´n. Dado
que un proveedor de cloud es un gran ejemplo de este tipo de actor, nos
referiremos a esta entidad tambie´n como “proveedor de cloud”. Este actor
es semiconfiable, ya que asumiremos que proporciona el servicio de manera
correcta y honesta, pero al mismo tiempo tiene incentivos para tratar de
leer los datos que tenga en su poder; en este caso, se dice que es de tipo
“honesto pero curioso”.
• Consumidores de datos: Estas entidades son los receptores leg´ıtimos de la
informacio´n compartida, que obtienen mediante interaccio´n con el proveedor
de almacenamiento.
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• Actores externos: Un quinto tipo de actor, omitido en la Figura A.1, es toda
aquella entidad externa que tenga un intere´s en acceder a la informacio´n
protegida (como por ejemplo, hackers). Este tipo de actores deben enfren-
tarse a las medidas de seguridad tradicionales (p. ej. cortafuegos), y en el
peor de los casos, si logran acceder vera´n informacio´n cifrada.
Si usa´ramos exclusivamente te´cnicas convencionales de cifrado (p. ej., de tipo
sime´trico como AES, o asime´trico como RSA) no podr´ıamos resolver de forma
adecuada la problema´tica de la comparticio´n segura de datos, ya que nos encon-
trar´ıamos con grandes problemas de gestio´n y distribucio´n de claves debido a la
configuracio´n de actores existente. Uno de los problemas ma´s acuciantes es que
los productores no conocen de antemano quie´nes van a ser los consumidores de
la informacio´n cifrada, por lo que se ven obligados a cifrarla con una clave con-
trolada por el duen˜o de los datos, de forma que pueda posteriormente autorizar a
los consumidores correspondientes. Con las te´cnicas convencionales, esto implica
que el duen˜o de los datos debe descifrar los datos y cifrarlos de nuevo con una
clave conocida por los consumidores, lo que es una solucio´n muy ineficiente. El
problema se vuelve inmensamente complejo cuando hay numerosos conjuntos de
datos, productores y consumidores.
Una manera elegante de resolver este problema es mediante el uso de esquemas
de recifrado delegado (en ingle´s, proxy re-encryption), un tipo de cifrado de clave
pu´blica que permite delegar en una entidad de recifrado (referida en ingle´s como
proxy) la capacidad de transformar textos cifrados de una clave pu´blica a otra,
sin que pueda obtener ninguna informacio´n sobre el mensaje subyacente, como
puede verse en la Figura A.2. Para ello, la entidad de recifrado necesita que el
destinatario original le env´ıe previamente una clave de recifrado, que le permite
realizar la transformacio´n. Desde un punto de vista funcional, el recifrado dele-
gado puede verse como un medio de delegacio´n segura de acceso a informacio´n
cifrada.
En esta tesis, postulamos que el recifrado delegado es un candidato natural para
el escenario de comparticio´n segura de datos, ya que permite construir sistemas
de control de acceso basados en la criptograf´ıa. En una solucio´n basada en el
recifrado delegado, la informacio´n a proteger se almacena en el cloud de forma
cifrada, aunque puede compartirse con consumidores autorizados por medio de
la operacio´n de recifrado, todo ello manteniendo la confidencialidad de los datos
respecto a entidades no autorizadas y el propio proveedor de cloud.
Sin embargo, existen varios retos de investigacio´n que deben tratarse antes de
avanzar en el uso del recifrado delegado en el mundo real, que clasificamos de
acuerdo a su nivel de abstraccio´n:
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Figura A.2: Recifrado Delegado
• Definiciones de seguridad: Los retos en este nivel esta´n asociados al pro-
pio concepto de seguridad de los esquemas de recifrado delegado, desde un
punto de vista criptogra´fico. Esto involucra diversas necesidades, como el
ana´lisis de las nociones de seguridad, el modelado de adversarios y la in-
vestigacio´n de propiedades relevantes, siendo la primera la ma´s acuciante.
En los esquemas de recifrado delegado es habitual reutilizar nociones de
seguridad heredadas de la criptograf´ıa de clave pu´blica; aunque esto tiene
sentido inicialmente, no se ha estudiado con detenimiento el impacto en las
nociones de seguridad que surge de dotar a un adversario de la capacidad
de recifrar.
• Construcciones: A este nivel, otras aspectos se tornan ma´s relevantes, como
las te´cnicas concretas para dotar de seguridad a los esquemas y el desem-
pen˜o logrado. Respecto a lo primero, existen varias te´cnicas gene´ricas para
mejorar la seguridad de los esquemas de clave pu´blica; sin embargo, no
contamos con te´cnicas similares para el recifrado delegado. Respecto a lo
segundo, es importante que un buen desempen˜o sea un objetivo prioritario,
ya que estamos defendiendo el uso del recifrado delegado como mecanis-
mo de control de acceso, lo que implica un uso potencial de este tipo de
esquemas en entornos de alta demanda; no podemos olvidar tampoco, que
cualquier sobrecarga computacional o de comunicaciones tiene, a la larga,
un impacto econo´mico, que puede afectar a la viabilidad de las soluciones.
• Aplicaciones: El escenario de comparticio´n segura de datos puede instan-
ciarse con diversos casos de uso, lo que requiere integrar los mecanismos de
recifrado delegado de manera correcta, analizando protocolos, arquitecturas
e implementaciones. Estos aspectos son muy importantes, ya que a menudo
se obvia el enlace entre las contribuciones teo´ricas y los sistemas reales.
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Estos retos constituyen las cuestiones dominantes en esta tesis, y por lo tanto, el
recifrado delegado es el tema central. Teniendo estos retos en mente, en esta tesis
hemos realizado las siguientes contribuciones:
• Estudiamos los conceptos ba´sicos del recifrado delegado, incluyendo defini-
ciones, modelos de seguridad y propiedades.
• Analizamos el estado del arte sobre esquemas de recifrado delegado, inclu-
yendo un estudio comparativo del desempen˜o, tanto desde un punto de vista
teo´rico como experimental. Adema´s, estudiamos la literatura en cuanto apli-
caciones del recifrado delegado, y en particular, las asociadas al problema
de la comparticio´n segura de informacio´n.
• Examinamos las nociones de seguridad del recifrado delegado e identifica-
mos una familia parame´trica de modelos de ataque, que considera la dispo-
nibilidad tanto del ora´culo de descifrado como de recifrado. Esta familia de
modelos de ataque nos permite definir un conjunto de nociones de seguri-
dad, cuyas relaciones tambie´n analizamos.
• Estudiamos la aplicabilidad de transformaciones gene´ricas para mejorar la
seguridad del recifrado delegado. En particular nos centramos en la trans-
formacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto, y formulamos las condiciones que nos permi-
ten aplicarla, incluyendo una nueva propiedad que llamamos “sustitucio´n
perfecta de claves”.
• Proponemos un nuevo esquema de recifrado delegado altamente eficiente,
llamado NTRUReEncrypt, y basado en el criptosistema NTRU [16]. Adema´s,
describimos una versio´n para la que demostramos su seguridad.
• Proponemos varias aplicaciones del recifrado delegado: un modelo de ges-
tio´n de identidad respetuoso con la privacidad, un sistema de delegacio´n de
acceso a informacio´n cifrada en clusters Big Data, y un criptosistema con
descifrado en depo´sito.
A.2 Ana´lisis sistema´tico del estado del arte so-
bre el recifrado delegado
En este cap´ıtulo, hacemos un estudio detallado del recifrado delegado, y anali-
zamos el estado del arte, tanto de esquemas como de aplicaciones, siguiente un
me´todo bibliome´trico. Mediante este me´todo filtramos una lista inicial de 152
publicaciones, donde 83 son sobre esquemas y 69 sobre aplicaciones. Para las pu-
204
A.3. Familia parame´trica de modelos de ataque
blicaciones menos recientes, usamos el nu´mero de citas como heur´ıstico de calidad,
aunque en todo momento es necesario una comprobacio´n manual para evitar des-
cartar publicaciones relevantes. El resultado de esta fase es una coleccio´n de 58
publicaciones, donde 13 son de esquemas y 45 de aplicaciones.
A.2.1 Esquemas
La primera parte de este trabajo se centra en estudiar los conceptos ba´sicos y
propiedades principales del recifrado delegado, as´ı como de un ana´lisis exhaus-
tivo de los principales esquemas. Seleccionamos un total de 13 publicaciones
[43, 11, 45, 13, 14, 63, 64, 54, 12, 46, 47, 48, 49], de las cuales surgen 19 es-
quemas. El objetivo es estudiar las caracter´ısticas de estos esquemas, en funcio´n
de las propiedades ma´s importantes; ver la Seccio´n 3.3.1 para ma´s detalles. Esto
nos permite realizar tambie´n un estudio comparativo, recogido en la Seccio´n 3.3.2.
Finalmente, en la Seccio´n 3.3.3, hacemos un ana´lisis del desempen˜o de los esque-
mas, tanto desde un punto de vista teo´rico, como pra´ctico.
A.2.2 Aplicaciones
La segunda parte de este estudio, contenida en la Seccio´n 3.4, esta´ dedicada
al ana´lisis de 45 aplicaciones del recifrado delegado. En un ana´lisis preliminar,
clasificamos cada aplicacio´n respecto al objetivo que persigue, el escenario y la
funcionalidad implementada. El resultado no es sorprendente: la mayor´ıa de las
aplicaciones esta´n centradas en proteger la confidencialidad de datos almacenados
en escenarios tipo cloud, de forma similar al escenario de la comparticio´n segura de
datos. Las soluciones propuestas son variaciones de la plantilla usual de aplicacio´n
del recifrado delegado a este problema.
A.3 Familia parame´trica de modelos de ataque
El recifrado delegado se puede considerar como un tipo de criptosistema de cla-
ve pu´blica, por lo que es natural reutilizar sus nociones de seguridad (ver Sec-
cio´n 2.3.1). Por tanto, los esquemas de recifrado intentan lograr nociones de se-
guridad del tipo IND-CPA [11], IND-CCA1 [48] y IND-CCA2 [45]. Sin embargo,
a menudo estas nociones se definen de manera ad-hoc para cada esquema, con
sutiles diferencias y restricciones, lo que dificulta la comparacio´n y ana´lisis. Esto
esta´ causado por una falta de definiciones comunes de las nociones de seguridad
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para el recifrado delegado, y en particular, de los modelos de ataque. En com-
paracio´n con el caso de la criptograf´ıa de clave pu´blica, los modelos de ataque
para el recifrado delegado son potencialmente ma´s complejos, ya que deben con-
siderar no solo la disponibilidad del ora´culo de descifrado, si no tambie´n el de
recifrado.
En este trabajo exploramos estas sutilezas mediante una familia de modelos de
ataque parametrizada por la disponibilidad de ambos ora´culos. Esto permite, a
su vez, definir una familia de nociones de seguridad, que analizamos en funcio´n de
las relaciones de implicacio´n y separacio´n que surgen entre dichas nociones. Las
separaciones que identificamos son consecuencia del estudio de una nueva propie-
dad del recifrado delegado que llamamos “privacidad de las claves de recifrado” y
que formaliza el concepto de que las claves de recifrado no deben filtrarse median-
te consultas al ora´culo de recifrado. Finalmente, mostramos co´mo un esquema de
recifrado presentado en PKC 2014 [48] es vulnerable a ra´ız de no cumplir dicha
propiedad.
A.3.1 Modelos de ataque y nociones de seguridad
Un modelo de ataque define las capacidades de un adversario hipote´tico, nor-
malmente a trave´s de la disponibilidad de ora´culos con una determinada funcio-
nalidad. Bellare et al. definen en [24] una regla mnemote´cnica para identificar
los modelos de ataque CCA2, CCA1 y CCA0 (es decir, CPA) en la criptograf´ıa
de clave pu´blica, segu´n la cual el ı´ndice en CCAi especifica la u´ltima fase en la
que el adversario tiene acceso al ora´culo de descifrado. De forma ana´loga, en el
contexto del recifrado delegado definimos una familia de modelos de ataque de la
forma CCAi,j, con i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, en donde los ı´ndices i y j especifican la u´ltima
fase en la que el adversario tiene acceso a los ora´culos de descifrado y recifrado,
respectivamente. Esto da lugar a un conjunto de nueve modelos. Como casos ex-
tremos tenemos CCA0,0, equivalente a CPA, y CCA2,2, que representa el modelo
de ataque ma´s completo. La u´nica diferencia entre los nueve modelos de ataque
es la disponibilidad de los ora´culos de descifrado y recifrado; el resto de ora´culos
habituales en el recifrado delegado se mantienen.
Al igual que en la criptograf´ıa de clave pu´blica, las nociones de seguridad se
construyen como una combinacio´n entre un objetivo de seguridad (como p. ej,
indistinguibilidad de los cifrados (IND), que formaliza la incapacidad del adversa-
rio de distinguir entre que´ mensaje esta´ cifrado en un determinado criptograma)
y un modelo de ataque, que en este caso pertenece a la familia parame´trica. Si
fijamos el objetivo de seguridad IND obtenemos nueve nociones de seguridad, de
la forma IND-CCAi,j, con i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
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A.3.2 Relaciones entre nociones
Implicaciones
Las nociones se seguridad obtenidas pueden organizarse jera´rquicamente, como
muestra la Figura 4.1, en donde pueden verse las implicaciones triviales entre
nociones. Los Teoremas 4.4 y 4.5 formalizan la idea de que un esquema que es
seguro en una determinada nocio´n, lo sigue siendo en nociones inferiores en la
jerarqu´ıa.
Separaciones
Aparte de las implicaciones triviales que acabamos de comentar, en este trabajo
estudiamos algunas separaciones – lo que es, si cabe, ma´s interesante. La Figu-
ra 4.2 muestra las relaciones encontradas en la jerarqu´ıa de nociones, enfatizando
aquellas que representan una separacio´n.
Las separaciones analizadas son consecuencia de las vulnerabilidades de los es-
quemas de recifrado delegado que no satisfacen la propiedad de privacidad de las
claves de recifrado. Esta propiedad, descrita primero en [45] de manera informal,
captura la nocio´n de que un adversario no debe de ser capaz de extraer una clave
de recifrado a partir de un texto cifrado y su correspondiente recifrado. En este
trabajo, hacemos una definicio´n ma´s formal de dicha propiedad (Definicio´n 4.6),
segu´n la cual un esquema de recifrado delegado la cumple si la probabilidad de
que un adversario que tiene acceso al ora´culo de recifrado Oreenc tenga una pro-
babilidad insignificante de computar una clave de recifrado va´lida.
En funcio´n del tipo de clave de recifrado obtenida, las consecuencias para el esque-
ma pueden ser ma´s o menos graves. Si la clave obtenida permite recifrar desde un
usuario honesto hacia otro usuario honesto, entonces podemos demostrar que el
esquema no puede lograr seguridad IND-CCA2,1 o IND-CCA2,2 (Teorema 4.7). Sin
embargo, si la clave obtenida permite recifrar desde un usuario honesto hacia uno
corrupto, entonces el esquema no puede ser ni siquiera de tipo IND-CCA0,1, lo que
produce una separacio´n mucho ma´s grande entre nociones (Teorema 4.8).
Para demostrar ambos teoremas se siguen estrategias similares. La primera es que,
asumiendo que el adversario puede extraer una clave de recifrado desde el usuario
objetivo hacia uno honesto mediante llamadas al ora´culo de recifrado, entonces
este puede ganar el juego si usa esta clave para recifrar localmente el reto c∗ en
ch, para posteriormente utilizar el ora´culo de descifrado sobre ch; esto funciona
porque se siguen cumpliendo las restricciones relativas a los derivados del reto,
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ya que no se ha utilizado el ora´culo de recifrado para recifrarlo. La separacio´n
asociada a este teorema, IND-CCA2,0 ￿=⇒ IND-CCA2,1, surge al observar que no
es posible seguir el ataque descrito cuando no se tiene disponibilidad del ora´culo
de recifrado para obtener la clave de recifrado.
La estrategia utilizada para la segunda demostracio´n es similar, excepto que aho-
ra la clave de recifrado obtenida permite recifrar hacia un usuario corrupto; con-
secuentemente, no es necesario utilizar el ora´culo de descifrado al final. Por lo
tanto, la separacio´n asociada es IND-CCA2,0 ￿=⇒ IND-CCA0,1, ya que se sigue
necesitando el ora´culo de recifrado en algu´n momento para obtener la clave de
recifrado.
A.3.3 Atacando un esquema que no garantiza la privaci-
dad de las claves de recifrado
La importancia de la propiedad de privacidad de las claves de recifrado y de es-
tudiar correctamente los modelos de ataque queda de manifiesto con una vulne-
rabilidad que detectamos en el esquema de Kirshanova [48], presentado en PKC
2014, y que logra supuestamente “seguridad CCA1”. Al analizar su prueba de
seguridad, observamos que no confiere una capacidad adecuada de recifrado al
adversario, correspondiente a un modelo de ataque CCA1. Nuestro estudio revela
que en realidad este esquema es de tipo IND-CCA1,0, ya que aunque permite un
ora´culo de descifrado en la primera fase, el esquema es vulnerable si se introduce
un ora´culo de recifrado. El motivo es que no cumple la propiedad de privacidad de
las claves de recifrado, por lo que se puede usar un ataque similar a los descritos
en las separaciones anteriores.
El esquema de Kirshanova es uno de los primeros esquemas de recifrado basados
en ret´ıculos. Es una extensio´n del cifrado de clave pu´blica de Micciancio y Peikert
[40]. En la Seccio´n 4.4 puede verse una descripcio´n detallada del esquema.
La idea ba´sica del ataque es la siguiente: la clave de recifrado es una matriz rk,
y la operacio´n de recifrado consiste u´nicamente en la multiplicacio´n de un vector
fila, que contiene el texto cifrado, con dicha matriz, tal como muestra la Figu-
ra A.3a. Por lo tanto, si usamos como vector de entrada un vector unitario (o ma´s
espec´ıficamente, los vectores de la base cano´nica de dimensio´n correspondiente),
obtendremos una de las filas de dicha matriz, como se ve en la Figura A.3b.
Repitiendo este proceso por cada fila de la matriz rk, podemos recuperarla por
completo. En la Seccio´n 4.4, describimos adema´s un refinamiento de este ataque,
en el cual en lugar de usar vectores unitarios como entrada, usamos vectores alea-
torios, de tal forma que la agrupacio´n de estos vectores de´ lugar a una matriz
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Simulador Adversario
Oreenc
ct
c￿t = ct · rk
(a) El ora´culo de recifrado
Simulador Adversario
Oreenc
ct = (1, 0, ..., 0)t
c￿t = (1, 0, ..., 0)t · rk = fila1(rk)
(b) Vector unitario como entrada
Figura A.3: Filtrando la clave de recifrado en el esquema de Kirshanova
invertible P . Si agrupamos las respuestas en forma de matriz obtendremos, por
tanto, P · rk; el siguiente paso es multiplicar por la izquierda esta matriz con
P−1 para recuperar la clave de recifrado rk. Una vez se ha filtrado la clave de
recifrado, podemos continuar con la estrategia descrita en la demostracio´n del
Teorema 4.8, de forma que el adversario gane el juego.
A.4 Esquemas de recifrado delegado basados en
NTRU
Otro de los temas que tratamos en esta tesis es el uso de fundamentos alter-
nativos para la construccio´n de esquemas de recifrado delegado, que permitan
lograr mayor seguridad y/o eficiencia. La mayor´ıa de los esquemas de recifrado
delegado esta´n basados en problemas relativos al Logaritmo Discreto. En este
cap´ıtulo estudiamos el criptosistema NTRU, un destacado ejemplo de la cripto-
graf´ıa basada en ret´ıculos1. A partir de este esquema, proponemos una variante
de recifrado delegado llamada NTRUReEncrypt. Nuestra propuesta es un esquema
bidireccional y multiuso, altamente eficiente. Adema´s de este esquema, tambie´n
describimos otra variante cuya seguridad es demostrable; en concreto, probamos
que logra seguridad IND-CPA bajo la asuncio´n Ring-LWE. Nuestras propuestas
son los primeros esquemas de recifrado delegado basados en NTRU. Los resul-
tados experimentales muestran que la eficiencia de nuestro primer esquema es
ampliamente superior a esquemas anteriores, por un orden de magnitud.
1Tambie´n llamados redes, te´rmino que evitaremos por su posible confusio´n con las redes de
comunicaciones.
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A.4.1 La criptograf´ıa basada en ret´ıculos y NTRU
La inmensa mayor´ıa de los esquemas de recifrado delegado esta´n basados en
grupos c´ıclicos o en emparejamientos criptogra´ficos (en ingle´s, pairings); otros
fundamentos, sin embargo, han recibido menos atencio´n. Recientemente, se han
propuesto algunos esquemas de recifrado basados en ret´ıculos [46, 47]. La cripto-
graf´ıa basada en ret´ıculos es un campo muy prometedor, principalmente por su
papel en la criptograf´ıa post-cua´ntica (es decir, asumiendo la existencia de ordena-
dores cua´nticos eficientes), aunque en algunos casos, tambie´n por su desempen˜o.
El mejor ejemplo de criptosistema basado en ret´ıculos es NTRU, originalmen-
te propuesto por Hoﬀstein, Pipher y Silverman en [16]. El principal intere´s en
NTRU radica en su desempen˜o, mucho mayor que otros esquemas de clave pu´bli-
ca e incluso comparable a cifrados sime´tricos. Por ejemplo, versiones optimizadas
de NTRU ejecutadas en GPUs son hasta 1000 veces ma´s ra´pidas que RSA y
100 veces que curvas el´ıpticas [124]. Esto se debe a que la operacio´n principal
en NTRU es la multiplicacio´n de polinomios con coeficientes relativamente pe-
quen˜os; esta operacio´n se puede implementar de forma muy eficiente e incluso
en paralelo. Adema´s, tambie´n implica menores taman˜os de clave. Gracias a su
eficiencia, es considerado como el esquema basado en ret´ıculos ma´s pra´ctico y
maduro actualmente, hasta el punto de ser estandarizado (IEEE Std 1363.1-2008
[79], ANSI X9.98-2010 [123]).
A.4.2 El esquema NTRUReEncrypt
Antes de explicar el esquema, es necesario establecer las bases sobre las que lo
definimos. El criptosistema NTRU original esta´ definido sobre el anillo cociente
de polinomiosRNTRU = Z[x]/(xn−1), con n primo. Por lo tanto, los elementos de
RNTRU son polinomios enteros de grado menor a n. Otros para´metros de NTRU
son el entero q, que es una potencia de 2 del mismo orden de magnitud que n, y
el polinomio p ∈ RNTRU , que suele tomar valores p = 3 o´ p = x+ 2. En general,
las operaciones sobre polinomios se desarrollara´n en RNTRU mo´dulo q y mo´dulo
p, a los que nos referiremos respectivamente como RNTRU/q y RNTRU/p.
Nuestro esquema es realmente una extensio´n del criptosistema NTRU original,
que consta de los siguientes algoritmos:
• KeyGen(): El resultado del algoritmo de generacio´n de claves para un usuario
A es un par de claves (pkA, skA). Primero se eligen un par de polinomios
fA, gA ∈ RNTRU aleatoriamente, aunque con un determinado nu´mero de
coeficientes iguales a 0, -1, y 1. Adema´s, fA debe ser congruente con 1
mo´dulo p y tener un inverso f−1A en RNTRU/q. La clave privada skA es
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el polinomio fA, mientras que la clave pu´blica pkA es el polinomio hA =
p · gA · f−1A mod q.
• Enc(pkA,M): Tomando como entrada una clave pu´blica pkA = hA y un men-
saje M ∈ RNTRU/p, el algoritmo de cifrado genera un polinomio aleatorio
pequen˜o s ∈ RNTRU , y produce el texto cifrado CA = hAs+M .
• Dec(skA, CA): Tomando como entrada la clave secreta skA = fA y un texto
cifrado CA, el algoritmo de descifrado computa primero C ￿A = (CA · fA)
mod q y devuelve el mensaje original M = (C ￿A mod p).
A este conjunto de algoritmos le an˜adimos las funciones necesarias para obtener
un esquema de recifrado delegado:
• ReKeyGen(skA, skB): Tomando como para´metros de entrada las claves se-
cretas skA = fA y skB = fB, el algoritmo de generacio´n de claves de
recifrado computa la clave de recifrado entre los usuarios A y B como
rkA→B = skA · sk−1B = fA · f−1B .
• ReEnc(rkA→B, CA): Tomando como entrada una clave de recifrado rkA→B y
un texto cifrado CA, el algoritmo de recifrado toma un polinomio aleatorio
e ∈ RNTRU y produce el texto cifrado CB = CA · rkA→B + pe.
En la Seccio´n 5.1.3 se demuestra la correccio´n de este esquema. En cuanto a
sus propiedades, es fa´cil comprobar que el esquema es bidireccional, ya que dada
una clave rkA→B = fAf−1B , cualquiera puede computar la clave opuesta rkB→A =
(rkA→B)−1 = fBf−1A . Este esquema es tambie´n multiuso, ya que se permiten
mu´ltiples recifrados, aunque de forma limitada, ya que el ruido an˜adido durante
el recifrado se va acumulando hasta que hace imposible el descifrado.
Puede verse que los costes computacionales asociados a NTRUReEncrypt en los
principales algoritmos (es decir, cifrado, descifrado y recifrado) solo implican una
multiplicacio´n. Esta es la operacio´n ma´s importante en NTRU, que puede hacerse
en tiempo cuasi-lineal usando la Transformada Ra´pida de Fourier [124]. Nuestros
resultados experimentales muestran que nuestro esquema de recifrado delegado
preserva el desempen˜o original de NTRU. Adema´s, con el fin de comparar nuestra
propuesta con respecto a otros esquemas, hemos implementado tres de ellos con
caracter´ısticas similares (BBS [43], Weng et al. [54] y Aono et al. [47]); este u´ltimo
es tambie´n basado en ret´ıculos. La Figura A.4 muestra los resultados de nuestros
experimentos. Puede verse que nuestro esquema supera a los dema´s por un orden
de magnitud (entre 10 y 20 veces ma´s ra´pido). El esquema de Aono et al. muestra
un desempen˜o similar en cuanto a cifrado y descifrado, pero es 20 veces ma´s lento
en el recifrado.
211
Ape´ndice A. Resumen
Cifrado Descifrado Recifrado
0
5
10
15
20
0,43
1,22 1,151,17
0,47
20,5
11,07 11,21 11,48
22,52
11,89
22,29
T
ie
m
p
o
(m
s)
NTRUReEncrypt Aono et al.
BBS Weng et al.
Figura A.4: Comparacio´n con otros esquemas de recifrado
Tabla A.1: Comparacio´n de costes espaciales (en KB)
Elemento Aono et al. [47] NTRUReEncrypt
Claves pu´blicas 60.00 1.57
Claves privadas 60.00 1.57
Claves de recifrado 2520.00 1.57
Textos cifrados 0.66 1.57
En cuanto a los costes espaciales, estos son tambie´n de orden cuasi-lineal; por
contra, otros esquemas basados en ret´ıculos, como el de Aono et al. [47], tienen
taman˜os de clave y de mensajes que crecen de forma cuadra´tica. La Tabla A.1
ilustra este hecho al mostrar una comparacio´n entre el esquema de Aono et al.
y el nuestro, para unos determinados para´metros. Como usamos el mismo tipo
de polinomios para representar todas las claves y los textos cifrados, todos ellos
tienen el mismo taman˜o (1.57 KB). El caso de las claves de recifrado es espe-
cialmente representativo, ya que la diferencia entre ambos esquemas es de tres
o´rdenes de magnitud.
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A.4.3 El esquema PS-NTRUReEncrypt
Uno de los problemas del esquema NTRUReEncrypt es que, al igual que NTRU, no
tiene una demostracio´n de seguridad. Stehle´ y Steinfeld propusieron en [73, 122]
una variante de NTRU cuya seguridad CPA se demuestra ante la asuncio´n Ring-
LWE, relativa a un problema intratable de la criptograf´ıa sobre ret´ıculos. Su
variante es muy similar al esquema NTRU, con ligeras variaciones menores en
la generacio´n de claves y en el algoritmo de cifrado. La diferencia fundamental,
no obstante, esta´ en la eleccio´n de los anillos de polinomios utilizados, ya que
permiten reducir la seguridad del esquema a la dificultad en resolver el problema
Ring-LWE.
Basa´ndonos en esta variante, definimos tambie´n un nuevo esquema de recifrado
delegado llamado PS-NTRUReEncrypt. Por motivos de espacio, no entraremos en
explicar los detalles de este esquema, aunque destacamos que realizamos tambie´n
una demostracio´n de seguridad y de correccio´n. El esquema resultante es tambie´n
bidireccional y multiuso.
A.5 Aplicabilidad de transformaciones gene´ri-
cas para seguridad CCA
El segundo esquema que propusimos en el cap´ıtulo anterior logra seguridad CPA,
aunque lo deseable ser´ıa conseguir seguridad CCA. Hay dos estrategias posibles
que pueden seguirse: una es redisen˜ar completamente el esquema, y otra es tratar
de mejorar la nocio´n de seguridad original usando algu´n me´todo gene´rico.
Para el caso de la criptograf´ıa de clave pu´blica, existen transformaciones gene´ri-
cas, como la Fujisaki-Okamoto y REACT [17, 18]. Sin embargo, este no es el caso
del recifrado delegado. En este trabajo, estudiamos la adaptacio´n de estas trans-
formaciones al contexto del recifrado delegado y encontramos resultados tanto
positivos como negativos.
A.5.1 Transformaciones para el recifrado delegado
La transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto original
Fujisaki y Okamoto proponen en [71, 17] una transformacio´n gene´rica para lograr
seguridad IND-CCA en el modelo del ora´culo aleatorio a partir de un esquema
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de clave pu´blica que logre seguridad OW-CPA, una de´bil nocio´n de seguridad.
Para ello, la transformacio´n integra tambie´n un esquema de cifrado sime´trico
y funciones hash. La transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto, que denotaremos como
Hyb, asume un cifrado de clave pu´blica PKE, un cifrado sime´trico Sym, y funciones
hash H y G. Asumiremos tambie´n que la funcio´n de cifrado en PKE, a parte de
tomar una clave pu´blica y un mensaje como entrada, tambie´n toma un para´metro
adicional para an˜adir aleatoriedad.
Para cifrar un mensaje m, la transformacio´n toma primero un elemento aleatorio
σ del espacio de mensajes de PKE. El mensaje m es cifrado con Sym usando G(σ)
como clave, lo que produce c = Sym.Enc(G(σ),m). A continuacio´n, el te´rmino σ
se cifra con PKE, tomando H(σ, c) como la aleatoriedad de entrada. Por tanto,
la transformacio´n produce la siguiente tupla como el texto cifrado de m:
Hyb.Enc(pk,m) = (PKE.Enc(pk, σ, H(σ, c)), c)
Para descifrar una de estas tuplas (e, c), la transformacio´n sigue el procedimiento
inverso: descifra σ a partir de e, y computa G(σ) para obtener la clave de desci-
frado de c, lo que le permite calcular el mensaje original m. Una sutileza de esta
transformacio´n es que despue´s de descifrar el mensaje m, es necesario recalcular
e = PKE.Enc(pk, σ, H(σ, c)) para verificar que es igual que el original. Si no lo es,
el texto cifrado se considera como no va´lido.
Es precisamente este u´ltimo paso el motivo por el cual la transformacio´n falla si se
aplica directamente con un esquema de recifrado delegado: la funcio´n de recifrado
cambia los textos cifrados de forma que esta validacio´n falla inevitablemente,
concretamente al alterar la aleatoriedad original. En la Seccio´n 5.2.4 describimos
co´mo el segundo esquema de Aono et al. [47] falla precisamente por no considerar
esta sutileza.
Extendiendo la transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto
El problema anterior nos lleva a preguntarnos si existen esquemas de recifrado en
donde la funcio´n de recifrado no altere la aleatoriedad original. En este trabajo ca-
racterizamos una propiedad que captura esta nocio´n, llamada sustitucio´n perfecta
de claves, y la utilizamos como una de las condiciones para aplicar exitosamente
la transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto al recifrado delegado.
Informalmente, un esquema de recifrado con sustitucio´n perfecta de claves se
caracteriza porque el resultado de la funcio´n de recifrado desde una clave a otra es
ide´ntico al que ocurrir´ıa si se cifrara directamente con la segunda clave y usando la
misma aleatoriedad. En otras palabras, el recifrado “sustituye” limpiamente una
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clave por otra, sin que se vea afectada la aleatoriedad original. La Definicio´n 5.8
captura esta nocio´n de manera formal:
ReEnc(rki→j,Enc(pki,m, r)) = Enc(pkj,m, r)
Los esquemas de recifrado BBS [43] y Canetti-Hohenberger [45] son ejemplos que
cumplen esta propiedad. Por ejemplo, en el esquema BBS, los textos cifrados son
de la forma (pkr, gr · m), para un exponente aleatorio r y claves publicas de la
forma pk = ga. Las claves de recifrado son cocientes entre exponentes rk = y/x.
Se puede comprobar que:
ReEnc(rkA→B,Enc(pkA,m, r)) = ReEnc(
b
a
, ((ga)r, gr ·m))
= ((gar)
b
a , gr ·m)
= (gbr, gr ·m) = Enc(pkB,m, r)
Puede verse que el texto cifrado original (gar, gr ·m) se transforma limpiamente
en (gbr, gr ·m).
Una vez asumimos que el esquema de recifrado delegado cumple esta propiedad,
el problema que aparec´ıa en el paso de validacio´n al intentar aplicar la trans-
formacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto desaparece. La extensio´n de esta transformacio´n al
recifrado delegado es ide´ntica en cuanto a los algoritmos de generacio´n de cla-
ves, cifrado y descifrado; queda, por tanto, definir las funciones de recifrado y
generacio´n de claves de recifrado.
• Hyb.ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj)→ rki→j. Tomando como entrada dos pares
de claves pu´blicas y privadas, correspondientes a los usuarios i y j, este
algoritmo devuelve rki→j ← PRE.ReKeyGen(pki, ski, pkj, skj).
• Hyb.ReEnc(rki→j, (ei, ci)) → (ej, cj). Tomando como entrada una clave de
recifrado rki→j y un texto cifrado (ei, ci), el algoritmo de recifrado devuelve
el texto cifrado (PRE.ReEnc(rki→j, ei), ci).
En la Seccio´n 5.2.3 mostramos que esta extensio´n es correcta y proporcionamos
una demostracio´n de seguridad. Los problemas mencionados en la seccio´n ante-
rior con la definicio´n del ora´culo de recifrado en el modelo del ora´culo aleatorio
implican que es necesario asumir que el esquema original tiene seguridad IND-
CCA0,1 (nocio´n inmediatamente superior a IND-CPA) y que el esquema que se
obtiene tras la transformacio´n es de tipo IND-CCA2,1 (nocio´n inmediatamente
inferior a IND-CCA2). El lector puede encontrar ma´s informacio´n sobre estas
nociones en la Seccio´n 4.3, as´ı como una descripcio´n gra´fica de sus relaciones en
la Figura 4.2.
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Para ilustrar la transformacio´n propuesta, en la Seccio´n 5.2.5 la aplicamos a un
esquema que cumple las condiciones (es decir, seguridad IND-CCA0,1 y sustitucio´n
perfecta de claves), obtenie´ndose un esquema con seguridad IND-CCA2,1 en el
modelo del ora´culo aleatorio. Finalmente, en la Seccio´n 5.2.6 describimos co´mo
podr´ıan extenderse otras transformaciones gene´ricas similares, como REACT [18]
y GEM [29].
A.5.2 Imposibilidad de aplicacio´n directa
La otra mitad de este trabajo consiste en mostrar que la aplicacio´n directa de
estas transformaciones implica fallos sutiles en las demostraciones de seguridad.
En este trabajo detectamos fallos en una docena de esquemas. Uno de ellos es
el esquema de Aono et al. [47], cuyo fallo describimos en la seccio´n anterior. Los
once esquemas restantes [55, 62, 54, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142] tienen
otro tipo de fallo, mucho ma´s sutil y dif´ıcil de detectar; esta lista no es exhaustiva,
por lo que no descartamos otros esquemas vulnerables.
Para comprender el fallo es necesario conocer co´mo se hace la prueba de segu-
ridad en la transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto original. Como el objetivo de esta
transformacio´n es lograr seguridad CCA, es necesario definir un ora´culo de des-
cifrado. En la prueba, este ora´culo hace uso de las tablas asociadas a los ora´culos
aleatorios, que contienen un registro con las entradas y salidas de estas funciones.
Asumiendo acceso a dichas tablas, es posible construir un ora´culo de descifrado
que no requiera la correspondiente clave de descifrado.
Esta estrategia, que funciona muy bien para el ora´culo de descifrado, no puede
usarse para el ora´culo de recifrado. El problema consiste en que la demostracio´n
difiere de la ejecucio´n real del esquema para cierto tipo de consultas de recifrado,
lo que invalida las demostraciones. Este es precisamente el fallo comu´n en los
once esquemas anteriores.
El problema se basa en que en la funcio´n de cifrado los valores aleatorios se
obtienen al llamar a una funcio´n hash con un valor que se mantiene secreto
(por ejemplo, el propio mensaje original). Durante el descifrado, estos valores se
pueden obtener de nuevo, por lo que es posible recuperar los valores aleatorios
para realizar el paso de validacio´n. Sin embargo, esto no es as´ı en el recifrado, ya
que los valores secretos no se desvelan en este proceso, por lo que no es posible
verificar aqu´ı si el texto cifrado se genero´ correctamente (es decir, usando las
funciones hash de manera adecuada) o no. En las demostraciones asociadas a los
esquemas fallidos, si un adversario hace una consulta a un ora´culo de recifrado
usando un texto cifrado no va´lido (por ejemplo, sin usar las funciones hash),
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entonces su ora´culo de recifrado rechaza el texto cifrado al considerarlo inva´lido,
ya que no hay un registro correspondiente en las tablas de los ora´culos aleatorios.
No obstante, en una ejecucio´n real, no es posible comprobar esto, por lo que el
recifrado va a funcionar normalmente. Consecuentemente, estas demostraciones
de seguridad no son correctas al no corresponderse con el comportamiento real
de los esquemas. En la Seccio´n 5.2.4 damos ma´s detalles sobre este fallo y lo
ilustramos con el ana´lisis de uno de los esquemas vulnerables.
A.6 Aplicaciones del recifrado delegado
La parte final de esta tesis esta´ dedicada a aplicaciones concretas del recifrado
delegado. La primera de ellas es un modelo de gestio´n de identidad respetuoso
con la privacidad, llamado BlindIdM, en el que la informacio´n de identidad se
mantiene cifrada en todo momento, pero manteniendo la funcionalidad. Adema´s,
describimos su integracio´n con el esta´ndar de gestio´n de identidad SAML 2.0. La
segunda aplicacio´n integra el recifrado delegado con Apache Hadoop, un sistema
de computacio´n para Big Data, de forma que los nodos de computacio´n solo
pueden descifrar la informacio´n en el momento de procesarla. La tercera aplicacio´n
es un criptosistema con descifrado en depo´sito, que funciona como un esquema
de clave pu´blica normal, pero permite a las autoridades descifrar criptogramas
sospechosos (es decir, la capacidad de descifrar esta´ en depo´sito), usando te´cnicas
de recifrado delegado.
A.6.1 BlindIdM: Gestio´n de Identidad a Ciegas
La gestio´n de la identidad es uno de los procesos internos ma´s importantes en
las empresas y organizaciones, ya que tiene un papel ubicuo en el resto de proce-
sos al formar parte de la autenticacio´n, autorizacio´n, control de acceso, etc. Sin
embargo, al mismo tiempo introduce una sobrecarga tanto en costes econo´micos
como en tiempo, y en muchas ocasiones requiere el uso de aplicaciones y perso-
nal espec´ıfico para la gestio´n y mantenimiento. Al igual que ya ha sucedido para
muchos otros servicios, el paradigma del cloud representa una gran oportunidad
para externalizar estos procesos.
Sin embargo, esto tambie´n conlleva riesgos ya que la informacio´n pasa a estar en
un dominio externo; esta informacio´n, adema´s, es sensible al tratarse de infor-
macio´n de identidad. Lo habitual es simplemente confiar en el que proveedor de
cloud no va a hacer un uso inadecuado de estos datos, pero hay mu´ltiples casos
en donde esto no ha sido as´ı, ya sea de forma accidental o intencionada.
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En esta aplicacio´n proponemos un modelo de gestio´n de identidad en donde no
sea necesaria esta relacio´n de confianza. En su lugar, usaremos mecanismos crip-
togra´ficos (concretamente, recifrado delegado) para garantizar la privacidad y
confidencialidad de los usuarios, de forma que el proveedor de identidad en el
cloud no sea capaz de leer los datos en su poder al estar cifrados, y al mismo
tiempo, pueda seguir proporcionando un servicio de gestio´n de identidad.
Hacia la Gestio´n de Identidad como Servicio
El modelo de Federacio´n de Identidad, ampliamente utilizado hoy en d´ıa, per-
mite la portabilidad entre diferentes dominios, lo que fomenta una distribucio´n
dina´mica de informacio´n de identidad y la delegacio´n de subtareas, como la au-
tenticacio´n o el aprovisionamiento de usuarios. Uno de los aspectos clave de este
modelo es el establecimiento de relaciones de confianza entre los miembros de
una federacio´n, lo que les permite dar validez a la informacio´n proporcionada por
otros miembros. Los principales actores que participan en las interacciones de
identidad son [155]:
• Usuarios, que son los sujetos en la informacio´n de identidad, y generalmente
los actores que solicitan el acceso a recursos y servicios.
• Proveedores de Servicio (SP), que son entidades que proporcionan servicios
y recursos a otras entidades.
• Proveedores de Identidad (IdP), entidades especializadas en gestionar in-
formacio´n de identidad y proporcionarla a los proveedores de servicio.
En la Figura A.5a se aprecia una vista a alto nivel de un escenario de federacio´n
de identidad, donde una organizacio´n actu´a como proveedor de identidad. En este
escenario, uno de sus empleados solicita acceso a un servicio de un proveedor de
servicios, que a su vez se dirige al proveedor de identidad para obtener informacio´n
sobre este empleado.
Aunque la federacio´n de identidad representa grandes ventajas en cuanto a inter-
operabilidad, tambie´n implica unos costes y sobrecargas, ya que requiere el uso
de aplicaciones especiales y personal cualificado para su instalacio´n, integracio´n
y gestio´n. El modelo de “Gestio´n de Identidad como Servicio” (en ingle´s, Identity
Management as a Service (IDaaS)) puede verse como un refinamiento del modelo
de identidad federada, en el que se usan las ventajas del cloud para ofrecer la
externalizacio´n de la gestio´n de identidad. Entre los beneficios del modelo IDaaS
destacamos: (i) mayor flexibilidad, escalabilidad y estabilidad en entornos de alta
demanda; (ii) reduccio´n de costes, ya que los proveedores de IDaaS pueden es-
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pecializarse en proporcionar servicios ma´s eficientes; y (iii), mejores medidas de
seguridad, al utilizar estos proveedores sistemas e instalaciones dedicadas.
Sin embargo, existen tambie´n riesgos, que coinciden con los riesgos habituales del
modelo de computacio´n en la nube. Es obvio que la externalizacio´n de la gestio´n
de identidad implica para las organizaciones una pe´rdida del control sobre esta
informacio´n, que ahora recae sobre el proveedor de identidad.
El modelo BlindIdM
Para solucionar los problemas que surgen al gestionar la informacio´n de identi-
dad en el cloud hemos propuesto el modelo BlindIdM (o Gestio´n de Identidad a
Ciegas), en el que el proveedor de identidad en el cloud puede ofrecer un servicio
de gestio´n de identidad sin necesidad de conocer la informacio´n de los usuarios
(en otras a palabras, a ciegas). Esto es una gran innovacio´n con respecto a los
actuales sistemas de gestio´n de identidad, en los que los usuarios deben confiar
en que los proveedores van a proteger la informacio´n y no hara´n un mal uso de
ella. La solucio´n en nuestro modelo pasa por mantener la informacio´n cifrada en
todo momento, desde antes de llegar al proveedor de cloud, pero de forma que
au´n pueda ser usada por este; para ello, proponemos usar esquemas de recifrado
delegado.
En nuestro modelo asumiremos un escenario de tipo federacio´n de identidad,
similar al mostrado en la Figura A.5a, pero en el que la organizacio´n externaliza
los procesos de gestio´n de identidad al cloud, aunque manteniendo los servicios
de autenticacio´n. El proveedor de identidad en el cloud actu´a de intermediario en
las interacciones de identidad, y esta´ a cargo de almacenar y proporcionar dicha
informacio´n. La Figura A.5b muestra el escenario propuesto. En cuanto al modelo
de confianza, asumimos entonces que el proveedor de identidad es un adversario de
tipo “honesto pero curioso”, lo que significa que seguira´ los protocolos establecidos
honestamente pero que intentara´ leer la informacio´n en su poder.
Nuestra propuesta concreta para el modelo BlindIdM usa SAML 2.0 como el pro-
tocolo subyacente de gestio´n de identidad y el recifrado delegado para lograr la
confidencialidad extremo a extremo de la informacio´n de identidad. En el esce-
nario planteado por este modelo, la organizacio´n (a la que pertenecen todos los
empleados) actu´a como duen˜o de los datos. Esta externaliza la gestio´n de iden-
tidad al proveedor de identidad en el cloud. Por lo tanto, el flujo de informacio´n
de identidad se dirige desde el duen˜o de los datos (es decir, la organizacio´n) ha-
cia los consumidores (es decir, los proveedores de servicio), pasando a trave´s del
proveedor de cloud. Suponemos que la informacio´n de identidad esta´ contenida
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Figura A.5: Relaciones entre entidades en diferentes modelos
en atributos, consistentes en una tupla con metadatos y el valor asociado, del ti-
po a = (a.metadatos, a.valor); por ejemplo, un atributo que representa el correo
electro´nico de un usuario es aemail = (“email”, “dnunez@lcc.uma.es”). Esta estruc-
tura basada en atributos es muy habitual en sistemas de gestio´n de identidad, y
en particular, en SAML 2.0, que usa el lenguaje XML para expresarlo.
En nuestro modelo, la informacio´n esta´ cifrada desde un principio por la organi-
zacio´n, usando su clave pu´blica pkH , antes de enviarla al cloud. Por tanto, por
cada atributo de usuario se genera una versio´n cifrada; para ello, y por motivos
de eficiencia, se hace uso de un me´todo h´ıbrido de cifrado incluyendo tambie´n un
cifrado sime´trico. El resultado es un atributo cifrado de la forma:
ca = (a.metadatos,PRE.Enc(pkH , Ka), Sym.Enc(Ka, a.valor)),
donde Ka es una clave sime´trica aleatoria; puede verse que los metadatos se
mantienen en claro para facilitar su gestio´n. SAML 2.0 tiene tambie´n mecanismos
para representar atributos cifrados.
Una vez la informacio´n esta´ almacenada en el cloud, en forma de atributos cifra-
dos, el uso de un esquema de recifrado delegado permite al proveedor de identidad
transformarlos en atributos cifrados que un proveedor de servicio puede descifrar
con su clave privada skSP . Para ello, el proveedor de identidad necesita una cla-
ve de recifrado rkH→SP generada por la organizacio´n, y que es u´nica para cada
proveedor de servicio SP . Cuando un proveedor de servicio pide un atributo de
identidad, el proveedor de identidad recifra el correspondiente atributo cifrado
usando la clave de recifrado asociada a dicho proveedor de servicio, y le devuelve
otro atributo cifrado, todo ello integrado con los protocolos habituales de SAML
2.0.
Puede verse que el principal requisito de nuestro modelo, que es que el servicio
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de gestio´n de identidad pueda seguir proporciona´ndose sin necesidad de que el
proveedor acceda a la informacio´n, se cumple gracias a la integracio´n del recifra-
do delegado en el protocolo de gestio´n de identidad. Finalmente, es importante
recalcar que nuestra propuesta no requiere ningu´n cambio en el protocolo SAML,
por lo que podr´ıa integrarse fa´cilmente con sistemas reales.
A.6.2 Acceso Delegado a Datos Cifrados en Hadoop
Otra aplicacio´n interesante del recifrado delegado puede encontrarse en el a´rea
del Big Data. Este te´rmino engloba a todas aquellas tecnolog´ıas que se utilizan
para almacenar y procesar cantidades ingentes de informacio´n. El Big Data hace
posible extraer informacio´n u´til para empresas y gobiernos a partir de grandes re-
positorios de informacio´n. Sin embargo, aunque en algunos casos esta informacio´n
puede ser sensible (por ejemplo, informacio´n me´dica o financiera), los sistemas de
Big Data actuales siguen almacena´ndola en claro.
El ma´s claro ejemplo es Apache Hadoop [20], uno de los sistemas de procesa-
miento Big Data ma´s conocidos. Apache Hadoop permite el almacenamiento y
procesamiento de grandes conjuntos de datos mediante clusters de computacio´n.
La estrategia de Hadoop consiste en dividir la carga de trabajo en partes y en dis-
tribuirla a trave´s del cluster. Sin embargo, su arquitectura no se disen˜o´ pensando
en la seguridad. En este trabajo, describimos un sistema de control de acceso para
clusters Hadoop usando recifrado delegado.
El sistema Hadoop
El sistema Hadoop implementa el paradigma de computacio´n MapReduce, que
permite distribuir la carga de trabajo en un cluster. Todas las operaciones en
Hadoop se ejecutan por nodos del cluster. Estos nodos pueden tomar dos papeles
principales: (i) el JobTracker, que distribuye la carga de trabajo en el cluster,
asignando tareas individuales a los dema´s nodos, y (ii) los TaskTrackers, que
simplemente ejecutan las tareas asignadas. En el paradigma MapReduce, cada
porcio´n de trabajo debe de ser independiente de las dema´s, de forma que se pueda
aprovechar el potencial de la paralelizacio´n intensiva. Por este motivo, un trabajo
en MapReduce esta´ separado en dos fases, Mapeo (Map) y Reduccio´n (Reduce),
como puede verse en la Figura A.6a. En la fase de mapeo, los datos de entrada
son divididos y procesados en paralelo por los nodos. Cada porcio´n de trabajo es
asignada a un TaskTracker libre. La salida de cada operacio´n de mapeo es una lista
de pares clave-valor, que es ordenada, particionada y almacenada localmente en
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los nodos que la generaron. Para cada particio´n, el JobTracker asigna una tarea de
reduccio´n a un TaskTracker libre, que debe leer remotamente los datos generados
anteriormente, por lo que esta fase representa el mayor cuello de botella. Una vez
estos datos intermedios son recuperados, cada tarea de reduccio´n los combina.
Finalmente, se recogen los resultados de todas las tareas de reduccio´n. Una de las
principales caracter´ısticas de Hadoop es que aprovecha la localizacio´n de los datos
para reducir las comunicaciones. Para ello, Hadoop asigna las tareas de mapeo a
los nodos que este´n ma´s cercanos a los datos que deben procesar, idealmente, en
los propios discos duros de las ma´quinas, lo que consigue que la fase de mapeo
sea extraordinariamente eficiente.
Integrando el Recifrado Delegado con Hadoop
Nuestra solucio´n consiste en integrar un control de acceso criptogra´fico basado
en recifrado delegado con el sistema Hadoop. La idea principal es cifrar la infor-
macio´n desde el origen, de forma que se almacene cifrada en todo momento. Los
u´nicos puntos en los que se requiere la informacio´n sin cifrar son en las operacio-
nes de mapeo y reduccio´n. Por lo tanto, en nuestra solucio´n, los nodos que deban
procesar un bloque de informacio´n cifrada pueden pedir un acceso delegado a di-
cha informacio´n, actuando como consumidores. Para ello, se siguen una serie de
protocolos que permiten la generacio´n de claves de recifrado y el propio recifrado
de los datos. La Figura A.6b muestra el funcionamiento simplificado de nuestra
solucio´n, que como puede apreciarse, es una extensio´n del flujo de datos normal
en Hadoop.
El ciclo de vida de los datos en nuestra solucio´n se compone de las siguientes
fases:
1. Fase de produccio´n: durante esta fase, los datos son generados por diver-
sas fuentes y almacenados cifrados con la clave pu´blica del duen˜o para su
procesamiento posterior.
2. Fase de delegacio´n: durante esta fase, el duen˜o de los datos genera las claves
necesarias para permitir el acceso delegado. Despue´s de esto, no necesita
participar de nuevo.
3. Fase de consumo: esta fase ocurre cada vez que el cluster Hadoop ejecuta
una tarea de procesamiento. Es en esta fase en donde los nodos del cluster
leen la informacio´n cifrada.
Hemos omitido los detalles de cada fase en este resumen; la Seccio´n 6.2.3 los
explica en detalle.
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Figura A.6: Integracio´n de Hadoop con Recifrado Delegado
En cuanto a resultados experimentales, hemos replicado el funcionamiento prin-
cipal, que ocurre en la fase de consumo. Este experimento se ejecuto´ en un cluster
virtual de 17 ma´quinas virtuales, cada una con doble procesador y 4 GB de RAM.
El experimento consistio´ en la ejecucio´n del programa de pruebas WordCount,
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uno de los que se incluyen por defecto en Hadoop, y que simplemente cuenta
la ocurrencia de palabras en un conjunto de ficheros. Para nuestro experimento,
creamos un conjunto de datos con 1800 ficheros cifrados de 64 MB cada uno; en
total, los datos de entrada conten´ıan casi 29 mil millones de palabras y ocupaban
112 GB.
El tiempo de ejecucio´n para las dos versiones de Hadoop comparadas (la original y
nuestra solucio´n) fueron de 1932.09 and 1960.74 segundos, respectivamente. Esto
es, una diferencia de 28.74 segundos, lo que representa una sobrecarga relativa del
1.49%. Creemos que una sobrecarga de esta magnitud es aceptable para muchas
aplicaciones.
A.6.3 Criptosistema con descifrado en depo´sito
Las aplicaciones anteriores era instancias claras del escenario de comparticio´n
segura de datos. La tercera aplicacio´n que proponemos, sin embargo, es algo
diferente: un criptosistema de clave pu´blica con descifrado en depo´sito (en ingle´s,
escrowed decryption). La innovacio´n de esta propuesta es el uso del recifrado
delegado para construir la funcionalidad del descifrado en depo´sito, que permite
a las autoridades descifrar mensajes sin recurrir a la obtencio´n de claves privadas,
que es el me´todo habitual de los criptosistemas con claves en depo´sito (en ingle´s,
key escrow), si no a trave´s del recifrado.
La motivacio´n de esta aplicacio´n es un tema controvertido en la actualidad. Hay
una gran preocupacio´n por parte de gobiernos y autoridades respecto a la impu-
nidad que se origina de la privacidad y confidencialidad en las comunicaciones
digitales, que en ocasiones sirve para encubrir actividades ilegales y amenazas
para la seguridad. La controversia surge del planteamiento de si romper esta´ con-
fidencialidad es un me´todo leg´ıtimo o no. Uno de las principales argumentos en
contra es la falta de mecanismos de rendicio´n de cuentas, que permitan fiscalizar
el uso (o mejor dicho, el abuso) por parte de las autoridades.
A este respecto, Liu, Ryan y Chen proponen en [181] un criptosistema fiscali-
zable con descifrado en depo´sito (en ingle´s, Accountable Escrowed Encryption),
que permite a las autoridades descifrar textos cifrados sospechosos, pero al mis-
mo tiempo, les obliga a rendir cuentas. Su propuesta consiste en un esquema de
cifrado similar a ElGamal, pero que incluye una funcionalidad de descifrado en
depo´sito. Para usarla, las autoridades deber seguir un protocolo que involucra a
un conjunto de entidades confiables llamadas custodios; solo si todos los custo-
dios colaboran, las autoridades son capaces de descifrar el texto cifrado. De esta
forma no es necesario poner en depo´sito las claves privadas de los usuarios, si no
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la capacidad de descifrar. Para conseguir la rendicio´n de cuentas de las autori-
dades, los custodios registran pu´blicamente todas las operaciones de descifrado
en depo´sito que realicen, de forma que la sociedad pueda actuar en consecuencia
a trave´s de cauces democra´ticos, demandando, por ejemplo, “menos descifrados”
por parte de las autoridades.
Aqu´ı proponemos una construccio´n alternativa, que resuelve algunos problemas
en cuanto a seguridad y eficiencia. Uno de los problemas es que una colusio´n de
custodios puede descifrar cualquier mensaje si tienen acceso a un texto cifrado
completo; por tanto, es necesario asumir que al menos uno de los custodios no
va a participar en una colusio´n. En nuestra propuesta, por contra, los custodios
no pueden descifrar el mensaje, ya que su u´nica capacidad es recifrar textos
cifrados.
Otro problema es la eficiencia. El protocolo propuesto en [181] para el descifrado
en depo´sito esta´ compuesto de dos rondas s´ıncronas, y en cada una participan
todos los custodios. Es decir, por cada peticio´n, las autoridades deben comu-
nicarse en una primera ronda con todos los custodios, y, solo cuando todos han
respondido, pueden continuar con una segunda ronda de interacciones. En nuestra
propuesta, solo hay una ronda.
El sistema propuesto
Nuestra propuesta es similar en esencia, pero hace uso del recifrado delegado
para construir la funcionalidad de descifrado en depo´sito, de forma que, ante
una peticio´n de las autoridades, los custodios recifran distribuidamente un texto
cifrado sospechoso, que finalmente puede ser descifrado por las autoridades. Para
conseguir el recifrado distribuido, es necesario “dividir” la clave de recifrado entre
los custodios, de forma similar a un criptosistema con umbral [143].
Nuestra solucio´n esta´ formada por los siguientes algoritmos, que describimos bre-
vemente:
• Setup(λ) → params. Los para´metros globales incluyen el emparejamiento
criptogra´fico e y los grupos c´ıclicos asociados G y GT . Adema´s se genera un
par de claves pu´blica y privada para las autoridades, pkEA = ga y skEA = a.
• KeyGen(pkEA)→ (pk, sk, {κi}ni=1). La generacio´n de claves de usuario con-
siste en un protocolo entre el usuario y una entidad de certificacio´n. Obvia-
remos en este resumen los detalles del protocolo. El resultado incluye las
clave pu´blicas y privadas del usuario, pk = (gsu, Zsv) y sk = gv/u, as´ı como
una divisio´n en n partes de la clave de recifrado hacia pkEA, que denomina-
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remos κi. El protocolo garantiza que solo el usuario conoce la clave privada
y que las partes κi son correctas.
• Enc(pk,m) → CT . Para cifrar un mensaje m con la clave pu´blica pk =
(gsu, Zsv), se elige un r ∈ Zq aleatorio y se devuelve el siguiente texto
cifrado:
CT = ((gsu)r, (Zsv)r ·m) = (gsur, Zsvr ·m)
• Dec(sk, CT ) → m. Para descifrar un texto cifrado CT = (CT1, CT2) =
(gsur, Zsvr ·m) se hace el siguiente co´mputo:
m =
CT2
e(CT1, sk)
=
Zsvr ·m
e(gsur, gv/u)
• ShareReEnc(κi, CT ) → ρi. Un custodio recifra parcialmente texto cifrado
CT = (CT1, CT2) = (gsur, Zsvr ·m) al hacer el co´mputo ρi = e(κi, gsur).
• Comb(skEA, CT, {ρi}ni=1) → m. Las autoridades pueden descifrar un texto
cifrado CT = (CT1, CT2) si obtienen los recifrados parciales {ρi}ni=1 de
todos los custodios y los combinan de forma que:
m =
CT2
(
n￿
i=1
ρi)1/skEA
En la Seccio´n 6.3.3 mostramos que la funcionalidad es correcta y que el esque-
ma cumple con la nocio´n de seguridad IND-CPA para cifrados de clave pu´blica.
Adema´s, hacemos una comparacio´n con el sistema de Liu, Ryan y Chen [181],
en el que mostramos que las mejoras en cuanto a funcionalidad que proporciona
nuestro sistema tienen un coste computacional algo mayor, aunque es importan-
te considerar la ganancia en costes de comunicaciones (una ronda frente a dos
rondas s´ıncronas).
A.7 Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Esta tesis se ha centrado, principalmente, en el estudio del recifrado delegado. La
motivacio´n inicial surge de la problema´tica de la comparticio´n segura de datos,
una funcionalidad especialmente relevante hoy en d´ıa, ya que es muy habitual
tener informacio´n almacenada en la nube. El recifrado delegado constituye una
elegante forma de mantener los datos cifrados en todo momento, permitiendo al
226
A.7. Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
proveedor de almacenamiento compartir la informacio´n sin necesidad de acceder
a los datos.
En esta tesis describimos diversos retos de investigacio´n asociados a los esquemas
de recifrado delegado, que surgen a distintos niveles de abstraccio´n, y contribui-
mos a la resolucio´n de algunos de ellos.
A nivel ma´s fundamental, era necesario contribuir a un mejor entendimiento de
este tipo de criptosistemas. Para ello, realizamos un ana´lisis exhaustivo de la
literatura cient´ıfica, tanto de los esquemas de recifrado delegado, como de sus
aplicaciones. Una contribucio´n clave de esta tesis es la identificacio´n de una fa-
milia parame´trica de modelos de ataque para el recifrado delegado, que considera
separadamente la capacidad de descifrar de la de recifrar. Esto nos permite defi-
nir, a su vez, una familia de nociones de seguridad, cuyas relaciones analizamos.
De especial intere´s es el estudio de las separaciones entre nociones, que explo-
tamos mediante el ana´lisis de una propiedad deseable en el recifrado delegado:
la privacidad de las claves de recifrado. Descubrimos que los esquemas que no
cumplen esta propiedad no pueden lograr una nocio´n de seguridad significativa,
y lo ilustramos al mostrar un ataque a un esquema reciente.
Una parte sustancial de esta tesis esta´ dedicada a la seguridad de los esquemas
de recifrado delegado. Aparte de la investigacio´n sobre modelos de ataque, que
se situ´a en el plano de los fundamentos del concepto de seguridad, destacamos
el estudio sobre transformaciones gene´ricas para incrementar la seguridad, ma´s
cercano a las construcciones concretas. A este respecto definimos una extensio´n de
la transformacio´n Fujisaki-Okamoto e identificamos las condiciones que permiten
aplicarla. La aplicacio´n de esta y otras transformaciones gene´ricas no es obvia, ya
que la funcionalidad de recifrado interfiere con los mecanismos de comprobacio´n
de validez que son inherentes a estas transformaciones. Como prueba de ello,
mostramos hasta 12 esquemas de recifrado delegado que son incorrectos a causa
de esta problema´tica.
Otra contribucio´n de esta tesis es NTRUReEncrypt, un esquema de recifrado de-
legado altamente eficiente, basado en el criptosistema NTRU. El desempen˜o de
este esquema es altamente superior a otros esquemas propuestos, hasta por un
orden de magnitud. Asimismo, describimos una variante cuya seguridad puede
reducirse a problemas intratables sobre ret´ıculos.
Finalmente, un principio que ha guiado esta tesis desde el principio es el enlace
de la teor´ıa con el mundo real. A este respecto, hemos procurado que las apli-
caciones no quedaran definidas a un nivel abstracto, si no que que se integraran
con sistemas y tecnolog´ıas del mundo real, en la medida de lo posible. Este es
el caso tanto de la aplicacio´n de gestio´n de identidad a ciegas, que integramos
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con el esta´ndar de gestio´n de identidad SAML 2.0, como de la aplicacio´n de Big
Data, que implementamos en el sistema Apache Hadoop. Proponemos tambie´n
un criptosistema con descifrado en depo´sito, una solucio´n te´cnica que se enmarca
en el debate actual acerca de la dicotomı´a entre la privacidad individual y la
seguridad de la sociedad.
Como trabajo futuro, hay diversas l´ıneas de actuacio´n con problema´ticas intere-
santes. Por ejemplo, no descartamos que el estudio de relaciones entre los modelos
de ataque y nociones de seguridad puede ampliarse con nuevas implicaciones y
separaciones. En relacio´n con los esquemas basados en NTRU, hay diversas a´reas
de trabajo futuro. Las ma´s importantes son conseguir seguridad CCA y definir
un esquema unidireccional. La primera cuestio´n fue lo que motivo´ inicialmente
el trabajo en transformaciones gene´ricas, aunque finalmente no pudo beneficiarse
de ellas. La segunda cuestio´n se trata de forma preliminar en la Seccio´n 5.1.6 y
requiere trabajo adicional.
Respecto a la contribucio´n sobre transformaciones gene´ricas, una l´ınea futura de
trabajo consiste en estimar cuantitativamente el nivel de seguridad obtenido, de
forma que se puedan inferir conjuntos de para´metros concretos. Aparte de esto,
un problema ambicioso es desarrollar transformaciones gene´ricas en el modelo
esta´ndar.
Finalmente, tambie´n hay posibles mejoras en el a´mbito de las aplicaciones pro-
puestas. Algunas de estas mejoras son puramente te´cnicas: por ejemplo, el modelo
BlindIdM podr´ıa refinarse mediante la integracio´n de especificaciones como SCIM
(System for Cross-domain Identity Management) [193], un esta´ndar abierto di-
sen˜ado para simplificar la gestio´n de identidad en servicios y aplicaciones del
cloud y facilitar el intercambio de informacio´n de identidad. En el caso de la apli-
cacio´n de Big Data, hay mucho potencial si la solucio´n se integra con HDFS, el
sistema de ficheros nativo de Hadoop. Respecto al criptosistema con descifrado
delegado, ser´ıa conveniente lograr que el esquema consiguiera seguridad CCA,
as´ı como reducir la confianza necesaria en la entidad de certificacio´n.
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